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BEALL V BEALL - THE EFFECT OF ONE SPOUSE'S
DEATH ON AN OFFER TO SELL PROPERTY HELD
AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES
Addressing an issue of first impression in Beall v. Beall,' the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, with two judges dissenting,2 concluded that an
offer to sell property held in tenancy by the entireties lapses on the
death of one of the tenants.3 In the majority's view, continuance of an
offer requires the continuing assent of the offeror.4 Death destroys the
offer by destroying the offeror's capacity to assent.5 The court reasoned
that a valid offer of tenants by the entireties requires the continuing
assent of both tenants and that the death of one causes their offer to
lapse.6
The absolute rule which the court enunciated may be unnecessa-
rily rigid, and it is not clearly mandated either by the doctrine of lapse
at the death of an offeror or by the nature of the tenancy by the entire-
ties. A more useful analysis would ask whether the parties to a joint
offer intended their contract formation to depend on the survival of
both offerors.
I. THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In 1975, Calvin BeaU and his wife Cecelia offered to sell their
property, which they held as tenants by the entireties, to Calvin's sec-
ond cousin, Carlton Beall. In May of 1978, nine months after Calvin's
death, Carlton notified Cecelia that he was accepting the offer.8 When
she refused to convey the property for the agreed price,9 Carlton sued
1. 291 Md. 224, 226, 434 A.2d 1015, 1017 (1981). The court found no case in point in
either the United States or Great Britain. Id. at 226 n.1, 434 A.2d at 1017 n.l.
2. Judge Smith was joined in dissent by Judge Digges. Id. at 236, 240, 434 A.2d at
1022, 1024 (Smith, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 235, 434 A.2d at 1022.
4. Id. at 235, 434 A.2d at 1021.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 232, 434 A.2d at 1020. The offer purported to be a second extension of an
option contract the parties had first executed in 1968. Id. at 226-27, 434 A.2d at 1017. The
1975 offer was an addendum to the 1971 extension of the option contract which stated in
full: "As of October 6, 1975, we, Calvin F. Beall and Cecelia M. Beall, agree to continue this
option agreement three more years - February 1, 1976 to February 1, 1979." Both Calvin
and Cecelia signed the addendum. Id. at 227, 434 A.2d at 1017.
8. Id. at 227, 434 A.2d at 1017. Calvin died in August 1977. Joint Record Extract at E-
56, BeaU v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 434 A.2d 1015 (1981).
9. 291 Md. at 227, 434 A.2d at 1017. Although she considered the agreed price of
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for specific performance.'"
The parties disagreed over what effect ownership by the entireties
should have on the owners' joint offer. Cecelia argued that a single
unit - the tenants by the entireties - made an offer, both of which
ceased to exist upon Calvin's death." Because Calvin's death termi-
nated the marriage and hence the tenancy, Cecelia argued that the gen-
eral rule that the offeror's death caused the offer to lapse should
apply. 12 Carlton, on the other hand, contended that Calvin and Cece-
lia had made the offer as individuals, each of whom owned an entire
interest in the property and possessed an unrestricted power to re-
voke.' 3 Although Calvin's death may have revoked his offer, it neither
revoked Cecelia's offer nor inhibited her capacity to convey the
property.' 4
The court agreed with Cecelia that the offer had lapsed, but ad-
vanced a formulation of the tenancy's legal effect on the offer which
differed from both Cecelia's and Carlton's views. The court first rea-
soned that because the continuance of an offer depends on the offeror's
continued assent,' 5 death revokes the offer by destroying the offeror's
ability to assent. 6 Because tenants by the entireties must act together
$28,000 to be too low, Cecelia indicated her willingness to consider a higher one. Joint
Record Extract at E-15, E-16.
10. 291 Md. at 227, 434 A.2d at 1017. The trial court dismissed Carlton's suit, finding
that the extension of the option was unenforceable as a contract for lack of consideration.
Id. On appeal the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded for determi-
nation of whether a valid, unrevoked offer existed and whether Carlton made a proper ac-
ceptance. Beall v. Beall, 45 Md. App. 489, 494, 413 A.2d 1365, 1368 (1980). Before factual
findings could be made on those questions, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari to consider whether an enforceable contract existed and, if not, whether Calvin and
Cecelia's offer survived Calvin's death. 291 Md. at 227, 434 A.2d at 1017.
The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the 1975 extension lacked any recita-
tion of consideration, it did not fulfill the requirements of the statute of frauds. See 291 Md.
at 229, 434 A.2d at 1018. The court further found that Carlton's forbearance of exercise of
his legal rights during the remainder of the enforceable 1971 option would not support spe-
cific performance, because it was not unequivocably related to the 1975 agreement. Id. at
232, 434 A.2d at 1020.
11. Brief of Appellant at 22-23, Beall.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Brief of Appellee at 24, Beall.
14. Id. at 25.
15. 291 Md. at 235, 434 A.2d at 1021.
16. Id. at 233, 434 A.2d at 1020. Among other authority, the court cites RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 48 (1932). But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 comment
a (1981):
The offeror's death terminates the power (of acceptance] of the offeree without notice to
him. This rule seems to be a relic of the obsolete view that a contract requires a "meet-
ing of minds," and it is out of harmony with the modem doctrine that a manifestation
of assent is effective without regard to actual mental assent.. . . In the absence of
legislation, the rule remains in effect.
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to alienate the entireties property, the court found that they necessarily
act as a "team" in making "but a single offer to convey."' 7 Continu-
ance of the offer requires the continued assent of both members of the
"team."'" The death of one tenant revokes the offer by destroying the
continued assent of the "team."' 9 The court asserted that the practical
consideration underlying the "team" concept made it preferable to
Cecelia's "unity" concept, which was based on a metaphysical notion
of the tenancy as the offeror.2 °
The court buttressed its reasoning and result with equitable con-
siderations.2' The death of one spouse often works major changes in
the financial and legal circumstances of the survivor. A couple may
make an offer appropriate to their needs that would be completely un-
suited to the surviving spouse's circumstances. 22
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Smith, joined by Judge Digges,
noted the scholarly criticism of the logic and utility of the general rule
that an offeror's death terminates an offer.23 Judge Smith further noted
that critics have attacked the entire concept of tenancy by the entireties
as anachronistic.24 Wherethe surviving spouse was a party to the offer,
and entire title vested in her by operation of law, he would have bound
the survivor to her own unrevoked offer.25
II. ANALYSIS
The outcome in Beall produces an unfortunate rule that promotes
efficiency and certainty, but may unnecessarily disappoint the legiti-
mate expectations of contracting parties by its arbitrariness and inflexi-
bility. A better approach would apply existing contract doctrine
regardless of the nature of the underlying estate. Discussion of this
proposed approach is more profitably undertaken after analysis of the
rationales supporting the court's rule: (1) the contract doctrine of lapse
upon the offeror's death, (2) the property concept of tenancy by the
entireties, and (3) equitable relief for changed circumstances.
17. 291 Md. at 234, 434 A.2d at 1021.
18. Id. at 235, 434 A.2d at 1021.
19. Id. *
20. Id. at 234-35 n.2, 434 A.2d at 1021 n.2. The court felt that Cecelia's concept of
"oneness" would produce anomalous results in situations where divorce destroyed the mari-
tal unity, this implying that divorce will not trigger automatic revocation of the offer. See id.
21. Id. at 236, 434 A.2d at 1022.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 237-38, 434 A.2d at 1022-23 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 A. CoaBIN,
CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 54 (1963)).
24. Id. at 239-40, 434 A.2d at 1023-24 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (A. Casner ed. 1952)).
25. Id. at 238, 434 A.2d at 1023 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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A. Lapse of Offer on Death of Offeror
The lapse-on-death rule has its origins in cases where the offeree
seeks to enforce the offer against a sole offeror's estate.26 The rule has
been criticized for its arbitrariness in that context,27 and it is especially
inappropriate in Beall where two persons participated in the offer, and
the offeree sought enforcement not against the deceased offeror's estate,
but against the surviving offeror. The court should have analyzed the
offer as analogous to a joint offer and concluded that the offer survived
Calvin's death.
1. Sole offeror - The rule originated with the notion that con-
tract formation requires mutual agreement between the parties at a sin-
gle moment.2" The court in Beall reasoned that an offer continues by
its constant repetition by the offeror, which ceases at death.29 After the
death of a sole offeror, no mutual agreement at the moment of accept-
ance is possible.30
Most courts no longer adhere to this metaphysical "meeting of the
minds" requirement. Rather, contract formation depends on the par-
ties' objective manifestations of mutual assent, not on their subjective
states of mind.3' An offeree's acceptance thus creates a contract if she
26. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 23; Ferson, Does the Death ofan Offeror Nullify his Offer?, 10 MINN.
L. REV. 373, 380-81 (1926); Oliphant, The Duration and Termination ofan Offer, 18 MIcH. L.
REv. 201, 209-10 (1920); Wagner, Some Problems of Revocation and Termination of Offers,
38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138, 152-55 (1962); Note, Termination of Offers Contemplating Unilat-
eral Contracts by Death, or Bankruptcy of the Offeror, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 295-96 (1924).
28. Oliphant, supra note 27, at 210. The origin of the "meeting of the minds" concept
has been traced to Sergeant Pollard's faulty etymology of the word "agreement" in the 16th
century case of Reniger v. Fogossa, 75 Eng. Rep. I (Ex. 1551). The phrase first assumed
legal consequences in Cooke v. Oxley, 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790). Farnsworth, "Mean-
ing" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943-45 (1967).
29. 291 Md. at 235, 434 A.2d at 1021 (quoting Pratt v. Trustees of Baptist Soc'y, 93 IU.
475, 478-79 (1879)).
30. Id. at 233, 434 A.2d at 1020.
31. To support its requirement of continuous assent in Beall, the Court of Appeals cited
a nineteenth-century decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 291 Md. at 235, 434 A.2d at
1021 (citing Pratt v. Trustees of Baptist Soc'y, 93 I1. 475 (1879)). The court ignored its own
recent precedents that discuss objective manifestation and assent. See, e.g., Klein v. Weiss,
284 Md. 36, 63, 395 A.2d 126, 141 (1978): "One of the essential elements for formation of a
contract is a manifestation of agreement or mutual assent...; in other words, to establish a
contract the minds of the parties must be in agreement as to its terms."
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 comment c (1979). One
judge has noted the effect that the law gives to objective acts by saying:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or individual, intent
of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain
acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and represent a known
intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used
19831
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properly dispatches it before receiving the offeror's attempted revoca-
tion, even though the offeror earlier had decided to revoke.3 2 In such
cases, the offeree has acted reasonably in reliance on the offeror's objec-
tive manifestation of assent without knowledge of the change in the
offeror's state of mind. The law presumes continuing assent from the
initial objective expression unless the offeror properly manifests
revocation.3
2. Joint offerors - One might try to bridge the gap between the
old "meeting of the minds" theory and today's objective focus by argu-
ing that death is itself an objective manifestation of revocation. Such a
rule would protect successors of a sole offeror who were without knowl-
edge of the original offer. In a joint offer, however, the surviving of-
feror has knowledge of the offer and remains free to revoke the offer or
to perform if it is accepted.
In Beall, death terminated not only Calvin's ability to assent as a
co-offeror, but all his interest in the property and the offer. Carlton
predicated his acceptance on Cecelia's continued objective manifesta-
tion of assent.34 Although Cecelia may have had mental reservations
concerning the written agreement that constituted the offer,3 she un-
questionably signed it.36 Carlton tendered acceptance to Cecelia,3 7
who had not altered her objective manifestation of assent during the
months between Calvin's death and Carlton's acceptance.38
the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon
them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else
of the sort.
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (L. Hand, J.). But see
Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring)
(critical analysis of the excesses of the "objectivist" theory of contracts, particularly in the
context of employees' releases of personal-injury claims against their employers).
32. United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'dper
curiam, 253 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1958); Falconer v. Mazess, 403 Pa. 165, 170, 168 A.2d 558, 560
(1961); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1981).
33. Oliver v. Wyatt, 418 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ky. 1967); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 42 (1981).
34. Carlton's notice of acceptance focused on Cecelia's assent to the offer, rather than
Calvin's. See Joint Record Extract at E-8, E-9. In his complaint, he named Cecelia as
defendant solely in her individual capacity. Id. at E-3.
35. See Joint Record Extract at E-63.
36. 291 Md. at 226-27, 434 A.2d at 1017. She signed it on three separate occasions. See
supra note 7.
37. Id. at 227, 434 A.2d at 1017.
38. Cecelia contended, however, that she had withdrawn the offer before Carlton effec-
tively accepted it. She argued that the wording of Carlton's attempted acceptance referred
only to the 1971 agreement and that Carlton thus failed effectively to express acceptance of
the 1975 agreement by failing to refer to it explicitly. Her refusal to sell for the agreed price,
[VOL. 42
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Lapse of an offer on the offeror's death has been defended on the
ground that the offeree's expectation was qualified by an implied con-
dition that the offer would lapse on death. In this view, each party
intended to contract with the other - not with the other's estate.39
That argument, however, is inapplicable where, as in Beall, the surviv-
ing offeree seeks enforcement against the surviving offeror. Where the
offeree is willing to receive performance from the remaining offeror,
and performance in accord with the offer's terms is possible, the offer
should not invariably lapse.'
Further, Beall did not present a question of forcing any party to
contract with an unintended party. As Judge Smith correctly noted in
his dissent, Cecelia was a party to the offer.4' Being vested with entire
title, she was able to convey the property according to the terms of the
offer. Each party would have received the performance for which she
or he had bargained from a party with whom she or he had dealt. Even
if a condition were implied that Carlton expected performance from
both Ceceia and Calvin, he plainly was willing to settle for purchasing
the property from Cecelia alone. An implied condition that the offeror
will be able to oversee the performance of the contract42 similarly
would not require the lapse of the offer in Beall. As the surviving of-
feror, Cecelia was capable of supervising Carlton's performance.
Although the Court of Appeals' majority correctly noted that other
courts have held that an offer lapses immediately upon the death of the
offeror,43 the decisions cited by the court all concern a single offeror."
she maintained, revoked the offer before it was effectively accepted. Brief of Appellant at
14-15.
39. Parks, Indirect Revocation and Termination by Death of Offers [sic], 19 MICH. L. REv.
152, 160 (1920).
40. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Of course, impossibility will excuse the
performance of an otherwise binding contract. For example, if the contract calls for per-
sonal performance by the promisor, her death excuses performance. Kowal v. Sportswear
By Revere, Inc., 351 Mass. 541, 544, 222 N.E.2d 778, 780-81 (1967).
41. 291 Md. at 238, 434 A.2d at 1023 (Smith, J., dissenting).
42. Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138, 140-41 (4th Cir. 1936), rev'don other grounds, 300
U.S. 31 (1937); see Parks, The Effect of an Offeror's Death Upon His Outstanding Offer, 23
MICH. L. REV. 475, 475-76 (1925).
43. 291 Md. at 233, 434 A.2d at 1020.
44. Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1936) (individual surety on bank's
depository bond of funds deposited by bankruptcy trustees did not enter into contract bind-
ing on his estate where first deposit of such funds was made after his death) rev'd on other
grounds, 300 U.S. 31 (1937); Shaw v. King, 63 Cal. App. 18, 24, 218 P. 50, 52 (1923) (unilat-
eral offer by brother to maintain sister revoked by brother's death before sister's acceptance,
despite sister's lack of notice of brother's death); Pratt v. Trustees of Baptist Soc'y, 93 Ill.
475, 478 (1879) (promissory notes, given to enable church to buy a bell, revoked by prom-
isor's death before trustees undertook to procure bell or to collect notes); New Headley To-
bacco Warehouse Co. v. Gentry's Ex'r, 307 Ky. 857, 862, 212 S.W.2d 325, 327 (1948)
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Beall, however, presented a joint offer, and neither case law nor com-
mentary has addressed the general question whether a joint offer sur-
vives the death of one offeror. Because an offer is an inchoate
obligation, the law of joint obligations provides a useful analogy.
Except in promises to render personal services, a5 if one of two joint
obligors dies, the survivor continues to be bound by the contract.46 If
Cecelia and Calvin had contracted, rather than offered, to sell the prop-
erty, Cecelia would have been obligated to carry out the promised con-
veyance despite Calvin's subsequent death.47  Each joint offeror
undertakes the full obligation and the full risk of nonperformance
upon the offeree's acceptance. Of course, an offer is not an obligation;
it merely empowers the offeree to create an obligation by acceptance.48
An offeror generally may revoke an offer at will. 49 In the analogy to
joint obligations law, however, survival of the offer leaves the surviving
offeror in exactly the same position as before her co-offeror's death -
(lessor's offer to extend lease if lessee would build within five years was revoked by lessor's
death before term for acceptance expired and before lessee accepted); Jordan v. Dobbins,
122 Mass. 168, 171 (1877) (decedent's guaranty under seal revoked by his death although
guarantee had no knowledge of death); Tucker v. Rucker, 221 Miss. 580, 588, 73 So. 2d 269,
272 (1954) (decedent's written offer to extend tenant's lease, unsupported by consideration,
was revoked by offeror's death before tenant accepted); Wallace v. Townsend, 43 Ohio St.
537, 3 N.E. 601, 604 (1885) (individual's conditional written offer to subscribe to railroad's
stock was revoked by offeror's death before railroad accepted subscription); Helfenstein's
Estate, 77 Pa. 328, 18 Am. Rep. 449, 451 (1875) (decedent's written promise to make a dona-
tion did not bind estate where donee accepted after promisor's death); National Eagle Bank
v. Hunt, 16 R.I. 148, 153, 13 A. 115, 117 (1888) (guarantor's death revoked guaranty, under
seal, by its terms continuing until guarantor gave notice of termination).
In Ritchie v. Rawlings, 106 Kan. 118, 186 P. 1033 (1920), noted in Beall v. BeaU, 291
Md. at 234-35 n.2, 434 A.2d at 1021 n.2, the proposed division of a decedent's estate could
not take effect unless all the heirs agreed to it. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that no
binding contract arose where one heir failed to sign the agreement before the death of the
decedent's husband. The facts of the case indicate that the agreement proposed by the hus-
band was designed to give him full title to the homestead instead of a life estate. Id. at 119,
186 P. at 1033. Although the Kansas court held that acceptance of an offer must be commu-
nicated during the life of all the parties, the case actually involved the death of a sole offeror.
Id. at 120, 186 P. at 1034.
45. Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 91 N.E. 683, 694 (1910) (joint contract requiring
personal services of all the joint contractors for its performance is terminated by death of
one).
46. Id. In Maryland, the common-law rule making the surviving obligor solely liable
has been modified by statute so that the executors and heirs of a deceased joint obligor are
obligated as well. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 1 (1979). See 291 Md. at 227-28, 434 A.2d at
1017-18.
47. Burka v. Patrick, 34 Md. App. 181, 187, 366 A.2d 1070, 1074 (1976).
48. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE
L.J. 169, 171 (1917).
49. Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 85 (1890).
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capable of revoking her offer. Hence, preserving the offer does not
transform it into an obligation.
Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight5 offers a useful analogy to the sit-
uation in Beall. In Columbian Carbon a husband, acting alone, exe-
cuted a lease of property he and his wife owned as tenants by the
entireties.51 After a divorce, the wife leased the property to another
party.5 2 Observing that in Maryland neither tenant by the entireties
alone can make a valid lease of entireties property because each is enti-
tled to the whole estate by reason of their legal unity, the Court of
Appeals held that the husband's lease was invalid during the mar-
riage.53 The court went on to observe, however, that the husband's
lease could have taken effect by operation of law when the divorce con-
verted the tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common.5 4 In
Columbian Carbon the tenancy by the entireties made the husband's
lease invalid at its inception, but the tenancy did not prevent the lease
from becoming valid under a theory of estoppel upon termination of the
tenancy. Cecelia Beall's offer was valid when made; a fortiori, termina-
tion of the tenancy by the entireties should not have invalidated it.
B. Tenancy by the Entireties
As the second rationale for its holding in Beall, the Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the nature of the tenancy by the entireties required
application of the doctrine of lapse. Examination of the tenancy's de-
velopment, however, shows that the purposes that supported its feudal
development no longer exist and the purposes that it serves in modem
society do not require lapse of an offer where both tenants knowingly
participated in making the offer.
The tenancy by the entireties served distinct functions in feudal
society. First, feudal society strongly preferred joint tenancies over
other forms of concurrent ownership. Survivorship under joint tenan-
cies avoided division of tenures, which weakened the feudal structure. 55
Second, the tenancy by the entireties developed as an adjunct to
the general devolution of property under male control.56 The control
of land carried with it the concomitant duty of service to the king,57
50. 207 Md. 203, 114 A.2d 28 (1955).
51. Id. at 204-05, 114 A.2d at 29.
52. Id. at 205, 114 A.2d at 29.
53. Id. at 209, 114 A.2d at 31.
54. Id. at 210, 114 A.2d at 31-32.
55. H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 190 (abr. 3d ed. 1970).
56. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24 (1951).
57. Duffly, The Effect of the State Equal Rights Amendment on Tenancy by the Entirety,
64 MASs. L. REv. 205, 206 (1979) (discussing the feudil development of the tenancy).
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and men rendered those services. Under the common law, a married
woman's identity merged into that of her husband. During marriage
the wife could not make a valid conveyance, execute an enforceable
contract, nor could she sue or be sued without the joinder of her hus-
band.59 The tenancy by the entireties converted the sole ownership of
property owned by a married woman before her marriage or acquired
during marriage into concurrent ownership with her husband. Because
the husband dominated the marital unit, he controlled the property and
thus incurred the concomitant feudal duties.6 °
The tenancy by the entireties, while preserving the male-domi-
nated feudal society, also gave the wife the protection of a survivorship
interest in the entireties property. Although the husband could convey
the entireties property to a third party during his life, he could not
alienate the wife's right of survivorship without her assent. A convey-
ance of entireties property in which she did not join was defeasible in
her favor if she survived her husband.61
Changes in society and societal attitudes have altered the original
purposes for the tenancy by the entireties. Reflecting those changes,
statutes and case law have altered the legal significance of the tenancy.
Virtually universal enactment of Married Women's Acts in the United
States during the nineteenth century62 gave married women the right to
acquire, hold, use, and convey property as though they were
unmarried.63
In Maryland, the tenancy by the entireties continues to exist, but
the Married Women's Acts have equalized the tenants' rights and pow-
ers regarding the property. In Marburg v. Co/e,' the Maryland Court
of Appeals held that the Married Women's Property Act allows a mar-
ried woman to acquire and to hold property, but does not affect the
58. Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curricu-
lum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1045-46 (1972).
59. D. STEWART, HUSBAND AND WIFE §§ 357, 394, 431 (1885).
60. King v. Green, 30 N.J. 395, 397, 153 A.2d 49, 52-53 (1959); Duffly, supra note 57, at
207; Phipps, supra note 56, at 25.
61. Duffly, supra note 57, at 206-07; Phipps, supra note 56, at 26-27; Starling, The Ten-
ancy by the Entireties in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 111, 133 (1961).
62. Phipps, supra note 56, at 27.
63. Any property that a woman had owned before marriage or that she acquired sepa-
rately during marriage she thereafter owned in her own right, rather than concurrently with
her husband. She could effectively convey it without her husband's joinder in the convey-
ance. Having no interest in that property, the husband could not convey it. See Johnston,
supra note 58, at 1070-79 (general discussion of Married Women's Act). In Maryland, the
provisions of the Married Women's Property Act are now codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
45, §§ 1-5 (1982). The Married Women's Acts also gave married women the right to con-
tract, to sue, and to be sued separately from their husbands. See, e.g., id. § 5.
64. 49 Md. 402 (1878).
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nature of an estate conveyed to her and her husband jointly.65 As at
common law, any conveyance to a husband and wife that does not ex-
pressly designate some other tenancy creates a tenancy by the entire-
ties.' 6 The Married Women's statute abrogates the husband's sole
control of the property, so that neither spouse can dispose of any part
of the property without the assent of the other.67
The tenancy by the entireties in Maryland thus prevents alienation
of any interest in the property without the consent of both tenants68
and vests each tenant with an indefeasible right of survivorship in the
property.69 During the tenants' joint lives, an attempted conveyance by
either of them alone is ineffective.70 On the death of one, the entire title
immediately vests in the survivor by operation of law.7' In sum, the
tenancy today serves to protect an unknowing spouse against possible
alienation of the entireties property by the other spouse during their
joint lives.72
The Beall decision gives the tenancy by the entireties more effect
65. d. at 412-13. For a discussion of the Maryland Married Women's Property Act, see
supra note 63.
66. Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 572-73, 48 A. 1060, 1062 (1901) (adopting per
curiam the opinion of trial court).
67. McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 390, 37 A. 214, 214 (1897). Richart v. Roper,
156 Fla. 822, 824, 25 So. 2d 80, 81 (1946). See Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 495-96, 160 A.
163, 165 (1932) (Digges, J.); id. at 489-99, 161 A. 510, 511 (1932) (Parke, J., dissenting)
(discussing statutory effect).
68. Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 496, 160 A. 163, 165 (1932) (Digges, J.); id. at 498-99,
161 A. 510, 511 (Parke, J., dissenting) (there can be no valid lease of property held by hus-
band and wife as tenants by the entireties except by their joint act). q. King v. Green, 30
N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49, 60 (1959) (life interest and survivorship interest of each tenant by the
entireties are alienable).
69. See Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402, 412 (1878).
70. Ades v. Caplin, 132 Md. 66, 69, 103 A. 94, 95 (1918) (sub nom. Ades v. Caplan).
71. Marburg, 49 Md. at 412.
72. See Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md. App. 230, 236, 388 A.2d 934, 938 (1978) (entireties
property is subject to attachment only for debts incurred by tenants jointly); In re Ford, 3
Bankr. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (under Maryland law, where only one spouse filed
petition in bankruptcy, debtor may exempt his or her interest in entireties property from
bankruptcy estate).
The Court of Appeals has highlighted the limited protection offered by the tenancy
in Grauel v. Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 43 A.2d 201 (1945). In that case a purchaser sought specific
performance of a contract for sale of entireties property in the husband's name alone. Id. at
123, 43 A.2d at 202. The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' argument that the con-
tract was unenforceable because of the tenancy by the entireties. Id. at 126, 43 A.2d at 204.
Finding that the wife had knowledge of the contract, the court held that her failure to repu-
diate the agreement ratified the transaction under agency principles. Although the hus-
band's action had been unauthorized, the wife's subsequent ratification through knowledge
was the equivalent to original authority. Id. at 126-27, 43 A.2d at 204 (quoting Kvedera v.
Mondravitsky, 145 Md. 260, 264, 125 A. 591, 593 (1924)). The wife was bound by the con-
tract even though she had not participated directly in its making. Id. at 127, 43 A.2d at 204.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
at the moment of its disappearance than it has during the joint lives of
the tenants. During the joint lives of Calvin and Cecelia, Cecelia could
be bound to an offer only by her own consent. She could have with-
drawn her consent at any time before acceptance of the offer and
thereby have revoked the offer. Actions showing her consent would
have been sufficient to bind her to any contract that Calvin signed.73
At all times, Cecelia was entitled to possess the entire property,7 4 and
she participated in and signed the offer of sale. After Calvin's death,
Cecelia's control of the property immediately became absolute. Under
such circumstances, the tenancy by the entireties alone does not justify
automatic withdrawal of the surviving tenant's consent and lapse of the
offer.
C. Change of Circumstances
The court in Beall noted the change in circumstances that often
results from the death of one's spouse.7" The surviving spouse takes on
legal and financial responsibility for joint obligations incurred during
the marriage. Family responsibilities devolve on the surviving spouse
alone. Moreover, entireties property, which is not subject to the indi-
vidual debts of either spouse,76 is immediately available to creditors of
the survivor.7 7 As a result of those changes, enforcement of an offer
made during the lives of both spouses may be a significant hardship to
the surviving spouse.
Courts have exercised some discretion in relieving parties from
specific performance of a "harsh or oppressive" contract due to events
subsequent to the contract,7" but they do not necessarily relieve parties
of all responsibility under the contract.79 In granting such relief courts
do not allow parties to escape bad bargains or circumstances that were
foreseeable when the contract was formed." In alluding to this equita-
ble doctrine as an alternate ground for the decision in Beall, the court
73. See Grauel v. Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 126, 43 A.2d 201, 204 (1945); supra note 72.
74. McCubbin v. Stanford, 85 Md. 378, 390, 37 A. 214, 214 (1897); Marburg v. Cole, 49
Md. 402, 411 (1878).
75. 291 Md. at 236, 434 A.2d at 1022. Co-ownership by two people who are not married
is less likely to entail family or similar responsibilities. The death of one such co-owner is
less likely to change the survivor's circumstances significantly with respect to the property.
76. Watterson v. Edgerly, 40 Md. App. 230, 236, 388 A.2d 934, 938 (1978).
77. Arnold, Tenancy by the Entireties and Creditors [sic] Rights in Maryland, 9 MD. L.
REv. 291, 297-98 (1948) (if judgment creditor of one spouse only has judgment outstanding
when other spouse dies, creditor can get execution on entireties property immediately).
78. Duane Sales, Inc. v. Carmel, 57 A.D.2d 1003, 1003, 394 N.Y.S.2d 307, 308 (1977).
See generally 6 A. CORBN, CORBIN ON CONRACTS § 1162 (1960).
79. CORBIN, supra note 78, § 1164.
80. Id.
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was sensitive to the plight of surviving spouses, but it did not discuss
how the circumstances of the case demonstrated a significant hardship
to Cecelia.8 Because circumstances may change on the death of one
spouse, parties should be held to contemplate such foreseeable oc-
curances as death. Although some contracts may implicitly contem-
plate survival of the parties as essential to performance, Beall does not
present such a case. 2 Calvin's survival was not essential to perform-
ance. 83 The changed circumstances doctrine thus appears inappropri-
ate in Beall.
III. A BETTER APPROACH
The rigidity of the Beall rule and the harsh surprise that it presents
for unwary offerees might have been avoided if the court had applied
well-established contract principles concerning implied conditions. Al-
though these concepts would not have allowed Cecelia to escape her
offer, they would have provided a fairer approach in future cases.
Contract law recognizes several types of conditions that may im-
pose duties on parties beyond the literal or express language of their
contract." In the view now generally adopted, implied conditions are
products of the interpretation of the parties' agreement, 5 derived from
the actual expressions of the parties and the actions surrounding the
literal agreement.86 In this sense, the parties impliedly assented to such
conditions."'
81. 291 Md. at 236, 434 A.2d at 1022.
82. At trial, the parties focused largely on the issue of consideration. The record does
suggest, however, that the parties may have been aware of problems with Calvin's health.
See Joint Record Extract at E-100.
83. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 comment c (1981); 3A A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 631 (1960); 5 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 668 (3d
ed. 1961).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 comment a (1981).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226 comment c (1981); 3 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562 (1960); 5 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 669 (3d
ed. 1961).
87. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562 (1960); 5 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW
OF CONTACTS § 668 (3d ed. 1961).
By contrast, courts create "constructive conditions" (sometimes called conditions
"implied-in-law") from the requirements of justice, although the parties may have had no
intentions concerning them. See supra note 84; 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 632
(1960); 5 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 669 (3d ed. 1961); Corbin, Conditions in
the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 743-44 (1919); Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 455, 466 (1897).
In this manner, the constructive condition of simultaneous exchange has been added
to simple land contracts. Where A promises to pay B for Blackacre, and B promises to
convey Blackacre to 4, but the contract says nothing of the time of exchange, courts now
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The participation of both joint offerors may be so central to the
contract as to constitute an implied condition of the contemplated con-
tract.88 In defending against an action for specific performance, a sur-
viving joint offeror should be allowed to show that all parties, including
the offeree, understood the existence of such an implied condition. 9
The burden of coming forward with evidence to show the implied
condition should be on the defending offeror, because the offeror could
have revoked the offer before acceptance. In this way, a "team" con-
cept would not impose an undue burden on the offeree and could be
dealt with by trial courts as a question of fact like that of the existence
of any other defense to an action for specific performance.
Implied conditions come from interpretation of the contract and
must follow logic and the limits of factual inference.' On the existing
record in Beall,9 the offer itself 2 does not raise an inference that sur-
vival of both offerors was essential to the contract. The attendant facts
that the offerors were spouses and tenants by the entireties raise con-
flicting inferences. The marital relationship and joint ownership indi-
cate the involvement of a "team" in the offer, but the survivorship
characteristics of the tenancy by the entireties make the "team" unnec-
essary for performance. Beyond these objective facts, the record
hold such exchange must be simultaneous. See 3A A. CORtBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS,
§ 663 (1960).
In Beall, the operation of constructive conditions might mean that Cecelia did not
have to convey the land until Carlton tendered the purchase price. Calvin's death, however,
did not require the creation of a new term to fulfill the inchoate obligation. Cf. Lishner v.
Bleich, 319 Mass. 350, 65 N.E.2d 693 (1946). (The court dismissed a suit for recovery of a
deposit from the defendant who had contracted to sell land tided in his wife's name. The
plaintiff contended that simultaneous exchange would not be possible because the defendant
lacked the power to convey tide. The court held such exchange possible because the defend-
ant could acquire tide by time of settlement.).
Although it might seem that a constructive condition of lapse on death of a co-
offeror could be applied in Beall, the doctrine of constructive conditions does not support
such an application. Although judicially established for justice, constructive conditions are
not broad equitable remedies, but rather outgrowths of the contract itself. In the view of the
Restatement, constructive conditions arise when the parties have neglected a term "essential
to a determination of their rights and duties .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 226 comment c (1981). But see 5 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 669
(3d ed. 1961) (implying a more flexible approach).
88. See Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc., 259 F.2d 137, 139-40
(2d Cir. 1958) (condition precedent is act or event which must exist or occur before duty of
performance arises), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959).
89. See Glenn R. Sewel Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde, 70 Cal. 2d 666, 676-77 n.13, 451
P.2d 721, 728 n.13, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889, 896 n.13 (1969).
90. See 3 A. CORaIN, CoRnN oN CONTRACTS § 562 (1960).
91. The record focuses largely on whether Carlton had given consideration for the
agreement, rather than interpretation of the agreement's terms. See supra note 10.
92. See supra note 7.
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reveals largely confficting arguments about the parties intentions and
little support for finding a mutual understanding that death would re-
voke the offer.
93
The inability to find an implied condition in Beall should not frus-
trate the application of such a condition in an appropriate case. For
example, where tenants in common offer to convey the entire property,
the inference would be clear that all of the offerors are necessary to the
contemplated contract." An approach which finds lapse only on deter-
mination of an implied condition would deal more fairly with the justi-
fiable expectations of both the joint offerors and the offeree.
IV. CONCLUSION
The narrow rule enunciated in Beall is unnecessarily rigid and
raises questions for practitioners in the future. For spouses offering to
sell their tenancy by entireties property, the Beall decision now affords
the protection of revocation without any express language in the offer.
Offerees and offerors who wish the offer to survive the death of one co-
offeror must consider specific language to achieve this result. The opin-
ion in Beall indicates that a binding option contract would provide the
most certain method of achieving this result.9" Unclear from the opin-
ion, however, is whether the parties can overcome the automatic lapse
of an offer by express language in the offer. Parties desiring survival of
the offer after the death of a co-offeror may wish to consider not only
express language about survival, but also an unequivocal expression of
separate, continuing assent to the offer by both offerors.
93. For example, at trial Cecelia testified that she had signed the agreements to sell the
property only because Calvin wanted to sell. Joint Record Extract at E-63. One must bear
in mind, however, that the 1975 offer was the third time Cecelia had signed such an agree-
ment, because the 1971 option contract to which the offer was appended was itself a re-
execution of an original three-year option contract executed in 1968. 291 Md. at 226, 434
A.2d at 1017.
94. Each tenant in common has a distinct estate in the property. Neither, therefore, has
any power over the other's share. See In re Estate of Horn, 102 Cal. App. 2d 635, 228 P.2d
99 (1951).
95. 291 Md. at 227-28, 434 A.2d at 1017-18.
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JOHNSON v. STATE-DIMINISHED CAPACITY REJECTED AS
A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
In Johnson v. State,' a divided Maryland Court of Appeals de-
clined to accept as a criminal defense a defendant's "diminished capac-
ity" - evidence tending to show that the defendant did not possess the
mens rea element for a specific intent crime.2 By holding that recogni-
tion of the diminished capacity defense is an "essentially legislative
prerogative,' 3 the court underestimated its own authority to fashion
common-law defenses to criminal charges. In addition, the court failed
to distinguish between the diminished capacity defense, which simply
negates one element of the crime, and the diminished reponsibility de-
fense, which reduces a guilty defendant's reponsibility for the act.4 An
evaluation of the diminished capacity defense on its merits indicates
that it should have been adopted by the Court of Appeals.
I. THE JOHNSON DECISION
In Johnson, the defendant joined two other men who had stolen a
car and abducted its owner. While driving around in the stolen car, the
men smoked parsley flakes treated with PCP. Johnson and one of the
other men raped the abducted woman, and then Johnson fatally shot
her.5 Johnson was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death.6 The case went directly to the Court of Appeals under the auto-
matic review provision of the Maryland death penalty statute.7 The
court affirmed the murder conviction, but vacated the death sentence
and remanded for further consideration of the punishment to be given.8
Johnson contended on appeal that his murder conviction should
1. 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
2. The term "criminal capacity" refers to the ability to form the mental intent required
to commit the crime. A person who lacks criminal capacity cannot be held criminally re-
sponsible because he is not guilty of the criminal offense. The term "criminal responsibil-
ity," on the other hand, refers to a guilty offender's liability for committing the crime. Lack
of criminal responsibility can be established by a showing of insanity. R. PERKINS, PERKINS
ON CRIMINAL LAW 857-58 (2d ed. 1969).
3. 292 Md. at 427-28, 439 A.2d at 555.
4. For a discussion of the diminished responsibility defense, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 44-47.
5. 292 Md. at 409, 439 A.2d at 545-46.
6. Id. at 408, 439 A.2d at 545. Johnson also was convicted of first degree rape, kidnap-
ping, and use of a handgun.
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414 (1982).
8. 292 Md. at 440-41, 439 A.2d at 561-62. The court's holding on this point rested on
the jury's failure to consider as a mitigating factor Johnson's lack of a prior record of violent
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be reversed because the trial court erred in not admitting psychological
evidence to show that he lacked sufficient mental capacity to form the
requisite intent to commit murder in the first degree.9 The defense had
called as a witness a clinical psychologist who had examined Johnson
and had compiled a psychological report." The trial court allowed the
psychologist to read to the jury only those parts of his report that re-
lated to Johnson's performance on intelligence tests - indicating an
I.Q. of 72 - and his conclusion that Johnson is a severely deprived
individual with a negative orientation and a severe authority problem.
The court excluded the portion of the report which stated that the de-
fendant showed signs of bizarre thinking, had a tenuous hold on real-
ity, and perceived the world as a cold, inhospitable place in which he
crime as required by the death penalty statute. The court also affirmed the sentences John-
son received for the other offenses. Id. at 408, 439 A.2d at 545.
9. Id. at 417, 439 A.2d at 549.
Johnson raised several other matters on appeal, including the contention that he was
not afforded adequate assistance of counsel at trial. Id. at 434, 439 A.2d at 558. Johnson's
argument on this point convinced all three dissenting judges. Id. at 444, 439 A.2d at 564
(Eldridge, J., dissenting); id. at 456, 439 A.2d at 570 (Cole, J., dissenting). At trial, defense
counsel tried to offer evidence of Johnson's diminished capacity based on his drug usage and
submissive personality. Because of procedural blunders, however, these possible grounds
were never fully explored.
The possibility existed that Johnson's mental capacity was impaired as a result of
drug use. The state psychiatrists' report concluded that he had a history of drug abuse. Id.
at 410, 439 A.2d at 546. Johnson himself testified at trial that he had used a variety of drugs,
id. at 468, 439 A.2d at 576 (Cole, J., dissenting), and that he had smoked parsley flakes
treated with PCP while riding in the victim's car. Id. at 409, 431-32, 439 A.2d at 545, 557.
The extent of the defendant's drug problem is difficult to gauge because the defense failed to
secure any expert testimony regarding the effects of PCP. Id. at 471, 439 A.2d at 578 (Cole,
J., dissenting).
Defense counsel also attempted to show that Johnson was particularly susceptible to
the overbearing influence of Mayers, one of Johnson's two companions on the night of the
murder. Id. at 466, 471, 439 A.2d at 575, 578 (Cole, J., dissenting). Certainly Johnson's
circumstances - he was only 19, he was Mayers' cousin, and he was living in Mayers' house
- could increase the likelihood that he could be controlled by Mayers. Id. at 417, 409, 468,
439 A.2d at 550, 545, 576. Johnson's testimony indicated that Mayers was the ringleader of
the trio. Johnson testified that it was Mayers who drove the stolen car, suggested raping the
woman, took the woman's coat and purse, decided the woman must be killed, provided the
gun, and ordered one of the other men to do the shooting. Id. at 409, 469, 439 A.2d at 545,
577. Nevertheless, evidence of Johnson's pliable nature was poorly presented at trial. The
only references to Johnson's submissiveness came from counsel's statements and appellant's
own testimony, with no independent evidence to support the theory. Brief for Appellant at
59, Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
10. The psychologist had examined Johnson as part of a psychiatric evaluation ordered
by the trial court when Johnson entered an insanity plea. 292 Md. at 417, 439 A.2d at 549-
50. Johnson withdrew his insanity plea when psychiatrists from the state Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene concluded that he was not insane and the trial court refused to
appoint a private psychiatrist at state expense to assist with his defense. Id. at 410-14, 439
A.2d at 546-48.
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had no opportunity." Johnson argued that the entire report should
have been presented to the jury because it was relevant to his defense of
diminished capacity.' 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals characterized the diminished ca-
pacity defense as the admission of any evidence relevant to the exist-
ence of the defendant's specific intent in order to negate that intent
when the defendant is charged with a specific intent crime. The court
observed that the purpose of the defense is to show that a lesser degree
of the offense, not requiring specific intent, was committed, and that the
diminished capacity defense is to be applied only after the defendant
11. The psychologist's full report is reprinted below. The portions that he was permitted







The patient is a 19-year old youth of medium height and build who presented a
neat and clean appearance. He was extremely sullen and hostile, and his cooperation
for interview and test was poor. In view of this test results have to be considered
tentative.
Test Results:
On the WAIS he earned a Verbal L Q. of 78, a Performance L Q. of 68, and a Full
Scale I. Q. of 72 which places him within the borderline range of intelligence. His poten-
tial, as gauged by his abstract reasoning, is at least within the low average range. Intel-
lectual efficiency is decreased by a combination of educational deprivation and
negativism. There are some signs which point in the direction of bizarre thinking and a
tenuous hold on reality. E.G. [sic] on Card 22 of the Holtzman he saw "the devil," and
on Card 27 he saw "God over water." But these should be interpreted with caution, as
they may also be attempts to embarrass and express contempt for the examiner by giv-
ing nonsensical answers.
The personality picture is that of an extremely deprived individual who does
not expect any affection and emotional support from either parental figure. He per-
ceives the mother figure as domineering, but distant and devoid of warmth and under-
standing and the father figure as hostile and threatening. Yet he has conjured up the
image of an idealized, all wise and all loving father surrogate with whom he will com-
pare any male elder. Since such a person is bound to fall short of his ideal he is apt to
equate this person with the real father figure whom he sees in negative terms and reject
him. As a result he not only has trouble with authority figures, but perceives the world
about him as a cold inhospitable place where he does not have a chance.
Conclusion:
The patient functions at the borderline intellectual level (I Q. 72), but his potential
is at least within the low average range. He can be described as a severely deprived individ-
ual with a hostile and negative orientation and an /sicl severe authority problem. Contact
with reality is difficult to evaluate on account of his poor productivity resulting from
extreme negativism.
Id. at 417-18 n.6, 439 A.2d at 550 n.6.
12. Id. at 417-18, 439 A.2d at 550.
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has been found to be sane and therefore accountable for his actions. 13
The court then reviewed prior Maryland cases, citing Spencer v.
State,1" Armstead v. State,'5 and Allen v. State,'6 to show that the de-
fense previously had been rejected in Maryland. 7 The court stated
that these decisions demonstrate that "the criminal law as an instru-
ment of social control cannot allow a legally sane defendant's lesser
disabilities to be part of the guilt determining calculus. '"'8
Despite its evaluation of the diminished capacity defense and its
review of judicial precedents, the court based its holding on legislative
pre-emption. The court found that "because the legislature, reflecting
community morals has, by its definition of criminal insanity, already
determined which states of mental disorder ought to relieve one from
criminal responsibility, this court is without authority to impose our
views in this regard even if they differed."' 9 Describing the diminished
13. Id. at 419, 439 A.2d at 551.
14. 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888). In Spencer, Maryland adopted the McNaughten test
for insanity, which holds that a defendant is accountable for his actions if "at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, he had capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to
distinguish between right and wrong, and understand the nature and consequences of his act
. .292 Md. at 421, 439 A.2d at 552 (quoting Spencer, 69 Md. at 37, 13 A. at 813).
The Spencer court refused to accept Spencer's testimony that his nervousness ren-
dered him incapable of forming the premeditation required to constitute first degree murder
because this evidence failed to establish his insanity under the McNaughten standard. 69
Md. at 43, 13 A. at 814-15. Thus, Spencer rejected a defense based on a diminished capacity
theory.
15. 227 Md. 73, 175 A.2d 24 (1961).
16. 230 Md. 533, 188 A.2d 159 (1963). The Johnson court failed to point out thatArm-
stead and Allen did not analyze the diminished capacity defense and therefore do not fur-
nish a strong rationale for rejecting diminished capacity in Johnson. Even if Armstead and
Allen were more strongly reasoned, the Court of Appeals could well have decided to
reevaluate them. They date from 1961 and 1963, respectively, before numerous jurisdictions
accepted the diminished capacity defense. Eg., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 140, 126 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1964);
State v. Nichols, 3 Ohio App. 2d 182,209 N.E.2d 750 (1965); People v. Lynch, 47 Mich. App.
8, 208 N.W.2d 656 (1973); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 212-13, 360 A.2d 914,
915 (1976).
17. The defense has been addressed, although only in the most perfunctory manner, in a
few other Maryland cases. In Simmons v. State, 292 Md. 478, 439 A.2d 581 (1982), decided
on the same day as Johnson, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's dimin-
ished capacity defense, stating only that it had "fully expressed" its views with respect to
diminished capacity in Johnson. 292 Md. at 479, 439 A.2d at 582.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals seemed somewhat receptive to the dimin-
ished capacity defense in Pfeiffer v. State, 44 Md. App. 49, 407 A.2d 354 (1979). The Court
of Special Appeals suggested that the Court of Appeals might be willing to reconsider the
defense because "a majority of jurisdictions [now] admit psychiatric opinions as evidence
that the defendant did not have the required specific intent ...... 44 Md. App. at 57 n.4,
407 A.2d 358 n.4. As Johnson attests, the Court of Special Appeals' prediction was wrong.
18. 292 Md. at 421, 439 A.2d at 552.
19. Id. at 425-26, 439 A.2d at 554.
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capacity defense as "'a fundamental change in the common law theory
of [criminal] responsibility,' "20 the court stated that the General As-
sembly has the "prerogative to make the delicate judgments upon
which changes in the limits of criminal responsibility are based."'"
In a dissent joined by Judges Cole and Davidson,22 Judge Eldridge
argued that diminished capacity is not really an independent defense at
all, but simply an opportunity for the defendant "to present evidence in
his own behalf."2 He stated that before Johnson, whenever a particu-
lar mental state was an element of the crime with which the defendant
was charged, "the Court has consistently held that evidence of the de-
fendant's mental capability is admissible to show the absence of that
element, and thus the absence of criminal conduct. ' 24 Judge Eldridge
concluded that the majority's refusal to admit evidence going to the
defendant's ability to form the requisite intent "represents an abrupt
departure from prior Maryland law."'25 He cited decisions26 that stated
that a first degree murder conviction must be supported by a finding
that the defendant had a "'[s]pecific purpose and design to kill.' "27
Reasoning that such a specific purpose and design "certainly involve a
defendant's mental state,"2 Judge Eldridge argued that evidence of the
defendant's capacity to form the requisite mental state should be ad-
mitted because a defendant's capacity to commit the crime should be
established before his criminal responsibility is considered.29
20. Id. at 420, 439 A.2d at 551 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476
(1946)).
21. Id. at 426, 439 A.2d at 555.
22. Id. at 456, 439 A.2d at 570.
23. Id. at 455, 439 A.2d at 569 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 449, 439 A.2d at 566 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 446, 439 A.2d at 565 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
26. Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 387, 330 A.2d 176, 178 (1974); Faulcon v. State, 211
Md. 249, 257, 126 A.2d 858, 862 (1956).
27. 292 Md. at 447, 439 A.2d at 565 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (quoting Faulcon).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 448, 439 A.2d at 566. Judge Eldridge interpreted the prior Maryland cases as
rejecting not a diminished capacity defense but a diminished responsibility defense, largely
because they used the term "diminished responsibility" rather than the term "diminished
capacity." Allen actually does seem to involve a diminished responsibility rather than a
diminished capacity defense. The court there noted that the defendant's "epilepsy played no
primary role in the affair" and thus presumably did not affect his capacity. 230 Md. at 534,
188 A.2d at 160. Because the Allen court did not make its reasoning explicit, however, it is
risky to assume, as Judge Eldridge did, that the court was consciously distinguishing dimin-
ished capacity from diminished responsiblity.
Armstead, however, used the terms interchangeably. The Armstead court para-
phrased the defendant's "diminished responsibility" argument as meaning that "when a stat-
ute . . . requires deliberate premeditation in order to constitute murder in the first degree
• ..the question of whether the accused is in such condition of mind as to be incapable of
deliberate premeditation necessarily becomes a material subject of consideration." 227 Md.
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE RATIONALE
The court's holding that the legislature had pre-empted the area of
criminal responsibility rested primarily on inferences drawn from legis-
lative inaction. The court noted that in 1967 the General Assembly
replaced the Spencer-McNaughten insanity test3° with a broader
formula patterned after the Model Penal Code,3 ' and made further
changes in the insanity test in 1970.32 The court concluded that "[b]y
thus defining and redefining the limits of criminal culpability as ex-
pressed in the definition of legal insanity, the General Assembly has
exercised its unique prerogative to balance the interests of the commu-
nity and the individual accused."' 33 The court also observed that the
legislature had deleted mental retardation from the definition of mental
disorder, but later redefined mental disorder to again include mental
retardation.34 The court interpreted these adjustments as an indication
of the General Assembly's intent to excuse from criminal accountabil-
ity only those mentally deficient persons whose deficiencies meet the
insanity test.35
The court regarded the legislature's silence concerning persons
whose mental deficiencies do not meet the insanity test as an indication
of the legislature's policy preference to ignore any form of mental defi-
at 76, 175 A.2d at 26. The court here was describing the defendant's diminished capacity
argument as one of diminished responsibility.
30. See supra note 14.
31. The General Assembly based the new insanity test on the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01 comment 3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See State v. Conn, 286 Md. 406, 417, 408
A.2d 700, 705 (1979).
32. 292 Md. at 424, 439 A.2d at 552. At the time Johnson was decided, the Maryland
insanity test provided:
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct and shall be found insane
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime if, at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disorder, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminal-
ity of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(a) (1979). Additionally, by that same enactment, mental disor-
der was expressly defined in section 3(f) as "mental illness or mental retardation or any
other form of behavioral or emotional illness resulting from any psychiatric or neurological
disorder." That test has since been changed. It now reads:
A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that con-
duct, the defendant, because of mental retardation or a mental disorder, lacks substan-
tial capacity:
(1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or
(2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of law.
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-107 (1982).
33. 292 Md. at 424-25, 439 A.2d at 553-54.
34. Id. at 426-27, 439 A.2d at 555. See supra note 32. The term "mental retardation,"
however, is not defined. See Revisor's Note to MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-101(f)
(1982).
35. 292 Md. at 427, 439 A.2d at 555.
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ciency short of insanity when determining criminal responsibility, rea-
soning that if the legislature had wished to adopt a diminished capacity
defense, it would have provided for one when it modified the insanity
defense. The court also concluded that adoption of the broad Model
Penal Code test rendered a diminished capacity defense unnecessary.
The court stated: "the arguable need for a doctrine such as diminished
capacity to ameliorate. . . the McNaughten rule has been eliminated
to the extent that the legislature has deemed it advisable to do so."36
In addition to the doubtful validity of the court's reliance on legis-
lative silence as an indication of legislative intent,37 several other diffi-
culties in the court's reasoning weaken its conclusion. First, the court's
legislative deference rationale is predicated on the faulty notion that
the insanity and diminished capacity defenses are equivalent. The in-
sanity defense focuses on the defendant's responsibility for his criminal
act and involves a policy decision not to punish him for that act. The
diminished capacity defense, on the other hand, does not measure the
defendant's criminal responsibility, but his criminal capacity to commit
a specific intent crime.38 The diminished capacity defense does not ex-
cuse the defendant from punishment, but punishes him only for the
36. Id. at 426, 439 A.2d at 554-55.
California cases have stated explicitly that the diminished capacity defense is an
attempt to mitigate the extreme all-or-nothing position of the McNaughten test. E.g., People
v. Drew, 22 Cal.3d 333, 343-44, 583 P.2d 1318, 1323, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280-81 (1978);
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 490, 386 P.2d 677, 682, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 82 (1963). See
also Held, Diminished Capacity in California: A Diminished Future or Capacity for Change?,
8 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 203, 210-11 (1980).
One of the major criticisms levied against the McNaughten test is its failure to take
into account the defendant's ability to control himself. Instead, the McNaughten test con-
siders only whether the defendant knew that what he was doing was wrong. Many authori-
ties have expressed concern that an offender who kills someone under the influence of an
insane delusion could be convicted of murder under the McNaughten test for insanity. See,
e.g., United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961); Bethea v. United States, 365
A.2d 64, 80 (Ct. App. D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Free-
man, 357 F.2d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1966); Held, supra, at 207.
The Model Penal Code test, however, takes account both of volitional factors (the
defendant's ability to control himself) as well as of cognitive factors (the defendant's ability
to know that what he was doing was wrong). MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment 3 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).
37. Legislative inaction can be traced to numerous reasons other than legislative disap-
proval. For example, the legislators may be completely disinterested in the issue, they may
consider it politically expedient not to take any present action on the matter, or they may be
undecided. The legislators may even be leaving the matter for judicial resolution. Because
the legislature has discretion in selecting the topics on which it legislates, little weight should
be given to its failure to legislate. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1395-96 (Tent. ed. 1958). See also
Abraham, 4dopting Comparative Negligence.- Some Thoughts For the Late Reformer, 41 MD.
L. REv. 300, 303-06 (1982).
38. See supra note 2.
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general intent crime that he was capable of committing.39 Because in-
sanity and diminished capacity are separate defenses, the court should
not have assumed that legislative attention to the insanity defense sig-
nalled consideration and rejection of the diminished capacity defense.
Second, the court's decision to defer to the legislature was based
on the mistaken assumption that adoption of the diminished capacity
defense requires a "delicate" legislative judgment in the area of crimi-
nal "responsibility." But, as the next section demonstrates, the dimin-
ished capacity defense does not involve criminal responsibility at all;
rather, it is an offer of proof designed to show that the defendant did
not commit the crime with which he was charged. Thus, the Court of
Appeals' power to adopt the diminished capacity defense is as broad as
its power to adopt any other common-law defense to a criminal charge.
Because Maryland is a common-law crime state," its willingness to
rely on the common law not only to fill the gaps left by statutes but also
to define criminal acts shows that judge-made law actually has a large
impact on the criminal law. If the Maryland Court of Appeals can
define the very crimes for which defendants can be prosecuted, surely it
has the power to adopt defenses to criminal charges.4"
39. Held, supra note 36, at 208-10. In Maryland, if an individual is found not guilty of a
crime by reason of insanity, the individual is committed to the state Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene for an examination to determine whether the individual is mentally
retarded or has a mental disorder, and whether, if he were released, the individual would be
a danger to himself or to another person or another person's property. MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 12-110 (1982). In jurisdictions that recognize the diminished capacity defense,
however, a successful assertion of the defense usually results in a conviction for a lower
grade offense with no provision for psychiatric treatment. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence In
Criminal Cases For Purposes Other Titan The Defense Of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1051, 1055 (1975).
40. See Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277, 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964); Reddick v. State,
219 Md. 95, 98, 148 A.2d 384, 386 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959); Ward v. State, 9
Md. App. 583, 585-87, 267 A.2d 255, 257 (1970).
41. Defining crimes by common law raises problems because it does not afford the pub-
lic fair warning of what conduct constitutes a criminal offense. R. PERKiNS, supra note 2, at
26-27; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(l)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Defining defenses
by common law, however, raises no such problem because they involve no sanction of which
a prospective defendant needs to be apprised. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 37, at 1231-
41. Many jurisidictions have adopted the diminished capacity defense judicially. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d
330, 343-49, 202 P.2d 53, 61-65 (1948), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836 (1949); Becksted v. People,
133 Colo. 72, 82, 292 P.2d 189, 194 (1956); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 140, 126 N.W.2d
285, 289 (1964); Washington v. State, 165 Neb. 275, 280-81, 85 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1957); State
v. Padilla, 66 N. Mex. 289, 292-96, 347 P.2d 312, 314-17 (1959); Commonwealth v. Walzack,
468 Pa. 210, 212-13, 360 A.2d 914, 915 (1976).
The Johnson court made no attempt to explain the willingness of these other courts
to adopt the diminished capacity defense, merely noting that some jurisdictions have recog-
nized diminished capacity "by judicial fiat." 292 Md. at 419 n.7, 439 A.2d at 551 n.7.
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The court's narrow view of its authority precluded it from basing
its decision to adopt or to reject the diminished capacity defense on its
merits. Nevertheless, the court's comments on the defense's merits in-
dicate that the court would have rejected it in any event. The court's
disapproval resulted from its mischaracterization of the diminished ca-
pacity defense as an issue of criminal responsibility.
III. THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE
A. The Distinction Between the Diminished Capacity Defense and the
Diminished Responsibility Defense
The diminished capacity defense is based on a definitional ration-
ale: if a crime by definition requires a specific state of mind, then any
evidence, including psychiatric evidence, that is relevant to the defend-
ant's mental state is admissible to refute the existence of the specific
intent.42 Thus, the diminished capacity defense is not an affirmative
defense, enabling the defendant to escape all liability, but a negation of
one element of the state's case against the defendant. Indeed, the di-
minished capacity defense is actually more an evidentiary rule than a
criminal defense.43 The issue before the court in Johnson was not
whether to establish a new affirmative defense. Rather, the question
was the much narrower one of what evidence is admissible to negate
the mental element of a specific intent crime.
The diminished capacity defense sometimes is misapplied to admit
evidence that explains why the defendant entertained the specific intent
instead of demonstrating that the defendant did not have the requisite
intent. This broad application of the defense" exceeds the definitional
rationale because evidence of the defendant's disability is used to re-
duce the defendant's culpability for his offense and thereby reduce his
punishment.45 This ameliorative' approach is actually a diminished
responsibility defense47 because it involves a determination of the de-
42. Held, supra note 36, at 203-04.
43. Arenella, The Diminirhed Capacity and Diminihed Responsibility Defenses: Two Chil-
dren of4 Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 827, 833 (1977).
44. Id. at 830-31. Arenella refers to this version of the defense as the "broad diminished
capacity model" and the narrower version, discussed supra text accompanying notes 42-43,
as the "strict mens rea model." Arenella concedes, however, that his broad diminished ca-
pacity model is in essence the same as the diminished responsibility model.
45. Lewin, supra note 39, at 1056-57. Lewin categorizes the various defenses which ad-
dress the defendant's mental state as either "causative" or "ameliorative." An ameliorative
defense uses evidence of the defendant's psychological abnormality to reduce the penalty; a
causative defense connects the abnormality to an essential element of the crime.
46. See supra note 45.
47. The diminished responsibility defense, as used in the United Kingdom, reduces the
[VOL. 42
JOHNSON V. STATE
fendant's criminal responsibility when the issue of his criminal capacity
- whether he possessed the mental element of the crime with which he
was charged - is not present.
These distinctions are narrow and therefore the diminished capac-
ity and diminished responsibility defenses are frequently confused.
The Johnson court failed to distinguish them, as demonstrated by its
statement that "the concept of diminished capacity as a separate de-
fense involves 'a fundamental change in the common law theory of
[criminal] responsibility.' "48 Thus, most of the court's reasons for re-
jecting the diminished capacity defense were misplaced because those
reasons were directed at a diminished responsibility defense.
The diminished capacity defense is frequently faulted for its ten-
dency to evolve into the diminished responsibility defense. Critics
often cite California as an example,49 noting that its diminished capac-
ity defense was transformed into a diminished responsibility defense in
People v. Wolff,5 ° where the court shifted the question from whether
the defendant had the requisite intent to why he had it. Instead of
finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the court redefined
premeditation so that it focused on the manner in which the defendant
thought about the act, finding the defendant guilty of only second de-
gree murder because he had not premeditated as a normal person
would have done.5' In Wolff, then, California began to establish a sep-
arate standard of culpability for aberrant but sane defendants.52
The tendency of the diminished capacity defense to expand into
the diminished responsibility defense does not counsel rejection of the
diminished capacity defense, but rather a careful application of it.
Courts can prevent this expansion by admitting only evidence that es-
tablishes that the defendant did not entertain the mental state required
defendant's punishment by moving the offense into a separate category for mentally dis-
abled defendants. Because the removal of the defendant's offense into a separate category
depends on a determination by the jury that the defendant was less culpable than a normal
person who would commit the identical act, the diminished responsibility defense addresses
the issue of criminal responsibility. AreneUa, supra note 43, at 829, 849-53. The diminished
responsibility defense as such has not been adopted in the United States. Id. at 830.
This article uses the term "diminished responsibility defense" to signify the amelio-
rative approach under which evidence is used to explain the defendant's mental state rather
than to negate it.
48. 292 Md. at 420, 439 A.2d at 551 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476
(1946)).
49. See, e.g., Arenella, supra note 43, at 836-49; Lewin, supra note 39, at 1077-89.
50. 61 Cal.2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
51. Arenella, supra note 43, at 841-42; Lewin, supra note 39, at 1083-84.
52. The California courts' enthusiasm for the defense may have led to the defense's
undoing. The California legislature recently abolished the diminished capacity defense by
statute. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (West 1981 Cum. Supp.).
1983]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
for conviction of the crime charged. 3 Strict monitoring of the dimin-
ished capacity defense will keep it faithful to the definitional rationale
on which it is founded.
B. Due Process Requirements
Because the diminished capacity defense involves nothing more
than allowing the defendant to introduce evidence that negates one ele-
ment of the crime with which he was charged, it may be required by the
United States Constitution. In In re Winship the Supreme Court of
the United States held that "the Due Process Clause protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." 5 Similarly, in State v. Grady,56 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals recognized that "under the Federal Constitution, as well as the
law of Maryland, the burden is on the state to prove all elements of the
alleged crime and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt."57 If the crime
with which the defendant is charged is defined as requiring a specific
intent or state of mind, then the defendant's state of mind is an element
of the crime. Because the prosecution has the burden of proving be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite state of
mind, the defendant should be allowed to introduce evidence that re-
futes his capacity to have formed such an intent at the time of the al-
leged offense. 8 Thus, constitutional principles of due process seem to
require that the defendant be permitted to introduce evidence, by
means of the diminished capacity defense, which negates the state-of-
mind element of the state's case against him.
C. Analogy to the Intoxication Defense
Adoption of the diminished capacity defense can be supported by
analogy to the intoxication defense.5 9 As the Court of Appeals stated
in State v. Gover,6° the intoxication defense holds that "when a defend-
ant, charged with a crime requiring a specific intent, is so drunk that he
is unable to formulate that mens rea, [h]is intoxication will then excuse
53. Arenella, supra note 43, at 835.
54. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
55. Id. at 364.
56. 276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975).
57. Id. at 182, 345 A.2d at 438.
58. 292 Md. at 455, 439 A.2d at 569 (Eldridge, J., dissenting); State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J.
279, 294, 168 A.2d 401, 409, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961).
59. E.g., Spencer v. State, 69 Md. at 46-49, 13 A. at 816-18 (Bryan, J., dissenting);
Lewin, supra note 39, at 1092-93, 1104.
60. 267 Md. 602, 298 A.2d 378 (1973).
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his actions and serve as a defense."' 6' The intoxication defense's focus
on the defendant's capacity to form the requisite mens rea rests on the
same definitional rationale as the diminished capacity defense.
Yet in Johnson, the court in a footnote disposed of intoxication as
an analogy for adopting the diminished capacity defense, asserting:
facile comparison of the doctrine of diminished capacity with the
rule allowing certain evidence of a defendant's intoxication on the
issue of mens rea does not withstand scrutiny. The degree of in-
toxication necessary to negate mens rea is great and is comparable
with that degree of mental incapacity that will render a defendant
legally insane.62
This criticism is misplaced: the intoxication defense, unlike the in-
sanity defense, does not address the defendant's criminal respon-
sibilty.63 Instead, like the diminished capacity defense, the intoxication
defense simply negates the mental element of the offense. Therefore,
the analogy between the diminished capacity and intoxication defenses
does indeed withstand scrutiny, and the existence of the intoxication
defense supports the adoption of the diminished capacity defense.
Furthermore, adoption of the diminished capacity defense through
analogy to the intoxication defense can be supported on policy
grounds. Although intoxication generally is considered a socially unac-
ceptable condition, many conditions that give rise to assertions of di-
minished capacity, such as subnormal intelligence' or delusions, 65 are
not caused by the defendant's own actions. If evidence based on a so-
cially repugnant condition is admitted to negate the mental element of
an offense, it similarly should be admitted if based upon a condition
61. Id. at 606, 298 A.2d at 381.
While this article was going to print, the General Assembly amended the death pen-
alty statute to remove intoxication as a separately enumerated mitigating circumstance.
1983 Md. Laws, ch. 296. The amendment does not preclude consideration of the defend-
ant's intoxication, however, which still may be considered under Art. 27, § 413(g)(8) ("any
other facts"). Furthermore, ch. 296 concerns only sentencing in capital cases; it has no effect
on the general common-law defense of intoxication.
62. 292 Md. at 425 n.10, 439 A.2d at 554 n.10.
63. Gover misstated the rationale for the intoxication defense when it stated that the
defendant's intoxication excuses his actions. Instead, the evidence of intoxication negates
the defendant's capacity to formulate the required mens rea.
64. Eg., Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 30, 313 N.E.2d 875 (1974) (defendant had
I.Q. of 77); People v. Fields, 64 Mich. App. 166, 235 N.W.2d 95 (1975) (defendant had I.Q.
of 68 and a mental age of 10 or 11 years).
65. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal.3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978) (De-
fendant entered an apartment under a delusion that he owned it, and lived there until the
rightful owner returned, cooking the food in the kitchen and wearing the clothes from the
closet. The court held that psychiatric evidence of the defendant's delusions should have
been admitted at trial to show his diminished capacity.).
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over which the defendant has no control.6
D. Relevance of Psychiatric Evidence
One distinction between the intoxication defense and the dimin-
ished capacity defense is that under the latter, a defendant usually will
seek to prove that he lacked criminal capacity by offering psychiatric
evidence. Because the issue of whether to adopt the diminished capac-
ity defense ultimately reduces to the question of what evidence is ad-
missible to negate the mens rea element of a specific intent crime, the
materiality and probative value of psychiatric evidence becomes a cen-
tral concern.
The law and psychiatry approach human behavior from two very
different perspectives. The law analyzes the defendant's actions in
terms of causation; psychiatry examines his behavior in terms of his
overall character. By assuming that any given act can be ascribed to a
particular intent, the law singles out from the continuity of a human
life one act and so forestalls inquiry into the defendant's total personal-
ity development which culminated in the particular act.67 In this way,
the law concentrates on whether the defendant had the ability to form
the requisite specific intent to commit the crime, while psychiatry asks
why he committed the crime. Thus, the diminished capacity defense is
sometimes criticized for its assumption that psychiatric evidence is rele-
vant to the legal question of criminal capacity.
Those who favor the diminished capacity defense frame the issue
in terms of psychiatry's reliability rather than its relevance. Somewhat
typical is a comment made in Commonwealth v. Walzack,6" the deci-
sion in which Pennsylvania recognized the diminished capacity de-
fense. In Walzack, the court stated that "psychiatry has a legitimate
scientific basis. While recognizing that psychiatry might well be less
exact than some other medical disciplines we are nevertheless cogni-
zant of the 'tremendous advancements made in the field.' "69 The court
then observed that psychiatric evidence is accepted on other criminal
law issues, including the defendant's competency to stand trial and
insanity.70
Despite the differences between law and psychiatry, the law should
not ignore the guidance that psychiatry can offer. The discrepancies
66. Lewin, supra note 39, at 1092.
67. Silving, Psychoanalysis And The Criminal Law, 51 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 19, 24-25
(1960).
68. 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976).
69. Id. at 218-19, 360 A.2d at 918.
70. Id. at 219-20, 360 A.2d at 918-19.
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between the two disciplines can be handled through instructions to the
jury on the weight to be given to the expert's testimony; total exclusion
of the psychiatrist's testimony is an unnecessarily broad measure. 71 If
judges are careful to limit use of technical psychiatric evidence to an-
swering the legal question of whether the defendant possessed criminal
capacity, the diminished capacity defense will enhance the jury's ability
properly to evaluate the defendant's level of accountability. 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The Maryland Court of Appeals' rejection of the diminished ca-
pacity defense is unfortunate. The diminished capacity defense is sim-
ply an offer of proof by the defendant to negate the mental element of a
specific intent crime. As Judge Eldridge observed in his dissent: "Evi-
dence designed to show that a particular defendant was incapable of
having the requisite mental state is nothing more or less than evidence
designed to show that he did not commit the crime with which he was
charged.'73 This offer of proof is virtually identical to the intoxication
defense, which is well established in Maryland. Moreover, preventing
a defendant from negating one element of the state's case against him
may offend principles of due process.
Existing procedures would not change greatly if the court were to
adopt the diminished capacity defense, provided that the defense were
properly applied and not permitted to burgeon into the diminished re-
sponsibility defense. Courts often admit evidence of the defendant's
mental capacity short of insanity without acknowledging the practice as
a form of the diminished capacity defense.74 For example, some evi-
dence probative of the defendant's diminished capacity actually had
been admitted by the trial court in Johnson. The defendant testified
that he had used a variety of drugs in the past75 and that on the night of
the murder he had smoked parsley flakes treated with PCP. 76 In addi-
tion, a psychologist was allowed to testify as to the defendant's low
intelligence level.7 7 The willingness of the trial judge to admit this evi-
71. Lewin, supra note 39, at 1097.
72. In his dissent to Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 493 (1946), Justice Murphy
observed: "Precluding the consideration of mental deficiency only makes the jury's decision
on deliberation and premeditation less intelligent and trustworthy." See also Bethea v.
United States, 365 A.2d 64, 81 (Ct. App. D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977);
Arenella, supra note 43, at 850 n. 115.
73. 292 Md. at 447, 439 A.2d at 565-66 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. See also Arenella, supra note 43, at 833.
75. 292 Md. at 468, 439 A.2d at 576 (Cole, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 468, 439 A.2d at 576.
77. Id. at 417 n.6, 439 A.2d at 550 n.6.
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dence bolsters Judge Eldridge's contention that such evidence is, and
should be, regularly admitted.7
If the diminished capacity defense were recognized, the evidence
of the defendant's drug usage and low intelligence level would be ad-
mitted if it were linked to the defendant's incapacity to form the requi-
site mental state. In addition, the psychologist would be permitted to
testify as to the defendant's "bizarre thinking and tenuous hold on real-
ity"79 - testimony which was excluded by the Johnson trial court.8 0
Evidence that merely offered possible explanations for the defendant's
actions, such as his relationships with his parents,8 would be excluded
because admission of this evidence would convert the diminished ca-
pacity defense into a diminished responsibility defense. A successful
diminished capacity defense in the context of Johnson would reduce
the degree of the offense of which the defendant is convicted.
78. Why the trial judge admitted the evidence of the defendant's low I.Q. is not clear.
The defense attorney proffered the evidence "to go to the mitigation of First Degree Murder
and any specific crimes." The judge asked, "You're talking about intelligence?" The de-
fense attorney replied, "(i]ntelligence and the rest of it" and the trial judge ruled, "[w]ithin
that limits [sic] we will permit it." 292 Md. at 445 n.l, 439 A.2d at 564 n.1 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 417-18 n.6, 439 A.2d at 550 n.6.
80. Id. at 417-18, 439 A.2d at 549-50.
81. Id. at 417-18 n.6, 439 A.2d at 550 n.6.
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WILLIAMS V STATE - WAIVER: CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
In Williams v. State,' the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a
criminal defendant will waive his right to be present at the voir dire of
prospective jurors unless he or his attorney objects or asks that the de-
fendant be present.2 Although other constitutional rights may restrict
its application to other stages of the trial, Williams explicitly overrules
more than sixty years of Maryland case law which held that only the
defendant could waive his right to be present, and then only if he did so
expressly.' The new standard removes Maryland from the majority of
jurisdictions that require a defendant to expressly waive his right to be
present at voir dire,4 and needlessly jeopardizes the free exercise of a
I. 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981).
2. Id. at 219-20, 438 A.2d at 1309-10.
3. Id. at 214, 438 A.2d at 1307.
4. The Williams court stated that "many other courts" are in accord with Maryland's
new waiver rule, but the cases cited do not deal with the Williams situation in which an
attorney's inaction is viewed as validating the defendant's absence while the voir dire is in
progress. For instance, in Tatum v. United States, 330 A.2d 552 (D.C. 1974), although the
defendant was not present at the bench while his attorney exercised three peremptory chal-
lenges, he was present during the entire voir dire of his jury. See Robinson v. United States,
448 A.2d 853, 855 (D.C. 1982) (distinguishing Tatum). Similarly, People v. Carrell, 396
Mich. 408, 240 N.W.2d 722 (1976), and State v. Nevels, 192 Neb. 668, 223 N.W.2d 688
(1974) both involve a defendant's absence at an in-chambers hearing on the jury's impartial-
ity, not an absence at voir dire.
The other cases cited by the court also involve stages other than voir dire. The
Williams court cites State v. Blier, 113 Ariz. 501, 503, 557 P.2d 1058, 1060 (1976) (defend-
ant's right to be present at competency hearing can be waived by counsel); People v. Harris,
28 Cal.3d 935, 955, 623 P.2d 240, 250-51, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 690 (1981) (defendant's pres-
ence not necessary at hearing as to the admissibility of exhibits); and People v. Hudson, 46
Ill.2d 177, 194, 263 N.E.2d 473, 482-83 (1970) (right to be present cannot be waived by
counsel but defendant's presence not required at hearing to show cause why counsel should
not be held in contempt of court). Because of the unique nature of voir dire and the pur-
poses that it serves, cases involving waivers at other stages do not support waivers at voir
dire. See infra text accompanying notes 26-31.
Most courts require at least a personal and express waiver of a defendant's right to
be present at all stages of the trial. See, e.g., People v. Harvey, 95 111. App.3d 992, 998, 420
N.E.2d 645, 650 (1981); Childers v. State, 408 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Ind.App. 1980); State v.
McClure, 94 N.M. 440, 612 P.2d 232, 234 (1980). Cf. State v. Hanagan, 559 P.2d 1059, 1063-
65 (Alaska 1977) (Counsel can waive defendant's right to be present in a noncapital case
only if defendant: (1) gave counsel express authority in a knowing and intelligent manner;
or (2) was present at the time of the waiver, was clearly informed of his rights, and remained
silent; or (3) subsequently acquiesced in the proceedings in a knowing and intelligent man-
ner.).
Many courts require that the waiver, in addition to being express and personal, be
some combination of knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Tugday, 128
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criminal defendant's right to be present at every stage of his trial.
THE OPINION
Williams claimed that his right to be present was violated when,
during voir dire, the trial judge questioned several prospective jurors at
bench conferences while Williams remained seated at the trial table.
Neither Williams's attorney, who was present at the bench, nor Wil-
liams himself, who was unaware of his right to be present, objected or
asked that he be present.' Williams was convicted and received con-
secutive thirty- and ten-year sentences for second degree murder and
assault with intent to commit murder.
After the post-conviction court and the Court of Special Appeals
reviewed Williams's case,6 the Court of Appeals granted him a new
trial, finding that under Maryland's "personal and express" waiver
standard Williams's absence from the voir dire bench conferences vio-
lated his right to be present.7 The Williams opinion went on to an-
Ariz. 1, 2, 623 P.2d 360, 361 (1981) (knowing and voluntary); People v. Shelby, 108 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 7, 12, 166 Cal. Rptr. 707, 709 (1980) (knowing and intelligent); People v.
Flores, 78 A.D.2d 554, 555, 432 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (1980) (knowing and voluntary); State v.
Moore, 276 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1979) (knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); State v.
Eden, 256 S.E.2d 868, 871-73 (W. Va. 1979) (knowing and intelligent); State v. Green, 269
S.C. 657, 662, 239 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1977) (voluntary and knowing); State v. Grey, 256
N.W.2d 74, 76-77 (Minn. 1977) (knowing and voluntary).
Some courts maintain that the right cannot be waived at all in capital trials, but
attach less strict standards as the seriousness of the criminal charge decreases. See, e.g.,
State v. Montgomery, 33 N.C.App. 693, 696, 236 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1977) (right cannot be
waived in capital cases, can be waived only by defendant in other felony cases, and can be
waived by counsel in misdemeanor cases).
5. 292 Md. at 215, 438 A.2d at 1307-08.
6. After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Williams's convictions and sentences,
Williams v. State, No. 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. March 8, 1977), he petitioned for review
under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §§ 645A-J (1982 & 1982
Cum. Supp.). The post-conviction court found that Williams's absence from the bench con-
ferences violated his right to be present and granted a new trial. On appeal, the Court of
Special Appeals remanded the case to the post-conviction court, ordering the post-convic-
tion judge to consider whether Williams had waived his right to be present in light of Noble
v. State, 46 Md. App. 154, 416 A.2d 757 (1980), which held that the right to be present at
bench conferences can be waived by inaction. State v. Williams, No. 38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Aug. 11, 1978).
7. 292 Md. at 220, 438 A.2d at 1310. In granting Williams's petition for certiorari the
court rejected the state's argument that § 12-202 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Arti-
cle prevented the Court of Appeals from reviewing any case arising under the Post Convic-
tion Procedure Act. MD. ANN. CODE CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-202 (1980). Section 12-202
states in pertinent part: "A review by way of certiorari may not be granted by the Court of
Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or
granted: (1) Leave to prosecute an appeal in a post conviction proceeding . . . ." The
court held that this limitation only denied it jurisdiction to review the specific exercise of
discretion by the Court of Special Appeals in denying or granting leave to appeal and did
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nounce prospectively, however, that in subsequent cases the "inaction"
of counsel and defendant will be sufficient to waive the defendant's
right to be present at voir dire.' In reaching this conclusion the Wil-
liams court, following prior Maryland law, did not regard the right to
be present as constitutionally protected except, perhaps, to the extent
that due process requires the defendant's presence at all stages of the
trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.9
Although a minority position,' 0 the court's view of the nature of
not prohibit review of the Court of Special Appeals' decision on the merits. 292 Md. at 2 10-
!1, 438 A.2d at 1305.
8. 292 Md. at 219-20, 438 A.2d at 1310. The court cited Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705,
713, 404 A.2d 1073, 1077 (1979) for the rule that "particularly in criminal cases, changes in
the common law ordinarily should have only prospective effect when considerations of fair-
ness are present." 292 Md. at 217, 438 A.2d at 1309. But because the court reasoned that the
new waiver rule would not impair the fairness of criminal trials, it remains unclear why the
court did not apply the rule retrospectively. Courts often justify prospective overruling by
referring to the need to protect criminal defendants who relied on prior interpretations of
criminal statutes. See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 620-25 (tent. ed. 1958). Because the very point of the
defendant's appeal was that he had been unaware of the right, this rationale also seems
inapplicable to Williams.
9. 292 Md. at 211, 438 A.2d at 1306. The Williams court stated that a criminal defend-
ant's general right to be present at every stage of his trial is a common-law right, to some
extent protected by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and guar-
anteed by MD. R.P. 724. The court's view that due process provides only limited protection
for the right is supported by ample authority. The Supreme Court has stated that the pres-
ence of a defendant is a condition of due process only to the extent that a fair and just
hearing would be thwarted by his absence. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
107-08 (1933). See also Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 224, 421 A.2d 69, 74 (1980).
Presumably, because the court stated that the new waiver rule will not apply in cases
in which it would implicate the sixth amendment confrontation clause, the Williams court
does not regard the confrontation clause as protecting a criminal defendant's right to be
present at voir dire. 292 Md. at 219, 438 A.2d at 1309-10. Although the confrontation clause
does not expressly apply to stages such as voir dire in which no witnesses are involved, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly warned that the right to be present guaranteed by the con-
frontation clause extends to the empanelling of a criminal defendant's jury. See Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 454-55 (1911); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338-41 (1969);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1974).
Maryland's position that the Williams case presents no constitutional question might
draw some support from several older Supreme Court cases that took pains not to invoke the
Constitution when reversing judgments for violations of the right to be present. For exam-
ple, in Fillipon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81 (1919) (civil) and Shields v. United
States, 273 U.S. 583, 588-89 (1927) (criminal), the Supreme Court declined to characterize
the right to be present as one involving the Constitution and instead described it as a rule of
orderly conduct of a trial by jury. In light of the clear constitutional language in Diaz v.
United States, 223 U. S. at 454-55; Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. at 338; and Faretta v. Califor-
nia, 422 U.S. at 816, however, those older cases do not warrant a strong inference that the
right to be present at voir dire is anything less than a constitutional right.
10. Most courts and commentators view the right to be present at all stages of the trial,
including voir dire, as constitutionally protected. See, e.g., United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d
930, 933 (2d Cir. 1977) (accused has constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial
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the right and its waiver-by-inaction rule have support in constitutional
law. The Supreme Court opinions dealing with the right to be present
are susceptible of Maryland's interpretation." Moreover, even if the
Court were specifically to hold that the Constitution fully protects the
right, waiver standards for constitutional rights vary, depending in part
upon the nature of the right. 12 The Supreme Court has not regarded
the right to be present at every stage of the trial as one of those rights
that require a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. 3 Consequently, the
Williams court's waiver-by-inaction rule probably would withstand a
including the empanelling of his jury). See also 3A C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 721, at 5 (2d ed. 1982).
11. See cases cited in United States v. Allessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 137 n.8 (3rd Cir.
1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Because no witnesses are involved in jury empanel-
ling, the sixth amendment confrontation clause is inapplicable.).
12. "Fundamental" constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel, require a "know-
ing and intelligent" or "knowing and voluntary" standard for waiver. See Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Waiver of "lesser" constitutional rights, however, such as
those granted by the fourth amendment, need not meet the "knowing and intelligent" test, as
they are not an "adjunct to the ascertainment of truth." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 241-42 (1973) (quoting Tehan v. United States ex. rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416
(1966)). These rights may be constitutionally protected only in the sense that, if the waiver
standard is so arbitrary as to deny the defendant a fair opportunity to raise his claim, appli-
cation of that standard may itself violate due process. See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
88-90 (1955). To ascertain whether a defendant's "inaction" can waive his rights, then, one
must determine first whether the right is a constitutional right and, if so, whether it is one of
those few constitutional rights that require a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. If the right
does not require at least a "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard, the states may fashion
any waiver standard they choose, so long as the rule satisfies due process requirements. See
infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
The Williams court stated that where the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard
is inapplicable, case law or any pertinent statutes or rules govern the waiver standard. 292
Md. at 216, 438 A.2d at 1308. One possibly pertinent statute is section 645A(c) of the Post
Conviction Procedure Act, which defines "waiver" as that which occurs when a petitioner
could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, an allegation of error.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 645A (c) (1982). The Williams court reasoned, however, that
subsection (c), with its "intelligent and knowing" standard, is applicable only where the
waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), governs (i.e., where the right
involved is "fundamental"). A rule that might determine the applicable waiver standard is
MD. R.P. 724. It reads in pertinent part: "The defendant shall be present at every stage of
the trial, including the impaneling of the jury ...." Subsection (c) sets forth two instances
in which the defendant may waive his right to be present at all stages of his trial. First, when
he voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced, whether or not he has been
informed by the court of his right to remain during trial, or second, when he engages in
conduct to justify his being excluded from the courtroom. MD. R.P. 724(c). The Williams
court, however, did not view the rule as limiting the situations in which the right to be
present can be waived. The court simply found that the two instances set forth in Rule 724
(c) are not the only ones under which the right to be present can be waived. 292 Md. at 212,
438 A.2d at 1306.
13. The rights that require a "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard are the right to
counsel, right to trial by jury, rights lost through a guilty plea, right to fifth amendment self-
incrimination privilege, rights under the double jeopardy clause, right to appeal, and the
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constitutional challenge. '
4
Although the prospective Williams rule arguably satifies minimum
constitutional requirements, the court's justification for greatly diluting
a defendant's common-law protections does not withstand analysis. By
abandoning Maryland's "personal and express" standard in favor of a
"waiver-by-inaction" rule, the court has moved as far as possible from
the "knowing and intelligent" standard applied in many jurisdictions.
Although the court intends to use the new standard to identify "waiv-
ers," the rule will operate as a rule of procedural default, which is most
precisely defined as "the loss of a right through a failure by the accused
or his representative to assert a claim in a prescribed manner or at a
required time."' 5 Procedural defaults traditionally are applied to rela-
tively less important rights and justified on grounds unrelated to the
right, such as the efficiency of the judicial system.' 6 In determining the
validity of a procedural default, courts balance the importance of the
constitutional adequacy of trial counsel's representation. See Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132,
143-44, 150-51, 395 A.2d 464, 471, 474-75 (1977).
14. Several Supreme Court opinions suggest that the Court will not interfere, on due
process grounds, with a state's application of its waiver standard for the right to be present
unless the defendant can show that his absence may have frustrated the fairness of his trial.
The Court found, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1974), by analogizing to other trial
rights that the Constitution implicitly protects, that the sixth amendment implies a right to
self representation without the aid of counsel. The Court then noted that where the ac-
cused's absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings, the constitutional stature of
his right to be present at all stages of his trial is now recognized. That right, though not
literally expressed in the Constitution, is "essential to due process of law in a fair adversary
process." Id at 819 n.15. The Court applied the same concept to waivers in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Schneckloth suggests a test for determining when a waiver
must be an intelligent relinquishment of a known right. Only where the particular right is
an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth, the Supreme Court implied, should every reason-
able presumption be indulged against voluntary relinquishment. 412 U.S. at 242-43. The
Court, in finding that the "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard is inapplicable to waiv-
ers of fourth amendment rights, reasoned that "the Constitution requires that every effort be
made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not unknowingly relinquished the
basic protections that the Framers thought indispensable to a fair trial." Id. at 242. The
fourth amendment, however, "is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth." Id. There-
fore the Court reasoned, the Constitution does not require waivers of fourth amendment
rights to be knowing and intelligent. Id. at 246. Most defendants, like Williams, will be
unable to show that their absence frustrated the Court's search for truth: Williams did not
allege that he would have done anything differently were he at the bench during voir dire,
nor did he contend that his jury was not impartial. Brief for Appellee at 16, Williams v.
State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981). It therefore follows that a defendant's waiver of
his right to be present at that stage need not be "knowing and intelligent" to pass the
Schneckloth test.
15. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 475 (1978).
16. See id at 513-14.
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right against the extrinsic interest served. 7 Although the Williams
court appears to have engaged in just such a balancing process, its rea-
sons for giving so much weight to the extrinsic considerations are prob-
lematic and its diminution of the right's importance is also
questionable.
The Williams court reasoned that changed conditions - the ad-
vent of the absolute right to counsel and the increased complexity of
criminal trials - require the less rigorous waiver standard. 8 When the
court first adopted the "personal and express" standard, indigents had
no right to state-compensated counsel; now, of course, this right is well
established.' 9 According to the court, this development undercuts the
original policy reasons for the "personal and express" standard and
makes its imposition on the courts institutionally impractical. Because
all defendants can be represented by counsel if there is a danger of
incarceration, and because criminal trials have become too complex for
most defendants to understand, our system must proceed upon the as-
sumption that it is primarily counsel's function to assert or waive most
rights of the defendant. Unless a defendant speaks out, normally he
must be bound by his attorney's trial decisions, actions, or inactions;
otherwise, according to the court, "the system simply would not
work."2
Although the court does not explain why the system would grind
to a halt under the burden of the "personal and express" standard, its
reasoning can be deduced from dicta in an earlier decision and from
the state's brief to the Court of Appeals. In Curtis v. State2 the court
said that if a "knowing and intelligent" waiver standard were applied
to those rights that could be lost through procedural default, the results
would be chaotic: Defense attorneys would have to interrupt a trial
repeatedly and go through countless litanies with their clients.22 Simi-
larly, the state in its brief argued that, given the sheer number of proce-
17. See id; Westen, Away From Waiver. A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1254-55 (1977).
18. 292 Md. at 217-18, 438 A.2d at 1308-09.
19. Id. The Williams court said that it recognized indigents' right to state-provided
counsel under the sixth amendment, under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, and under Maryland Rule 723. The Court of Special Appeals has since noted that
from this language it appears that the Court of Appeals has tacitly overruled its earlier
decisions giving a narrow construction to Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and has now equated the state provision with its sixth amendment counterpart, requiring
the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. See Baldwin v. State, 51 Md.
App. 538, 556 n.14, 444 A.2d 1058, 1069 n.14 (1982).
20. 292 Md. at 217-18, 438 A.2d at 1308-09.
21. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).
22. Id. at 149, 395 A.2d at 474.
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dural rights afforded criminal defendants and the adversary nature of
the system, it is not the function of the trial courts to advise defendants
on each occasion that a procedural right may be exercised.2 3 In addi-
tion, the court may have considered the familiar argument that when
defendants must object at trial to assert a right or to preserve a point
for appeal, trial courts are accorded a greater opportunity to correct
their own errors, thus reducing the burden on the appellate courts and
furthering the state's interest in the finality of judgment.24 Unless the
accused makes an issue of his right to be present, in other words, the
courts at both the trial and appellate levels have enough to do without
worrying about enforcement of this right.
The court's conclusion is sound if one accepts its central premises:
(1) that the advent of the absolute right to counsel has largely vitiated
the importance of the right to be present at voir dire so that the latter
right is no longer any more important than other rights that can be lost
through procedural default; (2) that the continued application of the
"personal and express" waiver standard would put an intolerable bur-
den on the judicial system; and (3) that a less strict waiver standard will
not affect the scope of the right waived.25
It is unclear, however, why the advent of the right to state-com-
pensated counsel has rendered the defendant's right to be present at
voir dire significantly less important than it was previously. Certainly
counsel now plays a key role at voir dire, assuming much of the respon-
sibility for juror selection that the indigent defendant alone once ex-
ercised. But, when viewed in light of the purposes served by both voir
dire and the defendant's presence at voir dire,26 the court's conclusion
that counsel alone can serve these purposes and protect the defendant's
interests is doubtful.
Blackstone, defending the concept of peremptory challenges and
thus of voir dire, identified one interest when he said that a defendant
"should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might to-
tally disconcert him."27 Accordingly, the law seeks to ensure that a
23. Brief for Appellee at 16, Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508 n.3 (1975); Dix, Waiver in Criminal
Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193, 209 (1977).
25. 292 Md. at 217-20, 438 A.2d at 1309-10.
26. The Maryland court may not recognize a distinction between these purposes. See
infra text accompanying notes 27-31 (describing the purposes). In another case the court
stated that the purpose of the right to be present during juror selection relates solely to jury
impartiality and the disqualification of prospective jurors. Porter v. State, 289 Md. 349, 355,
424 A.2d 371, 376 (1981) (defendant's presence not required during court's communications
with jurors or prospective jurors if unrelated to juror impartiality or disqualification).
27. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES $353-54.
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defendant will not have his fate determined by any juror against whom
the defendant has conceived a prejudice, even if the defendant cannot
explain why he dislikes the particular juror.28 Even the best defense
attorney cannot adequately protect his client's interest in having a good
opinion of the jury unless the client is present to advise counsel of his
personal prejudices and to participate in the selection of the persons
who will determine his guilt or innocence.
The Supreme Court identified a second interest in Hopt v. Utah,29
in which it rejected the suggestion that the presence of counsel had
reduced the importance of a defendant's right to be present at voir dire.
Justice Harlan focused on the impartial jury requirement, writing that
a defendant's life or liberty may depend upon the aid that his personal
presence may give to counsel and to the court in the selection of jurors.
The presence of counsel alone may not always meet the necessities of
his defense, Harlan emphasized.30 Although the instances where the
defendant alone will have knowledge relevant to the selection of an
impartial jury may be few, the Williams court has not suggested why
this potential aid is less important now than it was when Mr. Hopt
selected his jurors.
The extent to which the defendant's right to be present contributes
to the appearance of judicial fairness - a quality reasonably viewed as
being nearly as important as the court's paramount goal of actual fair-
ness31 - underlies both interests and is probably the most important
purpose served by the defendant's presence at voir dire. All but the
most apathetic of defendants must be presumed to have an intense in-
terest in the process of selecting the jurors who will determine their
fate. Failing to ensure that a defendant knows of his right to be present
during each stage of this process may well diminish the moral authority
that the defendant and the public are willing to accord the jury.
Moreover, in an era of budget cuts and burgeoning case loads as-
signed to public defenders,32 the familiar complaints concerning the
quality of representation accorded indigent defendants33 have taken on
a renewed sense of urgency. This, therefore, would seem to be a partic-
ularly inopportune time to cite the right to counsel as a major reason
28. Id.
29. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
30. Id. at 578.
31. See, e.g., Tisdale v. State, 41 Md.App. 149, 153-54, 396 A.2d 289, 292 (1979); Dix,
supra note 24, at 217. See generally Tigra, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, Forward- Waiver
of Constitutional Rights.- Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970).
32. See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Coun-
sel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 777 n.141 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. I (1973).
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for relaxing the waiver standard for the right to be present. The failure
of Williams's counsel to inform his client that he had the right to attend
the voir dire bench conferences, for example, was inadvertant, and not
part of any "tactical decision."34 Yet the new rule will operate to pun-
ish the defendant, not counsel, for such a failure to inform.
It is not clear why an affirmation of Maryland's traditional waiver
standard would have had the disastrous effect on the orderly procedure
of trials that the court seems to envision. Although it might be burden-
some to have to extract a "knowing and intelligent" waiver, surely it is
a relatively simple matter merely to inform a defendant of his right to
be present at voir dire. One such warning should suffice; there is no
reason why a trial would be significantly interrupted.
But perhaps the most curious aspect of the court's reasoning is its
emphatic assertion that the change in the waiver standard will not in
any way affect the scope of the right to presence.35 If by this assertion
the court means that the right will continue to exist in the abstract even
for defendants who are prevented by their own ignorance from ex-
ercising it, the reassurance seems hollow indeed, for the court clearly
feels that the judiciary has no obligation to inform defendants of the
right. If, on the other hand, the court is suggesting that the right as a
practical matter remains available to all criminal defendants, it simply
is wrong. For although the court views its decision as merely modify-
ing the waiver standard for the right, it actually is denying the right to
all but those defendants who either have learned of the right through
their own efforts (giving recidivists an advantage over first-time offend-
ers) or who are represented by counsel who will inform them of the
right. A convicted defendant surely will be excused if he fails to appre-
ciate the distinction between not having had a right to be present at all,
and of having "waived" that right, without his knowledge or consent,
before he even knew that he had it.
THE SCOPE OF WILLIAMS
The scope of the Williams rule is uncertain. Although the court
attempted to limit its reach, the opinion's diminution of a defendant's
right to be present at stages of the trial beyond voir dire is substantial if
the court's holding is read in light of its reasoning. The court mentions
that, in addition to stages of the trial at which the defendant's right to
34. At the hearing held upon Williams's petition for post-conviction relief, the attorney
who had represented him at trial testified that, although it was his policy to have defendants
present, he could not recall whether Williams was present at the voir dire bench conferences.
Brief for Appellant at 9, Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981).
35. 292 Md. at 219, 438 A.2d at 1310.
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confront witnesses is involved, the Williams waiver standard may not
apply when the absence of the defendant implicates "other constitu-
tional rights."3 6 But this additional limitation may be ineffective. Be-
sides the right to confront witnesses, the only explicit constitutional
right that requires the defendant's presence for its satisfaction is the
right to due process of law. Yet under the court's decision, any due
process rights of the defendant at voir dire would be adequately pro-
tected because his attorney could effectively represent the defendant's
interests without the defendant's presence.37 If an attorney by himself
can adequately represent the defendant's interests at voir dire, which
traditionally has been viewed as one of the primary stages at which the
defendant must be present to represent his interests, due process would
not seem to limit the extension of Williams to other stages where coun-
sel's help is viewed as more important and the defendant's participa-
tion less necessary. For example, the Court of Appeals has recognized
that a defendant has the constitutional right to be present during any
exchange between the judge and jury as to facts, law, or form of ver-
dict.38 Yet the Williams opinion specifically notes that these stages are
now subject to the new waiver rule.39
Other limitations, however, can be read into the Williams stan-
dard. First, other stages of the trial where the defendant's absence
would prevent him from exercising fundamental trial rights might also
be stages where the defendant's inaction would be insufficient to waive
his right to be present, even if his attorney failed to object. The
Supreme Court, for example, has stated that the right to be heard in
one's own defense, although not explicitly conferred by the Constitu-
tion, is so obviously fundamental as to be constitutionally protected.4"
Even though the Supreme Court has never said that a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver standard attaches to the right to be heard, a defend-
ant's inaction probably would be insufficient to waive his right to be
present at the only stages where he might exercise that fundamental
trial right.
A second limitation may be the constitutional guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel.4 Although the Court of Special Appeals has
ruled that it will not find an attorney incompetent just because he over-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 218, 438 A.2d at 1309.
38. Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 36-37, 139 A.2d 209, 214-15 (1958).
39. 292 Md. at 220, 438 A.2d at 1310.
40. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
41. The Supreme Court first construed the sixth amendment to guarantee effective
assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932).
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looked, in the heat of trial, the right of his client to be present at a short
bench conference,42 the Williams court implicitly presupposed compe-
tent counsel when it granted attorneys more power to waive their cli-
ents' rights by inaction.43 Maryland appellate courts look to all of the
circumstances in a particular case to determine whether an attorney
genuinely and adequately represented his client.' Consequently,
counsel's inattentive waiver of his client's right to be present, if com-
bined with other trial blunders, could help fuel an inadequate-repre-
sentation claim. Moreover, due process may require a higher degree of
competence when the attorney is given more power to bind his client by
waiving important rights.
Finally, two other possible limitations exist on both the extension
of Williams to other stages of the trial and to factual situations at voir
dire beyond those in Williams. First, although a waiver-by-inaction of
a defendant's right to be present at a given stage might be constitu-
tional most of the time, it sometimes might result in the impermissible
loss of another constitutional right. For instance, if Williams had con-
tested the impartiality of his jury, and if he alone could have discov-
ered the potential bias by being present at the bench conference where
the juror's qualifications were being discussed, Williams would have
been entitled to a new trial. Although the right to an impartial jury,
not the right to be present, would have been violated, Williams's ab-
sence would have served as the springboard for the impartial jury
claim. Consequently, any time a constitutional right is at issue and the
defendant's presence is necessary to ensure the satisfaction of the right
under the circumstances, a defendant's presence may be constitution-
ally mandated.
Second, the right to be present itself may limit the expansion of the
Williams waiver standard to other stages of the "trial or other fact situa-
tions. During the bench conferences, Williams was seated only a few
feet away and at least had the opportunity to observe what was hap-
pening.45 A far different case may have presented itself if Williams had
been improperly excluded from the court room during voir dire, or an-
42. Noble v. State, 46 Md.App. 154, 161-62, 416 A.2d 757, 761 (1980).
43. See, e.g., Conley v. Warden, 190 Md. 750, 752, 59 A.2d 684, 684 (1947) (per curiam)
(citing United States ex. rel. Jackson v. Brody, 47 F.Supp. 362, 367 (1942), affd 133 F.2d 476
(4th Cir.), ceri. denied 319 U.S. 746 (1943)), for the rule that "where in a State criminal trial
the defendant is represented by competent and experienced counsel, even constitutional
rights known or presumed to be known to counsel to exist must be held to have been waived
if not made at all or. . .inadequately presented."
44. See, e.g., State v. Lloyd, 48 Md.App. 535, 540, 429 A.2d 244, 247 (1981).




other stage. In that case, despite the Williams court's reasoning that
counsel properly represents the defendant's interests, traditional no-
tions of due process could be so offended as to require a reversal.4 6 The
same can be said for other stages of the trial; depending upon the de-
fendant's proximity and length of absence, an attorney may not be able
to waive the defendant's right to be present by action or inaction.
The Williams opinion contemplates that a defendant will be given
at least some minimal opportunity to object or to ask to be present.47
The court stated that if the defendant himself does not affirmatively ask
to be present at such occurrences or does not express an objection at the
time, and if his attorney consents to his absence or says nothing regard-
ing the matter, the right to be present will be deemed to have been
waived.4" Consequently, the waiver of a defendant's right to be present
may itself be a stage of the trial where the defendant who has not vol-
untarily absented himself or engaged in obstreperous conduct4 9 must
be present in the courtroom. Perhaps only the defendant's presence
can protect his and society's interest in the apparent fairness of the pro-
ceedings when his rights are being waived.
CONCLUSION
The Maryland court's apparent eagerness to abandon an easily en-
forced waiver standard which served to protect an important right is
troubling, for the new standard is not as conducive to providing equal
protection to all criminal defendants. Surely it will be the exceedingly
rare defendant who, if he is not informed of his right to be present, will
nonetheless possess both the legal sophistication and the temerity to
object contemporaneously to a stage of the voir dire being conducted
out of his hearing. Those defendants fortunate enough to be repre-
sented by an attorney who will inform them of their right to be present
have nothing to fear from Williams. But others, unless they can show
that their absence reflected ineffective assistance of counsel or caused
the violation of some other important right, are likely to find the new
waiver standard an effective bar to their acknowledged right to be pres-
ent at every stage of their trials.
46. See, e.g., Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 667-68, 59 A.2d 509, 512 (1948).
47. Cf. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955) (right to object to composition of
grand jury presupposes an opportunity to exercise that right).
48. 292 Md. at 220, 438 A.2d at 1310.
49. See MD. R.P. 724(c).
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MARYLAND'S EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER
STERILIZATION PETITIONS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In Wentzel v. Mongtomery General Hospital,' the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that a circuit court has inherent equitable jurisdiction
to hear a guardian's petition requesting authority to consent to the ster-
ilization of an incompetent minor.2 Joining a growing minority of state
courts,3 the Maryland court based its finding of subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the parens patriae doctrine.4 To guide circuit courts in the exer-
cise of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals established minimal
substantive and procedural standards controlling the issuance of sterili-
zation authorizations.' Finally, refusing to remand the case for recon-
sideration in accordance with those new standards, the court upheld the
1. 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982).
2. Id at 701-02, 447 A.2d at 1252-53.
3. Recent decisions in nine states are in accord with Maryland. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d
712, 718-19 (Mass. App. 1982) (probate court has general equitable jurisdiction); In re Ter-
williger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. 1982) (orphans court has statutory and parens
patriae jurisdiction); In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981) (parens patriae jurisdic-
tion); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 373-75 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (expansive probate court
jurisdiction); In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 120-22, 405 A.2d 851, 861-63 (1979) (parens
patriae jurisdiction) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467
(1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 231-34, 608 P.2d 635, 637-38 (1980)
(inherent power of superior court to hear all cases). See also In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269,
271, 414 A.2d 541, 542 (1980) (per curiam) (statutory jurisdiction).
The vast majority of courts have refused to consider sterilization petitions. See Case
Comment, Inherent Parens Patriae Authority Empowers Court of General Jurisdiction to Order
Sterilization of Incompetents, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 1177, 1181 n.21 (1982) for a list of those
courts denying jurisdiction. See also Comment, Equitable Jurisdiction to Order Steriliza-
ions, 57 WASH. L. REv. 373 (1982) suggesting that the development of the majority position
was the result of judicial fear of civil liability for ordering sterilization. When the Supreme
Court held that a judicial sterilization order could not result in civil liability unless the order
was made in "clear absence of jurisdiction," it allowed state courts to consider freely the
jurisdictional issue. Id at 381.
4. "Parens patriae" means literally "parent of the country," and "refers traditionally to
[the] role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIoNARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Originally, the term referred to the King's per-
sonal authority to act as guardian for those with a legal disability. Beverley's Case, 76 Eng.
Rep. 1118, 1125-26 (K.B. 1603). The King subsequently delegated this power to the Chan-
cellor as the King's personal representative. Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 534, 137 A.2d 704,
706 (1958). Acting in parens patriae, the King or his representative was required to promote
the interests and welfare of his ward. Rebecca Owings' Case, 1 Bland 290, 294 (Md. 1827).
See Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1207-10 (1974) (discussing origins and nature of parens patriae).
5. 293 Md. at 702-03, 447 A.2d at 1253-54. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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circuit court's denial of the guardians' sterilization petition.6
Although the Court of Appeals did not address the constitutional
issues involved in the Wentzel decision,7 this Note, after summarizing
the court's opinion, concludes that the court was constitutionally com-
pelled to accept jurisdiction over sterilization petitions. Moreover, con-
stitutional analysis of the Wenizel standards suggests that they do not
adequately protect an incompetent's privacy rights. Thus, the court
should reconsider the Wentzel decision in light of its constitutional im-
plications and should adopt a standard that fully protects an incompe-
tent's constitutional rights.
Sonya Star Flanary was born a normal child. But at five months
of age she was severely injured in an automobile accident resulting in
blindness, pronounced neurological problems, and severe permanent
retardation. Those disabilities limited Sonya's intellectual develop-
ment to that of a one- to two-year-old.8 After caring for Sonya for
thirteen years, Sonya's aunt and grandmother petitioned the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County requesting that they be appointed
Sonya's co-guardians. They also requested that the court authorize
them, as guardians, to consent to a subtotal hysterectomy which would
terminate Sonya's menstrual cycle and result in her sterilization.9
The circuit court, after appointing a guardian ad litem,'0 held a
hearing on the petition." A child psychiatrist testified that a subtotal
hysterectomy would be in Sonya's best interests, but he would not con-
clude that a hysterectomy was necessary for Sonya's physical or mental
health.' 2  Although the circuit court appointed the petitioners co-
guardians, it refused to grant them authority to consent to the hysterec-
tomy.' 3 The guardians appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and
6. 293 Md. at 704-05, 447 A.2d at 1254.
7. Courts generally avoid the constitutional issue if the record presents another basis on
which to decide the case. See J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
83-85 (1978).
8. 293 Md. at 687, 447 A.2d at 1245-46.
9. Id at 687-88, 447 A.2d at 1246.
10. See Md. R. P. R76 permitting a circuit court to appoint an attorney (the guardian ad
litem) in a guardianship hearing to investigate the facts and report to the court.
11. The evidence disclosed that Sonya had recently reached puberty and that her men-
struation was painful. She was irritable and disoriented during her menstrual period and
could not care for her basic hygienic needs. The evidence also showed that, although Sonya
was capable of bearing a normal child, she was incapable of understanding sexual reproduc-
tion or caring for a child. 293 Md. at 688, 447 A.2d at 1246.
12. Id See also 293 Md. at 707 n.l, 708-12, 447 A.2d at 1256 n.l, 1256-58 (Smith, J.,
concurring and dissenting, quoting testimony of Dr. Rogers Burlton).
13. 293 Md. at 690, 447 A.2d at 1247. See also Brief for Appellant at E-8, Wentzel v.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (reproducing Opinion and Order,
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Bell, J.).
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the Court of Appeals granted certiorari before decision by the interme-
diate court.14
I. THE WENTZEL OPINION
The Wentzel opinion answers two important questions: (1) Upon
what jurisdictional basis may a Maryland court rest its authority to
consider sterilization petitions? (2) What standards should a Maryland
court use to determine whether to grant the guardian of an incompetent
minor the authority to consent to the minor's sterilization?
A. Jurisdictional Authority
Courts in at least eighteen states have explicit statutory grants of
authority to order the sterilization of the mentally incompetent. 15
Maryland, however, does not have a sterilization statute. Because an
incompetent may be unable to give effective legal consent,' 6 physicians
generally refuse to perform sterilizations without a court order.17 If a
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a sterilization petition,
14. 293 Md. at 690, 447 A.2d at 1247.
15. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-501 to -502 (1971); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128
to -132 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-78p to -78z (West 1981 & 1982 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 199 (West)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5701-05 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1
to -6 (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3901 to -3910 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34,
§§ 2471-87 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252A. 11, .13, & 525.56 (West 1982 & Supp.
1983); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (1976
& Cum. Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-01.2-01 to -11 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.271 (Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 341-46 (West
1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 436.010 -. 150 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-47-10 to -100 (Law.
Co-op 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to -13 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 8705-16 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.9 -. 15 (1982); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-16-1 to -5
(1980).
16. The doctrine of informed consent requires that legal consent be made voluntarily,
with the information necessary to decide and with sufficient mental capacity to understand
the decision. The courts generally hold that mental incompetency prevents an individual
from giving informed consent to sterilization procedures. See, e.g., Relf v. Weinberger, 372
F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974) (nearly universal common-law rule that mental incompe-
tents cannot consent to medical operations), final disposition 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C.
1975), vacated as mootper curiam, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Commentators have at-
tacked this rule. Because capacity to consent depends on the individual's capabilities, the
rule is arguably too broad. See Neuwirth, Heisler & Goldrich, Capacity, Competence, Con-
sent.- Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentaly Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
447, 447-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Neuwirth); Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded- A
Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 933-34 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Conn. 1978) (hospital refused to
sterilize because of fear of future civil liability); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 270, 414 A.2d
541, 542 (1980) (doctor refused to operate without court approval); Note, Addressing the
Consent Issue Involved in the Sterilization ofMentally Incompetent Females, 43 ALB. L. REV.
322, 322-23 (1979).
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any court order authorizing sterilization could be considered invalid by
a higher court and might not protect the physician performing the ster-
ilization from future liability.' 8
The court identified two bases from which to derive subject matter
jurisdiction: statutory jurisdiction and inherent equity jurisdiction.' 9
Because the Court of Appeals found that no Maryland statute author-
ized circuit courts to consider sterilization petitions,2" only the circuit
court's inherent equitable jurisdiction could form the basis for jurisdic-
tion.2" To sanction the inherent equitable jurisdiction of the circuit
courts, the court had to make two findings. First, because circuit
courts, as the highest courts of general jurisdiction, can exercise full
common-law equity jurisdiction only if that jurisdiction is not limited
by statute,22 the court had to determine that no statute restricted circuit
courts from hearing sterilization petitions. Finding no limiting stat-
ute,23 the court then looked for a source of jurisdictional authority. Be-
cause the source of inherent equitable jurisdiction emanates from
18. See Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977) rev'd on other grounds sub
nomL Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The Supreme Court held that a judge order-
ing sterilization cannot be held liable unless he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
435 U.S. at 357, This holding should not affect the viability of any state claims for assault or
battery.
19. 293 Md. at 692, 447 A.2d at 1248.
20. Id at 699, 447 A.2d at 1252. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-704 to -710
(Supp. 1982) govern the guardianship of disabled persons, and the petitioners argued that
§ 13-708(a) authorized the court to grant their petition. That statute allows "[t]he court [to]
grant to a guardian of a person only those powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated
need of the disabled person." MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-708(a) (Supp. 1982).
The Court of Appeals reasoned that, because the MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 13-101(d) defines a "disabled person" as a person other than a minor, § 13-708(a) did not
give circuit courts jurisdiction over a petition requesting the authority to sterilize a minor.
In addition, the court found that, although the Maryland Estates & Trusts Code gives circuit
courts the power to appoint guardians for minors, the Code does not explicitly define the
powers a court may grant to a minor's guardians. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§§ 13-701 to -703 (1974). Absent such definition, the court concluded that no Maryland
statute granted jurisdiction to circuit courts to hear petitions to sterilize minors. 293 Md. at
699-701, 477 A.2d at 1252.
21. 293 Md. at 701, 447 A.2d at 1252.
22. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1-501 (1980) states that circuit courts:
are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction
within the State.. . [with] full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all
civil and criminal cases within [their] count[ies], and all the additional powers and juris-
diction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has
been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.
23. The Court of Appeals reasoned that by enacting MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 13-702 without explicitly defining a guardian's powers and duties, "the legislature in-
tended that circuit courts would exercise their inherent equitable jurisdiction over guardian-
ship matters pertaining to minors." 293 Md. at 701, 447 A.2d at 1252. Therefore, § 13-702,
allowing circuit courts to appoint a guardian on petition by any person interested in a mi-
nor's welfare, does not limit a circuit court's jurisdiction.
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certain equitable doctrines, the court looked to the origins of equity to
ascertain the appropriate doctrine upon which to base jurisdiction.24
Two equitable doctrines - "substituted judgment"25 and parens
patriae26 - have been relied on by other state courts to confer equita-
ble jurisdiction over sterilization petitions." Without discussing the
substituted judgment doctrine,28 the Court of Appeals relied on the cir-
24. "It is not so easy to ascertain the origin of equitable ... jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery," 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41 (1836 & photo. reprint 1972), but there are certain principles
which both limit and define the boundaries of inherent equitable jurisdiction. Id at 21-25,
70-71. Story asserts that inherent equity jurisdiction is governed by "such civil maxims, [sic]
as are adopted by any particular state or community." Id at 4. Although disputed, an
equity court's jurisdiction over minors and incompetents seems to have evolved from the
King's duty to protect his subjects. 2 Id at 557-58, 591-92. That duty is embodied in the
parens patriae doctrine and the doctrine of substituted judgment, see supra note 4 & infra
note 25.
25. The doctrine of substituted judgment allows a court, or other appropriate entity, to
do whatever the incompetent would have done if she were capable of making a reasoned
decision. See, e.g., In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 720; In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750-52 (D.C.
1979). See also Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 57-68 (1976). The court may allow the parents to make
the final decision as to whether a particular surgical procedure is to be performed, or the
court itself may decide. Compare In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (1981)
(court's judgment, not parents' good faith judgment is controlling) with In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 53-55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 cert. denied sub nom Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976) (parents may decide whether to terminate life support; court will endorse their
decision). The Grady court distinguished Quinlan on the grounds that the alternatives were
more clearcut in the Quinlan case and the medical procedure in question was not subject to
extensive abuse. In re Grady, 85 N.J. at 251-52, 426 A.2d at 475. Because the parents'
interest in sterilization may conflict with the child's interest, allowing the court to substitute
its judgment is the better alternative. See Neuwirth, supra note 16, at 455; infra text accom-
panying notes 103-07.
To exercise substituted judgment, the court generally gathers evidence of previous
expressions by the incompetent concerning her choice if she were to become incompetent.
In the absence of such evidence, the court will base its decision on what a reasonable person
in the incompetent's position would do. Robertson, supra, at 61.
26. See supra note 4. The parens patriae doctrine, unlike the substituted judgment doc-
trine, restricts the court to a decision based on the "best interests" of the incompetent. Id
Best interests are usually determined by weighing objective factors such as age, health, and
mental capacity. See, e.g., the Wentzel standards, infra note 39. See also In re Terwilliger,
450 A.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Pa. Super. 1982); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d. 228,
237-39, 608 P.2d 635, 639-42 (1980).
27. See, e.g., In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 710 (Mass. App. 1982) (relying on substituted
judgment doctrine); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261-62, 426 A.2d 467, 479 (1981) (relying on
parens patriae doctrine).
28. But see 293 Md. at 714-18, 447 A.2d at 1259-61 (Smith, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Judge Smith urged that the court not only accept jurisdiction, but grant the guardians
the authority to consent to sterilization. He argued that because Sonya would have chosen
to be sterilized if she "were in a position to make a sound judgment," the court, as a court of
conscience, should authorize sterilization. Id at 717, 447 A.2d at 1260. Thus, Judge Smith
advocated the use of the doctrine of substituted judgment.
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cuit court's inherent parens patriae power over incompetent minors.29
In Maryland, an individual's mental incompetence does not auto-
matically vest a court with parens patriae jurisdiction over the individ-
ual. 3° The legislature must delegate to the courts the power to conduct
incompetency proceedings and to regulate the custody and control of
incompetent adults.3' But, even in the absence of statutory authority,
equity courts have inherent jurisdiction to appoint guardians for mi-
nors and to supervise those guardians' activities.32 The parens patriae
power of a Maryland equity court over minors is plenary, and allows
the court, in the absence of statutory authority, to act in the minor's
best interests.33 Thus, the Wentzel court's jurisdictional finding was
based on a Maryland circuit court's authority over individuals who are
incompetent by virtue of their age, not the court's authority over per-
sons who are incompetent by virtue of their mental abilities.34
Wentzel does not directly address whether circuit courts have sub-
29. 293 Md. at 701-02, 447 A.2d at 1252-53.
30. "[L]unacy, or incompetence alone does not originate equitable jurisdiction over the
person or estate of a lunatic, except to a limited degree; consequently, if the equity courts of
this State possess such jurisdiction, its source is other than the general jurisdiction of those
courts." In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 180, 133 A.2d 441, 443-44 (1956).
31. Id at 183, 133 A.2d at 444-45. "It is well settled that equity has no inherent power
to deal with insane persons or their property." Schneider v. Davis, 194 Md. 316, 321, 71
A.2d 32, 33 (1950). Maryland equity jurisdiction is derived from the jurisdiction of the
English Chancery Court. Chancery jurisdiction over incompetents did not arise until a per-
son had been declared incompetent by a jury. Once declared incompetent, the Chancery
Court had jurisdiction to supervise the guardian committee. Because authority to declare a
person incompetent was personal to the King, the King had to delegate this power. The
power to declare individuals incompetent was not delegated to the Court but to the Chancel-
lor, as the personal representative of the King. Accordingly, it was exercised by the Chan-
cellor, not the Court. See Hamilton v. Traber, 78 Md. 26, 29-32, 27 A. 229, 230-31 (1893); 4
J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 1311 (S. Symons 5th ed. 1941).
32. E. MILLER, EQUITY PROCEDURE As ESTABLISHED IN THE COURTS OF MARYLAND,
§ 717 (1897).
33. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 175, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977). "In other words, a
court of chancery stands as a guardian of all children and may interfere at any time and in
any way to protect and advance their welfare and interests." Id at 176, 372 A.2d at 586
(quoting Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 118, 43 A.2d 186, 192 (1945)).
34. The Maryland court is the only court to base jurisdiction exclusively on its inherent
equitable power over minors. Of those cases which have recently held that state courts have
equitable jurisdiction to consider sterilization petitions, see supra note 3, only two have in-
volved the sterilization of a mentally incompetent minor. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366
(Colo. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash.2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980). Only one
of those, In re .4. W., distinguished the jurisdictional authority to hear petitions for the steril-
ization of mentally incompetent adults from the jurisdictional authority to hear petitions for
the sterilization of mentally incompetent minors. In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 371-75. Colorado
courts, unlike Maryland courts, have expansive jurisdictional authority over all claims un-
less a statute provides otherwise. Patterson v. Parr, 23 Colo. App. 479, 489, 130 P. 618,
621-22 (1913). Thus, the In re A. W court was able to base its jurisdictional authority on its
inherent power over all incompetents, both minor and adult.
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ject matter jurisdiction to consider a petition for the sterilization of an
incompetent adult. Nevertheless, under current Maryland law, guardi-
ans of incompetent adults may consent to any medical procedure for
which a "demonstrated need" is proven.35 The court in Wentzel stated
that section 13-708 of the Maryland Estates and Trusts Code, contain-
ing the "demonstrated need" test, essentially paralleled and was "de-
claratory of the common lawparens/patriae powers of circuit courts
over incompetent minors. 31 6 Therefore, it apparently follows from the
Wentzel decision that the circuit courts of Maryland have jurisdictional
authority to decide whether any person, minor or adult, declared to be
incompetent, will be sterilized.
Unfortunately, the parallel drawn between the statutory "demon-
strated need" test and the court's inherent equitable jurisdiction over
minors under the parens patriae doctrine erroneously implied that the
Wentzel best interests standard should apply in cases concerning peti-
tions to sterilize adults. The legislature, by enacting section 13-708, has
indicated that the standard to use in deciding adult petitions is a
"demonstrated need" standard. The parallel implies that the best inter-
ests standard, as established by the Wentzel court, will be used to define
the "demonstrated need" standard. Because the Wentzel court defined
the best interests standard very strictly,37 use of the Wentzei standards
in deciding adult cases will not adequately protect the incompetent's
constitutional right to reproductive autonomy. Therefore, the Wentze/
decision should not constrain Maryland courts when considering a
guardian's petition to sterilize an adult.
B. Standards for Authorizing Guardian Consent
In a sweeping opinion,38 the Wentzel court established minimal
standards to govern circuit courts when ruling on a guardian's petition
for authorization to consent to the sterilization of a minor. The court
must first comply with certain procedural safeguards designed to en-
sure that the incompetent is fully represented and that the court has a
full understanding of the circumstances surrounding the request for
35. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-708(a) (Supp. 1982).
36. 293 Md. at 701, 447 A.2d at 1252.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
38. The Court of Appeals explicitly recognized that it was overstepping the traditional
function of the judiciary and, in effect, legislating. "We recognize, of course, that declara-
tion of the public policy of this state is normally a function of the legislative branch of
government." 293 Md. at 705, 447 A.2d at 1255. The "public-policy emphasis" of the judi-
ciary has been criticized as inappropriate. See, e.g., Berger, Paul Brest's Brief For an Impe-
iat Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REv. 1, 7-18 (1981); Fernandez, Custom and the Common Law.
Judicial Restraint and Lawmaking by Courts, 11 Sw. U. L. REv. 1237, passim (1979).
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sterilization. Then the court must make three evidentiary findings:
(1) The incompetent must be incapable of making the sterilization deci-
sion, (2) sterilization must be in the minor's best interests, and (3) steril-
ization must be medically necessary. All of these factors must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.39
Because the court identified the parens patriae doctrine as the
source of jurisdiction, the Wenizel standards were designed to promote
the minor's best interests. Historically, the best interests standard has
been loosely construed' but the recent cases that influenced the Went-
39. The court established the following standards:
1. The court must appoint an independent guardian ad litem to act on the ward's be-
half. This guardian ad litem must be given a full opportunity to meet with the ward,
and, to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at a full judicial hearing.
2. Medical, psychological, and sociological experts must present independent evalua-
tion to the circuit court. In addition, the court may appoint its own experts to evalu-
ate the ward's best interests.
3. The court should personally meet with the ward to obtain its own impression of the
ward's competency.
4. The circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the ward is incom-
petent to make a decision about sterilization and that this incompetency is unlikely
to change in the foreseeable future.
5. The court must find by clear and convincing evidence that sterilization is in the best
interests of the ward. The best interests of the ward are determined by several fac-
tors including:
a. Whether the incompetent is capable of reproduction;
b. The incompetent's age and circumstances at the time of the petition;
c. Extent of exposure to sexual contact that could result in pregnancy;
d. Feasibility of other effective contraceptive procedures;
e. Availability of less intrusive sterilization procedures; and
f. Possibility of scientific advances that could result in improvement of the incompe-
tent's mental condition.
6. In addition, the court, before authorizing sterilization as being in the best interests of
the incompetent, must find by clear and convincing evidence that the requested oper-
ative procedure is medically necessary to preserve the life or physical or mental
health of the incompetent minor. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253-54.
40. One of the earliest cases finding inherent jurisdictional authority to order the sterili-
zation of an incompetent was, Ex parte Eaton, Daily Record, Nov. 11, 1954, at 4, col. 1
(D.C. Balt. City, Nov. 10, 1954). That court stated, in dicta, that "the facts and law in this
case are so clear and pointed that [the court] has not only the authority but a definite obliga-
tion to this Incompetent to authorize the operation." Id at col. 2. The opinion did not
enunciate specific standards for determining when sterilization would be ordered, but
merely recited that sterilization was necessary for the incompetent's health and well being,
and would promote the incompetent's mental recovery. 1d at col. 1. Thus, the court ap-
peared to articulate a best interests standard.
Later cases relying on Exparte Eaton show, however, that although the courts have
denominated a best interests standard, that standard can be abused. For example, in In re
Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1962), an Ohio probate judge ordered the sterilization of an
eighteen-year old woman with an IQ of 36 because she was sexually promiscuous, her ille-
gitimate child needed welfare aid, state institutions were overcrowded, and any additional
children would be burdensome to the county and state welfare departments. 180 N.E.2d at
207-08. Judge Gray continued authorizing sterilizations for ten years until a woman who
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zel decision have established a tighter structure within which to evalu-
ate an individual's best interests.4 The Washington Supreme Court in
In re Guardianship of Hayes,'2 the first state court of last resort43 signifi-
cantly to elaborate the best interests standard, established guidelines
for decisionmaking in sterilization cases.44 The Hayes standards are
very similar to those enunciated in other recent sterilization decisions
influencing the Maryland court.45
The Wentzel standards differ from the Hayes standards in two sig-
nificant ways.' The Washington court required that the factors weigh-
ing in favor of, or against, sterilization be individually established by
clear and convincing evidence.47  The Maryland court, however,
merely listed a number of factors that are determinative of the best
interests of the incompetent." Although sterilization generally must be
proven to be in the best interests of the incompetent by clear and con-
vincing evidence, Maryland circuit courts have comparatively wide dis-
had been sterilized without her knowledge sued him for deprivation of her civil rights. See
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Ffitch isA/most Dead- Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of
Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995, 1015 (1977) (discussing abuse of best interests
standard).
41. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981);
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) rev'g 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (1979);
In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
42. 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
43. In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (1979), was decided eight months
prior to In re Hayes, but the New Jersey Superior Court's decision that the parents of an
incompetent may substitute their judgment for her's was vacated later by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. That court held that sterilization could be ordered only when shown to be
in the best interests of the incompetent. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 244, 264-67, 426 A.2d 467,
471, 482 (1981).
44. 93 Wash. 2d at 238-39, 608 P.2d at 641-42.
45. In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612-14; In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 375-76; In re Grady,
85 N.J. 235, 264-67, 426 A.2d 467, 481-82.
46. In addition to the differences discussed in the text, the Hayes standards require the
court to find that the incompetent is permanently incapable of caring for a child. 93 Wash.
2d at 238, 608 P.2d at 641. Although the Maryland court indicated that its list was not
exhaustive, it did not list child-care ability as one of the factors to be considered when au-
thorizing sterilizations. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253-54. When applying the Wentzel
standards, circuit courts should consider an incompetent's ability to care for a child before
ordering sterilization. Empirical studies show that many persons who are legally incompe-
tent are capable of being or becoming good parents. Comment, Nonconsensual Sterilization
of the Mentally Retarded - Analysis of Standards for Judicial Determinations, 3 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 689, 698 (1981) citing Note, Retarded Parents in Neglect Proceedings: The
Erroneous Assumption of Parental Inadequacy, 31 STAN. L. REv. 785, 797-803 (1979) (re-
viewing empirical data on child-rearing capacities of retarded parents). See also Develop-
ments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1302-03
(1980).
47. 93 Wash. 2d at 238, 608 P.2d at 641.
48. See supra note 39.
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cretion to weigh the relevant factors and arrive at a final decision
concerning the incompetent's best interests.
Most important, the Hayes and Wentzel standards differ in that
Wentzel makes medical necessity a factor controlling the sterilization
decision. 9 In establishing the medical necessity requirement, the Mary-
land court cited the only other case holding that medical necessity con-
trols whether an incompetent can be sterilized. 0 In In re A. W. ," the
Colorado Supreme Court defined medical necessity as "necessary, in
the opinion of experts, to preserve the life or physical or mental health
of the mentally retarded person."52 The Colorado court reasoned that
the requirement was necessary to emphasize that the incompetent mi-
nor's interests were paramount and to protect against the historical
abuse of sterilization." The Court of Appeals did not analyze the rea-
soning of In re A. W but appears to have accepted it without question.
The Colorado court's reasoning is not persuasive. Because the
medical necessity requirement may, on occasion, be inconsistent with
the incompetent's best interests, the medical necessity test cannot in
every case emphasize the priority of the incompetent's best interests.
Individuals can choose to be nontherapeutically sterilized. In fact, psy-
chologists often advocate the nontherapeutic sterilization of the men-
tally incompetent to enhance their ability to live in a less restrictive
environment. 54 Preventing the nontherapeutic sterilization of all in-
competents does not emphasize the incompetents' interests but prohib-
its them from exercising the same rights as competent persons. As
argued in the third section of this Note, that restriction may be
unconstitutional.
The historical abuse of the reproductive rights of the mentally re-
tarded does not justify such a restrictive standard. That abuse occurred
as a result of misguided eugenic theories,55 involuntary sterilization
49. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
50. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1254 (citing In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981)).
51. 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).
52. Id. at 375-76.
53. Id at 376.
54. See Bass, Voluntary Eugenic Sterilization, in EUGENIC STERILIZATION, 94, 104-06 (J.
Robitscher ed. 1973); but see Giannella, Eugenic Sterilizations and the Law, id at 76, noting
that the "increased freedom" argument could be used by the state to coerce incompetents to
undergo sterilization as a condition of release from an institution.
Despite that debate, it is obvious that one reason competent persons choose to be
sterilized is to be able to engage in sex without fear of pregnancy. Incompetence should not
deprive a person of that freedom, but the court must be alert to any coercive motive behind
the petition for sterilization.
55. See Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L.
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laws,56 and irresponsible use of the best interests standards.57 When
equity courts are guided by specific rules for granting sterilization peti-
tions, a broad rule, preventing all sterilizations not necessary to pre-
serve or protect an incompetent's health, is unnecessary.
II. APPLICATION OF THE WENTZEL STANDARDS
After establishing stringent standards for Maryland circuit courts
to follow when considering a guardian's petition for authority to con-
sent to sterilization, the Wentzel court reviewed, in a cursory fashion,
the Chancellor's decision on the merits.58 Although the newly estab-
lished criteria could not have been applied at the trial, the court af-
firmed the Chancellor's denial of the guardian's petition.59
Because the lower court record was inadequate, the Court of Ap-
peals should have remanded the case for further consideration. 60 The
REV. 1418, 1423-27 (1981); 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 467, 468-70 (1982) for good discussions of
eugenic theory.
56. Comment, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled" Shedding Some Myth-Con-
ceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 599, 602-29 (1981). Maryland has not been immune from
outrageous sterilization legislation. In 1960, Senate Bill No. 91, introduced by Senator John
Sanford, Jr., was designed to punish any woman who gave birth to more than two illegiti-
mate children. The bill provided for a fine and/or imprisonment for three years. The state
would assume custody of the children, and the mother would be sterilized. This bill passed
the Senate by a vote of 23 to 3 but was defeated in the House. Paul, The Return of Punitive
Sterilization Proposals- Current Attacks on Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program, 3 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 77, 84-87 (1968).
57. See supra note 40.
58. The Court of Appeals' decision to dismiss rested on the court's interpretation of the
Chancellor's opinion. The court stated that the Chancellor had not dismissed the petition
for lack of jurisdiction, but for the petitioner's failure to establish that sterilization was justi-
fied. 293 Md. at 704, 447 A.2d at 1254. But the Chancellor's opinion did not clearly hold
that she found jurisdiction to consider the sterilization petition.
The Chancellor stated:
The Court has considered the various bases suggested as a possible avenue for the
Court to order a hysterectomy for Sonya and might well wish that it had the authority
to act. . . . In the absence of such statutory authority and guidelines, this Court cannot
find that it has the authority to grant the relief sought.
Brief for Appellant at E-7, Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244
(reproducing Opinion and Order, Circuit Court for Montgomery County).
Thus, the Court of Appeals apparently misinterpreted the Chancellor's opinion. She
did not consider whether there was any "demonstrated need" for sterilization but disposed
of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.
59. The court stated: "Considering Sonya's age and circumstances, the absence of any
evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence of any medical necessity for the steriliza-
tion procedure at this time, no useful purpose would be served by remanding the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in light of today's opinion." 293 Md. at 705, 447 A.2d at
1254 (footnote omitted).
60. See 293 Md. at 718, 447 A.2d at 1261 (Digges, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge
Digges agreed with the court's analysis but would have remanded the case for further con-
sideration. Judge Davidson disagreed with the majority's standards but would have re-
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
court established extensive procedural and substantive safeguards with
one hand, but refused to allow the trial court to apply them with the
other. The court's failure to remand the case not only deprived Sonya
of the full panoply of procedural rights established by the court, but
also effectively deprived her of her constitutional freedom of choice.
III. THE WENTZEL DECISION: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hospital was not decided on con-
stitutional grounds.6" Nevertheless, because the case involved the con-
stitutional right to privacy,62 constitutional considerations should
support the decision.63 Skinner v. Oklahoma,64 a case predating the de-
velopment of the right to privacy which struck down, on narrow equal
protection grounds, a compulsory sterilization statute,65 is remembered
for its broad dicta that the right to procreate is "one of the basic civil
rights of man. ' 66 The Court, anticipating the later recognition of "fun-
damental interests, 67 stated that "[m]arriage and procreation are fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the race."68
Although the parameters of the right to privacy are unclear,69 the
Supreme Court has consistently applied the privacy doctrine to protect
certain procreative rights.70 In Griswold v. Connecticut,7 the Supreme
manded for further consideration in accordance with her own. 293 Md. at 718-25, 447 A.2d
at 1261-64 (Davidson, J., dissenting). Judge Smith would have granted the guardian's peti-
tion based on the majority's standards. 293 Md. at 705-18, 447 A.2d at 1255-61 (Smith, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The facts developed at trial are noted supra at notes 8-12 and
accompanying text. The failure to remand illustrates the court's refusal to recognize a right
to sterilization.
61. See supra note 7.
62. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (discussing Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of constitutional right to privacy).
63. J. Davidson, dissenting, argued that the majority's standards unduly infringe on an
incompetent's fundamental rights. 293 Md. at 718-25, 447 A.2d at 1261-64. See also, In re
Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719-20 (Mass. App. 1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-50, 426 A.2d
467, 471-74 (1981); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Colo. 1981).
64. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
65. Id at 542-43. The court found that there was no eugenic basis for sterilizing those
thrice convicted of larceny but not those thrice convicted of embezzlement. Thus, the statu-
tory distinction was "conspicuously artificial" and violated the equal protection clause. Id
66. 316 U.S. at 541.
67. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 572 (10th ed.
1980).
68. 316 U.S. at 541.
69. See Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1419 (1974) (recogniz-
ing the "varieties and uncertainties of definition"); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy. Re-
pose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1448 (1976) ("To construct a
synthesis of those holdings favoring privacy is difficult.").
70. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (citing cases).
71. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Court held that the right to privacy encompassed procreative decisions
within the marriage relationship.72 That constitutional protection has
been extended to unmarried individuals73 and minors.74 Extending the
protection to unmarried individuals, the Supreme Court stated that
"[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."" Similarly, in Whalen v. Roe,7 6 the
Supreme Court characterized the right to privacy as "independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions, ' 77 specifically those deci-
sions "dealing with 'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, and child rearing and education
. . ,"7 Thus, the constitutional right involved in any sterilization
case 79 is the fundamental right to freedom of choice - freedom from
governmental intrusion in making, implementing, and avoiding the
consequences of failing to make that choice. 0
Just as any legislation that deprives an individual of a fundamen-
tal constitutional right must satisfy the procedural requirements of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause,8' so too the Wenizel stan-
dards should ensure procedural due process. Additionally, any statu-
tory classification that results in the deprivation of a class's
constitutional right must be sufficiently related to the purposes of the
legislation to satisfy the varying levels of scrutiny under the equal pro-
72. Id at 484.
73. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
74. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of major-
ity. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." Id at 74.
75. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
76. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
77. Id at 600.
78. Id at 600 n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
79. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, addressed all forms of contra-
ception including sterilization.
80. The discourse leading to this conclusion parallels that found at Note, Eugenic Artf-
cal Insemination: A Curefor Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1850, 1866-67 (1981). But see
Gavison, Privacy andthe Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421 (1980), asserting that the claim for
privacy "is a claimfor state interference in the form of legal protection against other individ-
uals, and this is obscured when privacy is discussed in terms of non-interference with per-
sonal decisions." Id. at 438 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).
81. To determine the adequate process, the court balances the private interest involved,
the effectiveness of the present procedure and additional effectiveness of any additional pro-
cedures, and the government's interest in limiting its administrative and fiscal burden. Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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tection clause.82 If the right deprived is fundamental, then the equal
protection clause demands strict scrutiny of both the classification and
the legislative purpose to determine whether the classification is neces-
sary to promote a governmental interest compelling enough to override
the interests of the affected class.8 3 If the classification is not necessary
to achieve the legislative purpose, or if the governmental interest is not
compelling, the statute is unconstitutional."
Finally, substantive review of state action under the due process
clause requires that any legislation that limits a fundamental right, re-
gardless of any classifying scheme, must be necessary to promote a
compelling or overriding governmental interest.85 Thus, when a funda-
mental right is involved, both the equal protection clause and the due
process clause require that any legislation must be narrowly drawn to
promote a compelling governmental interest.86 Obviously, the stan-
dards established by the Wentzel court are not legislation. 7 Neverthe-
less, this approach is a useful analytic tool for evaluating a decision
82. The "rational relationship" test requires that the classification serve some reasonable
governmental interest. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1068 (1979). In addition to the "rational relationship" test and
"strict scrutiny" test (see infra text accompanying notes 83-84), Justice Marshall has argued
that the Court applies "a spectrum of standards" when applying the equal protection clause.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). For a general introduction to the evolution of equal protection standards of
review see G. GUNTHER, supra note 67, at 670-75, and those materials cited at 675 n. 10.
83. Eg., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-33 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-34 (1969).
84. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7 (1978).
85. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). The Supreme Court apparently
transferred the compelling state interest test used in equal protection analysis to the substan-
tive due process analysis in Roe. Id at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Although equal protection and substantive due process analysis are generally two
distinct strands of constitutional scrutiny of legislation, when fundamental rights are in-
volved, equal protection analysis collapses into the substantive due process analysis. See,
Westen, The Empty Idea fEquality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 564 and authorities cited at 562
n.84 (1982); Perry, supra note 82, at 1074-83. But see, Comment, Equal Protection and Due
Process: Contrasting Methods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 527 (1979), arguing that although the Supreme Court has confused
equal protection and due process review, id at 531-33, when fundamental rights are at issue,
the two methods of review are conceptually distinct and should be so applied. Id at 537-41.
87. Courts over the last 60 years have reviewed, for constitutionality, legislation address-
ing the sterilization of the incompetent. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)
(upholding Virginia's compulsory sterilization statute) with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541-42 (1942) (compulsory sterilization statute invalid). See also, In re Moore, 289 N.C.
95, 103-04, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (1976), finding the North Carolina sterilization statute
constitutional. It served compelling state interests in the welfare of the unborn, the preven-
tion of birth of mentally deficient children, and the best interests of incompetent. Id
Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 40, at 1013-23, provides an excellent survey of cases re-
viewing sterilization statutes.
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which in many ways resembles legislation.8
In sterilization cases, several state interests may be considered suf-
ficiently compelling to permit state interference with an incompetent's
right to privacy: (1) the state's interest in protecting the welfare of the
incompetent's unborn child;8 9 (2) the state's interest in protecting the
financial welfare of all citizens;9° and (3) the state's interest, as sover-
eign, in protecting the rights of children and incompetents. 9 The
Court of Appeals, by designing standards that emphasize the best inter-
ests of the child, implicitly decided that only the state's interest in pro-
tecting incompetents and their rights was sufficiently compelling to
warrant state interference with an incompetent's right to privacy. If the
court had used any other rationale to justify its intervention, the incom-
petent's rights arguably would have been infringed.92
A. A Constitutional Analysis of the Jurisdictional Issue
When competent individuals attempt to exercise their fundamen-
tal privacy rights, their right to choose and their right to freedom from
governmental intrusion with their choice coalesce. Theoretically, a
competent individual's privacy rights are protected when the govern-
ment refrains from interfering with both the individual's decisionmak-
ing process and the way in which the individual implements that
88. This approach is admittedly unusual. Although Supreme Court review of a decision
such as Wentzel would probably not follow the textual argument, this approach is enlighten-
ing. Cf. Comment, An Analytical Model to Assure Consideration of Parental and Familial
Interests when Defining the Constitutional Rights of Minors - An Examination of In re Scott
K., 1980 B.Y.U.L. Rnv. 598 urging the judiciary to treat any prospective opinion affecting
fundamental rights as "legislation". Because the public policy set by judicial precedent
often has the same political and practical impact upon society as legislation, the author
recommends that the court apply an equal protection analysis to the opinion. Id at 608.
89. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 9 Or. App. 224, 230, 495 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1972) (classifica-
tion based on whether prospective mother would be able to care for child not denial of equal
protection).
90. See, e.g., In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 103, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (1976) ("The people
.. . have a right to prevent the procreation of children who will become a burden on the
State."); In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 720-21, 157 N.W.2d 171, 177 (1968) ("Mental deficiency
.. . presents a social and economic problem of grave importance .... ").
91. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 288, 235-37, 608 P.2d 635,
639-40 (1980).
92. An indepth analysis of the asserted interests is beyond the scope of this article.
Commentators have concluded that legislation based on any interest other than protecting
the incompetent could not be drawn narrowly enough to allow the state to interfere with an
incompetent's privacy right. See Comment, supra note 46, at 695-702, 708 (concluding that
only best interests standard may protect constitutional rights of incompetents). Cf Com-
ment, Constitutional Law - Legislative Naivet in Involuntary Sterilization Laws, 12 WAKE
FoREST L. REv. 1064, 1080-81 (1976); Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes A Constitu-
tional Re-Evaluation, 14 J. Ftss. LAW 280, 298-303 (1975) (both articles conclude no state
interest compelling; neither article discusses best interests of the incompetent).
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choice. 9 3 For example, if a woman chose to be sterilized and the gov-
ernment prevented her doctor from performing the appropriate sterili-
zation procedure, the government would be interfering with her
freedom of choice. Similarly, any governmental interference with the
actual decisionmaking process, regardless of limitations on the achieve-
ment of sterilization, would interfere with an individual's freedom of
choice. Such intervention would have to be constitutionally justified.
An incompetent's exercise of constitutional freedoms is more
problematic than that of a competent person.94 Because the constitu-
tional right involved in the Wentzel case is a constitutional freedom -
the freedom of choice - and because an incompetent, by definition, is
incapable of exercising choice, ascription of freedom of choice to an
incompetent is "paradoxical."95 Nevertheless, those rights which the
constitution protects should not categorically be denied an individual
because of a physical or mental disability.96 Incompetency should not
93. See Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 193,
199 (giving examples of governmental interference).
94. See general, Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1756 (1981) (defining the problem and developing four theories allowing constitutional free-
dom to be attributed to persons of diminished capacity).
95. In re Grady, 85 N.J. at 235, 426 A.2d at 469; see also Garvey, supra note 94, at 1762,
noting "the difficulty of explaining why we should ascribe, to those unable to choose, liber-
ties that are valued because of the protection they offer for choice."
96. Because the Wentzel decision applies specifically to incompetent minors, one could
argue that the restrictive standards are constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the state may regulate children more closely than adults. See, e.g., Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-39 (1979) (plurality opinion). In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981), the Supreme Court upheld a Utah statute which required physicians to notify the
parents of immature girls prior to performing an abortion. The Court held that, as applied
to immature and dependent minors, parental notification did not violate the minor's consti-
tutional right to privacy. The Court reasoned that the statute did not give parents a veto
over the minor's decision but served "important considerations of family integrity and pro-
tect[ed] adolescents." 450 U.S. at 411.
The reasons justifying different protection for the constitutional rights of children do
not apply when the child is also mentally incompetent. Justice Powell, in his plurality opin-
ion in Belotti v. Baird articulated the three reasons why the constitutional rights of children
have not been protected to the same extent as the rights of adults: "the peculiar vulnerabil-
ity of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed mature manner, and
the importance of the parental role in child rearing." 443 U.S. at 634. Although incompe-
tents apparently possess all of these characteristics, careful examination of Justice Powell's
reasoning reveals otherwise. Justice Powell first suggested that the peculiar vulnerability of
children may allow the state to provide fewer procedural safeguards for children. Id at
634-35. Procedural due process, however, is designed to protect individuals from biased
decisionmaking processes; the vulnerability of the individual should not be relevant to the
adequacy of the process afforded him. Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the
Family, supra note 46, at 1368 (1980).
With regard to the second reason, Justice Powell noted that the state's power to limit
the decisions of immature children is premised on the notion that these children may be
adversely affected by an unthoughtful decision when they mature. Bellotti v. Baird, 443
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result in the loss of constitutional rights. 9 7
Although a competent individual's freedom to choose is protected
when the government does not interfere with both the choice and the
right to implement and avoid the consequences of not making that
choice, for incompetents, governmental noninterference cannot simul-
taneously protect all aspects of the privacy right. Because an incompe-
tent is generally unable to consent to sterilization effectively, physicians
usually refuse to sterilize the mentally incompetent without a court or-
der.98 Thus, in the absence of a court order, an incompetent will be
unable to obtain a sterilization, and, consequently, could be denied her
freedom to choose. To protect an incompetent's freedom to choose to
have a sterilization, the state must step in and either grant or deny the
sterilization of the incompetent or allow someone else to consent to the
incompetent's sterilization." Paradoxically, the state must seem to in-
terfere with an incompetent's privacy right to protect that privacy right.
Because the state must become involved in the decision to protect
the incompetent's privacy right, state courts must interject themselves
U.S. at 635-36. Justice Powell noted that in an earlier case the Supreme Court upheld a
statute which prevented minors from selling religious literature on the ground that "'the
interests of society to protect the welfare of children' and to give them 'opportunities for
growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens', permitted the state to
enforce its statute, which '[c]oncededly... would be invalid' if made applicable to adults."
443 U.S. at 636 n.14 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 162, 165, 167 (1944)
(citations omitted)). Because permanently mentally incompetent minors will never develop
into competent adults, protection of these minors to preserve their autonomous development
is illogical.
The third basis for limiting the constitutional rights of children articulated by Justice
Powell is similarly inapplicable to mentally incompetent individuals. Parental infringement
on the constitutional rights of their children is based on "[t]he duty to prepare the child for
'additional obligations'." 443 U.S. at 637 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233
(1972)). "Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding." 443 U.S. at 638-39 (citation
omitted). Permanently mentally incompetent minors will not grow to participate fully in
society. Thus, the rights of incompetent minors and incompetent adults should be equally
protected. The age of the incompetent is irrelevant.
97. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. App. 1982). "To protect the incompetent person
within its power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford
to that person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons."
Id at 720 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
746, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977)).
98. See supra notes 16 and 17.
99. See Tribe, Foreward" Toward a Model of Roles & the Due Process of Life and Law,
87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973). Tribe argues that the Roe v. Wade decision should be analyzed
as a case in which the court was "choosing among alternative allocations of decisionmaking
authority." Id at I I (emphasis omitted). One of his theses is that "the due process clause is
violated whenever the state either assumes a role the Constitution entrusts to another, or
fails to assume a role the Constitution imposes upon it." Id at 15.
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into the sterilization decision by accepting jurisdiction over sterilization
petitions. If a court refuses to accept jurisdiction over sterilization peti-
tions, incompetents will never be able to procure sterilizations; and as a
matter of fact, the court's refusal to act would lead to the deprivation of
an incompetent's fundamental privacy rights." By this analysis, the
Court of Appeals may have been constitutionally compelled to accept
jurisdiction over sterilization petitions.'
B. Constitutional Analysis of the Wentzel Standards
Assuming that judicial intervention into the sterilization decision
is necessary to protect the rights of the incompetent, what form should
that intervention take? The court must first identify the appropriate
decisionmaker, and then develop constitutionally adequate standards
to guide that decisionmaker. Addressing the first of these issues, a
court, by granting all petitions requesting the authority to consent, in
effect, could allow the guardians 0 2 of an incompetent to decide
whether that incompetent will be sterilized. Or the court itself could
decide whether an incompetent should be sterilized, and, finding sterili-
zation warranted, authorize the guardians to consent.
Indiscriminate authorization of all guardians' petitions would be
unwise as a matter of policy, and might impermissibly infringe on the
incompetent's rights. Although parents or guardians are presumptively
motivated by the best interests of their children, 03 their interest in their
100. See text accompanying notes 16-17.
101. It is axiomatic that the Constitution protects individuals only against "state" depri-
vation of constitutional rights. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because it is the unwilling-
ness of the medical profession to sterilize incompetents without a court order that actually
prevents incompetents from exercising their constitutional freedom, the state seems not to be
implicated. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the plaintiffs challenged the
state's mandatory statutory requirement that anyone seeking a divorce pay a minimum court
fee. The Supreme Court held that when a state monopolizes the means of exercising a con-
stitutional right, the state may limit access to that means only on the basis of a "counter-
vailing . . . interest of overriding significance." Id at 377. Connecticut's interest in
preventing frivolous litigation and in allocating scarce resources was not sufficient to over-
ride an indigent's right to obtain a divorce. By analogy, the state must provide a forum
within which incompetents will be allowed to exercise their constitutional right to privacy.
The argument for requiring the state to provide such a forum is more persuasive in Wenizel
than in Boddie. For those judicially declared incompetent, the state has erected a barrier to
the exercise of all legal rights. Furthermore, the state affirmatively designates those individ-
uals whom this barrier will obstruct by declaring them legally incompetent. Therefore, the
state must afford those judicially declared to be incompetent a forum within which to vindi-
cate their constitutional rights.
102. This Article will use the term "guardians" to refer to any person standing in loco
parentis.
103. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1978). Parents have a common-law duty to care
for and protect their child, including the limited ability to make medical decisions for the
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incompetent child's welfare may conflict with the child's right to pri-
vacy. " A guardian's view of what is best for the child may be colored
by concern for the mental competency of the incompetent's children or
the incompetent's ability to care for children, 05 or a wish to avoid the
costs associated with the birth and raising of a child. " The parents or
guardians of a severely mentally retarded child may be motivated by a
desire to protect her from the normal hygienic and emotional problems
associated with menstruation.° 7 Because judicial intrusion into an in-
competent's privacy is premised on protecting that incompetent's
rights, a disinterested decisionmaker is generally in a better position to
decide whether a particular incompetent should be sterilized than is
that incompetent's parent or guardian. Thus, rubberstamped parental
or guardian control over the sterilization decision would be improper.
To guide the circuit court, as the disinterested decisionmaker, the
Wentzel court recognized the importance of substantive standards eval-
uating the appropriateness of sterilization. Because judicial authoriza-
tion is the only mechanism through which an incompetent may exercise
her constitutional rights, the Wentzel standards must satisfy the same
constitutional requirements that the jurisdictional decision must satisfy.
Specifically, the standards must provide procedural due process0 8 and
must be narrowly drawn to promote a compelling governmental
interest. 109
Because the only governmental interest sufficiently compelling to
allow the state to intervene in the sterilization decision is an interest in
protecting the incompetent, 110 any standards governing sterilization de-
cisions must protect the privacy rights of the incompetent. The Wentzel
standards require circuit courts to find, first, that the incompetent is
child. Id at 600. See generally Comment, Sterilization, Retardation, and ParentalAuthority,
1978 B.Y.U.L. REv. 380, 387-404 (examining the common-law parent-child relationship).
104. See, e.g., Comment, The Sterilization Rights of Mental Retardates, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 207, 215-16 (1982); Neuwirth, supra note 16, at 455 (parent's interest may be dia-
metrically opposed to child's).
105. Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So.2d 310, 311 (Ala. 1979).
106. Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 760, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65-66 (1974).
107. 293 Md. at 706, 447 A.2d at 1255 (Smith, J., concurring and dissenting) ("the diffi-
culties connected with menstruation apparently ... [have] motivated [the] request for the
operation").
108. See supra note 81. By requiring that the court appoint an independent guardian ad
litem to act on the ward's behalf and that the guardian ad litem be given ful opportunity to
meet with the minor, present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at a full judicial hearing,
the court granted full procedural due process rights to the incompetent child. 293 Md. at
703, 447 A.2d at 1253. For a discussion of the appointment of a guardian ad litem see supra
note 10.
109. See upra text accompanying notes 82 to 86.
110. See supra notes 89 to 92 and accompanying text.
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incapable of making the sterilization decision.'I' Because circuit court
intervention is justified only if the individual is unable to exercise her
constitutional rights, that finding is a threshold finding. It merely iden-
tifies the group of persons for whom the court will be the surrogate
decisionmaker. If a legally incompetent individual is capable of mak-
ing the sterilization decision, the court should follow that choice. Sec-
ond, the court must find that sterilization is in the best interests of the
incompetent." 2 But, even if the court decides that sterilization would
be in the incompetent's best interests, it must make a third finding -
that sterilization is medically necessary to protect the incompetent's
health." 13
The medical necessity standard is so restrictive that circuit courts,
in all but extraordinary circumstances, will be unable to grant steriliza-
tion petitions. Thus the court, the surrogate decisionmaker for the in-
competent, has been denied the opportunity to choose that which may
be in the best interests of the incompetent. To restrict the freedom of
the court to choose is to restrict the privacy rights of the incompetent.
Such a restriction is unconstitutional.
C. Suggestionsfor the Court
The Wentzel court could have developed a substituted judgment
standard that would protect the incompetent's privacy rights." 4 Al-
though the source of jurisdiction under the court's analysis, the parens
patriae doctrine, requires the court to act in the "best interests" of the
incompetent" 5-an objective requirement--the definition of "best in-
terests" is open to judicial interpretation." 6 Despite Maryland prece-
dent restricting the use of the substituted judgment doctrine,' the
111. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253-54. For a discussion of assessing competence, see
R. MACKLIN & W. GAYLIN, MENTAL RETARDATION AND STERILIZATION 57-62, 149-64
(1981).
112. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253-54.
113. Id
114. Because the issue of which standards should govern the court in making the steriliza-
tion decision was not briefed by any of the three parties before the court, the court did not
have the benefit of opposing views.
115. See supra note 4.
116. For example, the best interests in child custody cases vary from case to case depend-
ing on the factors involved in each situation. See Ester, Maryland Custody Law - Fully
Committed to the Child's Best Interests?, 41 MD. L. REv. 225, 262-73 (1982).
117. An early Maryland case implied that an equity court's power to substitute its judg-
ment for that of an incompetent arose from a court's inherent equity jurisdiction. Corrie's
Case, 2 Bland 488, 492-93 (1830). But in Kelly v. Scott, 215 Md. 530, 137 A.2d 704 (1958),
the Court of Appeals held that, unless a statute conferred the power, Maryland equity courts
could not exercise substituted judgment. Id at 533-35, 137 A.2d at 705-06. Whether a
court has inherent or statutory power to exercise substituted judgment has been the subject
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court could have relied on the principles of substituted judgment in
developing a best interests standard. Judicial application of the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine usually entails the use of subjective standards,
but when it is impracticable to determine the past subjective desires of
an incompetent, the court will supplement any past evidence of the in-
competent's desire with a judgment as to what a reasonable person in
the incompetent's position would choose." 8 Because a substituted
judgment standard is less well defined than the Wentzel court's best
interests standards, any particular sterilization decision will be more
difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, the constitutional rights of the incom-
petent demand a substituted judgment standard.
Assuming that the court has found that an incompetent is unable
to make a decision about sterilization," 9 the court should then consider
medical evidence about whether that incompetence is permanent. 20
When determining the permanency of incompetence, the court should
consider the individual's age and disability, but the incompetent's age
should not be dispositive. A fifteen year-old with the mental ability of
a two year-old will become, if her incompetence is permanent, a thirty
year-old with the same mental ability. If an individual's incompetence
is permanent, her youth should not preclude the exercise of her consti-
tutional rights. 12 1 If the incompetency is temporary, the court should
not consider the sterilization petition.
When an incompetent is both presently and permanently incapa-
ble of making the sterilization decision, the circuit court should substi-
tute its judgment for that of the incompetent. First, the court must
consider any expression by the incompetent when she was capable of
making the decision as to her choice. Although such evidence may fre-
quently be unavailable, in a small number of cases the evidence will be
invaluable.
Second, the court should consider evidence concerning both the
of comment. Compare Carrington, The Application of Lunatics' Estatesfor the Benefit of
Dependent Relatives, 2 VA. L. REV. 204, 204-07 (1914-15) (doctrine was part of inherent
equitable power) with Thompson & Hale, The Surplus Income of a Lunatic, 8 HARV. L. REv.
472, 472 n. I (1894-95) (recognizing division of authority but stating that the power "appears
to have been first definitely" statutory). Nevertheless, the absence in Maryland of statutory
authority to use the substituted judgment doctrine should not hamstring the court. The
Constitution, in place of a statute, provides sufficient authority to overcome the restriction of
the Kelly v. Scott precedent.
118. See supra note 25.
119. But if a legally incompetent individual is capable of making a sterilization decision,
the court should follow that choice.
120. The Wentzel standards require this finding. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1253-54.
121. Paradoxically, the severe incompetence of the person eliminates to a great extent the
adult/minor distinction that is often made in privacy rights cases. See supra note 96.
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physical and psychological health of the incompetent and the physical
and psychological effect of sterilization on the incompetent. For exam-
ple, evidence of poor physical health may weigh against choosing steril-
ization. Evidence of the psychological effect of sterilization on the
incompetent may weigh for or against sterilization.1 22 The lack of med-
ical necessity, however, should not prevent the court from granting the
sterilization petition.
Those factors are not all inclusive. To determine what other cir-
cumstances are relevant in each particular case, the circuit court must
consider the purpose for the sterilization. For example, if sterilization
is posited as a method of birth control, the court should determine if
other less intrusive means of contraception are feasible, 23 their effec-
tiveness, and their effect on the incompetent. Considering all factors
that are relevant to the choice of sterilization, the court should substi-
tute its judgment for that of the incompetent. 24 Thus, the incompe-
tent's right to choose will be protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Maryland correctly accepted jurisdiction
over petitions requesting the authority to consent to the sterilization of
incompetent minors. When adopting standards to govern the consider-
ation of those petitions, however, the Court of Appeals failed in two
respects. First, the court established a restrictive medical necessity re-
quirement which prohibits circuit courts from both acting in the incom-
petent's best interests and protecting the incompetent's right to choose
to be sterilized. Second, the court did not provide genuine guidance to
circuit courts for determining when an individual should be sterilized.
When the Court of Appeals again considers the issue of sterilization, it
should reevaluate the constitutional implications of the Wenizel deci-
sion. Specifically, when the Court of Appeals decides whether the
Wentzel standards apply to the sterilization of adults, it should redefine
the Wentzel standards to protect the incompetent's constitutional free-
dom of choice.
122. Roos, Psychological Impact of Sterilization on the Individual, I LAW & PSYCHOLOGY
REv. 45,passim (1975).
123. The Wentzel standards include this type of inquiry. 293 Md. at 703, 447 A.2d
1253-54.
124. For a similar conclusion, see 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 467, 474 (1982).
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TURNER V STATE - SHOULD AN ACCOMPLICE'S
EXCITED UTTERANCE CORROBORATE HIS IN-
COURT TESTIMONY?
The testimony of an accomplice is viewed with great suspicion
under Maryland law. Presumed untrustworthy, such testimony will not
support a conviction unless corroborated by independent evidence ca-
pable of identifying the accused with the crime.' In Turner v. State,2
the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the question of whether
an accomplice's excited utterance3 could sufficiently corroborate his in-
court testimony.4 Holding this evidence insufficient, the court deter-
mined that Maryland's accomplice corroboration rule requires that cor-
roboration be derived from a source independent of the accomplice
himself.5 In so holding, the court failed to consider this judicially cre-
ated rule in light of its underlying purpose and consequently rejected
probative, reliable evidence.6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In February, 1980, Howard A. Turner was convicted of first degree
murder in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City.7 The decisive evi-
dence against Turner was the testimony of an accomplice' who stated
1. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 246, 378 A.2d 1104, 1108 (1977); see infra
notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
2. 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d 416 (1982).
3. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) defines an excited utterance as a "statement relating to a star-
ding event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition." For a discussion of the rationale behind the excited utterance
exception, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 297 (2d ed. 1972).
4. McCormick suggests that a declarant's excited utterance is more reliable than his
testimony in court "given at a time when his powers of reflection and fabrication are opera-
tive." Id. at 704. Prior to Turner, however, the court never addressed the question of
whether an accomplice's excited utterance was sufficient corroboration of his in-court
testimony.
5. 294 Md. at 647, 452 A.2d at 420.
6. A dissenting opinion, filed by Judge Smith and joined by Chief Judge Murphy, 294
Md. at 647, 452 A.2d at 420 (Smith, J., dissenting), noted that the accomplice corroboration
rule was of judicial origin, and, as such, no reason for excluding the excited utterance exists
if the jury can find truth in it. The decision in Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 378 A.2d 1104
(1977), reaffirmed and set forth the reasons for retaining the accomplice corroboration rule.
See Mfra text accompanying note 26.
7. In addition, Turner was found guilty of unlawful use of a handgun and robbery with
a deadly weapon. Appellant's Brief at 2, Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d 416 (1982).
8. The accomplice, John Morris, had previously pled guilty to charges of second degree
murder and robbery with a deadly weapon, but was not yet sentenced at the time of the
Turner trial. Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d 416 (1982).
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that both he and the victim had been shot by Turner during the course
of a hold-up.' The accomplice further testified that, immediately after
being shot, he fled to a nearby apartment where he excitedly told the
occupants what had transpired.'" The occupants of this apartment ap-
peared at the trial as third-party witnesses and related the accomplice's
excited utterance to the court." Over the objections of the defense, the
trial court held the excited utterance to be sufficient corroboration of
the accomplice's in-court testimony.'
2
Agreeing that the accomplice's excited utterance sufficiently cor-
roborated his in-court testimony, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
Turner's conviction.' 3 The Court of Appeals reversed, however, hold-
ing that the accomplice corroboration rule' 4 required that evidence be
derived from a source independent of the accomplice himself." Al-
though acknowledging that the accomplice's excited utterance was ad-
missible, the court nonetheless concluded that the third-party testimony
offered by the state was insufficient corroboration. ' 6 To hold otherwise,
the court concluded, essentially would allow an accomplice to corrobo-
rate himself. '
Although at first glance this holding seems consistent with the rule,
closer examination reveals that the court's reasoning was misguided.
This Recent Decision will illustrate how the excited utterance and the
accomplice corroboration rule can work together in assuring the relia-
bility of accomplice testimony.
9. 294 Md. at 641, 452 A.2d at 417. The accomplice apparently was shot by accident.
Brief of Appellee at 4, Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d 416 (1982).
10. A police officer testified that he had seen the accomplice running from the scene of
the crime, and that he had encountered the accomplice, soon thereafter, in the apartment.
294 Md. at 649, 452 A.2d at 421 (Smith, J., dissenting).
11. Both of the third-party witnesses attributed the following declaration to the accom-
plice: "We robbed someone. . . if the m f-----g Howard [Turner] had shot right he
wouldn't have shot me." Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d
416 (1982).
12. Appellant's Brief at 2, Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d 416 (1982).
13. Turner v. State, 48 Md. App. 370, 428 A.2d 88 (1981).
14. See supra text accompanying note 1; infra text accompanying note 28.
15. 294 Md. at 644,452 A.2d at 418 (1982); see infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
16. The state argued that because an excited utterance is a trustworthy statement, it
satisfies the purposes of the accomplice corroboration rule. Brief of Appellee at 10, Turner
v. State, 294 Md. 640, 452 A.2d 416 (1982). The court, however, rejected the state's argu-
ment, stating that it confused "the admissibility of evidence with its sufficiency to serve as
corroboration." 294 Md. at 646, 452 A.2d at 419.
17. 294 Md. at 647, 452 A.2d at 420; see infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
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THE ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATION RULE
In the early 1900's, 8 Maryland joined a minority 9 of states in
adopting an accomplice corroboration rule.20 Since then, the Court of
Appeals has set forth two justifications for the rule: First, because the
accomplice is admittedly guilty of the crime in question, his testimony
is presumed untrustworthy. 2 Second, and perhaps of greater concern,
is the possibility that an accomplice's desire for prosecutorial favor
might motivate fabrication of his testimony.22
Although these are important concerns, 23 the accomplice corrobo-
ration rule's purpose is confined to ensuring the reliability24 of accom-
plice testimony. Hence, courts have taken care to avoid making the
rule so rigorous that it operates to exclude otherwise reliable evidence.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Brown v. State 25 specifically ques-
tioned whether the rule should be abandoned in its entirety. In decid-
ing to retain the rule as an added safeguard, the court recognized its
"limited utility"26 and cautioned that only minimal evidence should be
18. The case usually cited as having formulated the accomplice corroboration rule is
Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911), but the requirement was first applied in
Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909).
19. The accomplice corroboration rule is not used in the federal courts or those of some
thirty-four states. While the rule in Maryland and Tennessee is judicially created, in other
minority states the rule is mandated by statute: ALA. CODE § 12 - 21 - 222 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.020 (1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43 - 2116 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1111 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 19 - 2117 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.04 (West
1947); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46 - 16 - 213 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.291 (1979); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.22 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-21-14 (1974); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 742 (West 1969); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.440 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-8 (1979); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.14 (Vernon 1979).
20. At common law, the court merely instructed the jury to review the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice with caution. This is the practice followed in the federal courts
and those state courts that do not have the accomplice corroboration rule. Wigmore pre-
ferred this approach, stating that the need for corroboration was best addressed on a case-
by-case basis. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2060, at 451 (Chadwick rev. ed. 1978). For a
comparative view tracing the origin of the rule to Roman law, see Peiris, Corroboration In
Judicial Proceedings.: English, South African And Sri Lankan Law on The Testimony of Ac-
comp/lices, 30 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 682 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955), cited with
approval in Brown, 281 Md. at 244, 378 A.2d at 1107.
22. Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 293, 81 A. 681, 684 (1911), cited with approvalin Brown,
281 Md. at 243, 378 A.2d at 1105-06.
23. The Brown court recognized that the growing use of accomplices as state witnesses
increased these concerns. 281 Md. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108.
24. The Turner court noted that "as a safeguard against depriving the factfinder of evi-
dence from a source intimately connected with the crime," only slight corroboration is
needed. 294 Md. at 642, 452 A.2d at 417.
25. 281 Md. 241, 242, 378 A.2d 1104, 1105 (1977).
26. Id. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108.
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required as corroboration.27 Thus, in order to satisfy the rule, the state
need only present evidence that independently identifies the accused
with either the perpetrators of the crime or the commission of the crime
itself.28 As long as this standard is satisfied, the accomplice's entire
testimony will be deemed sufficiently trustworthy to go to the jury.2 9
THE TURNER DECISION
In applying this standard to the facts in Turner, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the evidence did not satisfy the accomplice corrobora-
tion rule even though the evidence offered as corroboration clearly
identified Turner as a participant in the crime.30 Rather, the court fo-
cused its inquiry upon the requirement that corroborative evidence be
independent." Although previous decisions required that such evi-
dence be independent-in the sense that it could sufficiently identify
the accused with the crime without having to rely upon the accom-
plice's in-court testimony 32-the Turner decision added a new dimen-
sion to this requirement: Corroborative evidence must be derived from
a source not only independent of the accomplice's testimony, but in-
dependent of the accomplice himself 33
27. Id. See also 294 Md. at 644, 452 A.2d at 418 (only "minimal evidence [is] required"
to corroborate).
28. 281 Md. at 244, 378 A.2d at 1107.
29. Corroborative evidence is not required to cover every detail. As long as the accused
is identified with the crime or its perpetrators, the jury is allowed to "credit the accomplice's
testimony even with respect to matters as to which no corroboration was adduced." Id.
30. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. This testimony, although not actually
naming Turner as the killer, tends to show that he was involved in the robbery and that he
unlawfully used a handgun. Thus, the testimony was sufficient corroboration.
31. 294 Md. at 646-47, 452 A.2d at 419-20.
32. The Turner court cited no Maryland cases in support of its conclusion that an ac-
complice's testimony must be corroborated by evidence "from some source other than the
accomplice himself." Id. at 644, 452 A.2d at 418. None of the out-of-state cases cited by the
court in support of this conclusion involved excited utterances. Moreover, neither Brown
nor any of Maryland's other accomplice corroboration rule decisions placed emphasis upon
an independent source requirement. Although the Brown decision mentioned that material
facts must be corroborated by evidence "independent of the accomplice's testimony," this
language only requires that the corroborative evidence be able to identify the accused with
the crime without the aid of the accomplice's in-court testimony. 281 Md. at 246, 378 A.2d
at 1108. See infra note 39. This is also the rule in Tennessee, the only other state to have a
judicially created accomplice corroboration rule, as well as in New York. See State v. Fowl-
er, 213 Tenn. 239, 373 S.W. 2d 460 (1963) (requiring corroborative evidence which "taken by
itself' identifies the accused); People v. Hudson, 51 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 414 N.E.2d 385,
387-88, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007 (1980) (Reliance may not be "placed on testimony of the
accomplice. . . . [T]he so-called corroborative evidence must stand on its own.").
33. "We believe the conclusion . . . logical that commensurate with the requirement
that an accomplice's testimony . . . be corroborated is the requirement that the evidence
offered as corroboration . . . be independent of the accomplice's testimony. Clearly, re-
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Although it noted the trustworthiness of an excited utterance, the
court stated that the issue turned not upon the statement's reliability,
but upon its sufficiency as corroboration.34 Yet, by focusing upon the
evidentiary source rather than the manifest reliability of the excited ut-
terance, the Turner court disregarded the Brown court's reason for
choosing to retain the accomplice corroboration rule: To safeguard
against unreliable accomplice testimony.3" Hence, in conceding the ut-
terance's reliability yet rejecting its sufficiency, the court applied the
rule in a manner that ignored the very reason for its existence.36
At least two theoretical routes lay open to the court for avoiding
this anomalous result. First, the court could have considered the ex-
cited utterance, as defined by traditional res gestae theory,37 as in-
dependent of the declarant. 38 A second and perhaps more satisfactory
alternative would have been to recognize that an accomplice's excited
utterance provides a justifiable exception to the court's independent
source requirement.
Although the first route is artificial, it is no less so than the court's
distinction between reliability and sufficiency. 39 At the very least, it
peating what an accomplice stated out of court cannot mount this hurdle." 294 Md. at
646-47, 452 A.2d at 419 (emphasis added).
34. 294 Md. at 646, 452 A.2d at 419. The court stated that the question was not "the
reliability of the statement but its sufficiency as corroboration. Id.
35. 281 Md. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108.
36. One of the principle weaknesses of the Turner opinion was the court's rigid adher-
ence to the technical form of the accomplice corroboration rule without paying regard to the
rule's substantive purpose, as demonstrated by the following passage:
We agree with the State that when the utterance is closely connected in time and caus-
ally connected with the event itself that the likelihood for reflection and fabrication by
the utterer is most unlikely if not improbable. However, despite the usual credibility
given to an excited utterance and despite the minimal evidence required to be corrobora-
tive, we think it at least implicit in the requirement that. . . corroboration come from a
source other than the accomplice himself.
294 Md. at 644, 452 A.2d at 418 (emphasis added).
37. The phrase res gestae refers to both the principal litigated act and the acts and decla-
rations which accompany it. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 288; Thayer, Beding/leld's Case
- Declarations AsA Part Of The Res Gesta (pts. I-IlI), 14 AM. L. REV. 817 (1880), 15 AM.
L. REV. 1, 71 (1881), [hereinafter cited as Thayer]; see generally 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1745-57 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) (stating the general form of the res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule). Because the res gestae declaration is so connected to the principal act, it
becomes a natural part of it and is thus admissible as a hearsay exception. See Thayer,
supra, 14 AM. L. REV. at 829; Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869).
38. The traditional theory was best stated by Thayer: The declarations are admissible as
a part of the event itself - "it being always understood that they are not to be taken upon the
credit ofthe declarant." Thayer, supra note 37, 15 AM. L. REV. at 83 (emphasis added).
39. The court's reasoning may be broken down into the following steps:
(1) Excited utterances are admissible because "the likelihood for reflection and
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leads to a sensible result. Like all res gestae declarations, 4° the excited
utterance derives its trustworthiness from its theoretical identity with
the act itself.4' To qualify as an excited utterance, a declaration must
be both spontaneous 42 and causally connected4 3 to a startling event.44
Considered a product of the event45 rather than of the declarant,' ex-
fabrication by the utterer is most unlikely if not improbable." 294 Md. at 644, 452 A.2d
at 418.
(2) The accomplice, however, is presumed to be untrustworthy and may have
dishonest motives; therefore, his testimony must be corroborated. 294 Md. at 642, 452
A.2d at 417.
(3) Corroboration must be sufficient.
(4) Because the excited utterance is the product of the accomplice, it will not
suffice as corroboration. This is presumably because accomplices are unreliable and
may fabricate their testimony in order to gain prosecutorial favor.
Plainly, steps (1) and (4) are irreconcilable. Moreover, sufficiency has never been
dependent upon the source of testimony. Sufficiency hinges upon whether the evidence is
able to link the accused to the crime. In Wright v. State, 219 Md. 643, 150 A.2d 733 (1959),
the Court of Appeals quoted the following passage with approval: "[I1t seems that corrobo-
ration which with some degree of cogency tends to establish facts material and relevant
which would authorize the jury to credit the accomplice's testimony should be sufficient."
Id. at 649, 150 A.2d at 737 (quoting 1 H. UNDERHILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CIMI-
NAL EVIDENCE § 185, at 412 (5th ed. 1956)). Viewed in this light, the accomplice's excited
utterance was sufficient in this respect.
40. McCormick gives four examples of res gestae declarations: "(1) declarations of pres-
ent bodily condition, (2) declarations of present mental states and emotions, (3) excited ut-
terances, and (4) declarations of present sense impressions." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3,
§ 288, at 686. For an early discussion of these separate classifications, see Morgan, A Sug-
gested Classfcation of Utterances Admissible As Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922); Stone,
Res Gesta Reagitata, 55 LAW Q. REV. 66 (1939).
41. Wharton stated that "the statement born of surprise is an act, just as much as shoot-
ing a gun is an act, and may therefore be described by testimony in court." 2 F. WHARTON,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 297, at 62 (13th ed. 1972).
42. Spontaneity lasts as long as the shock prevents the declarant from reflecting upon
the event. Thus, depending upon the circumstances, an excited utterance may be made
within seconds or hours of the startling event. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 297, at
706.
43. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 3, 26 A.2d 770, 772 (1942) ("tested, not by
closeness in time, but by [causal] connection").
44. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 297, at 704; Morgan,
supra note 40, at 238. For a comparison of the reliability of excited utterances and present
sense impressions, see Note, The Present Sense Impression, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1053 (1978).
45. Thayer described res gestae declarations with a "pebble-in-the-pond" metaphor.
The causal event is similar to a stone cast upon the water; the declarations which arise from
this event are likened to the ripples which "extend outward after the stone has sunken from
sight." Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay.- Origs
and Attributes, 66 IOwA L. REV. 869, 898 (1981). The metaphor applies well to the Turner
case: The stone thrown upon the water (i.e., the causal event) is the robbery-murder in
which the accomplice was wounded; the extending ripples (i.e., the res gestae) are the ac-
complice's excited utterance and his plainly visible wound.
46. The Maryland courts seem to have accepted this traditional view. See, e.g., Reckard
v. State, 2 Md. App. 312, 316, 234 A.2d 630, 632 (1967), cert. denied, 248 Md. 734 (1968)
(calling an excited utterance the "facts talking through the party" rather than the declarant's
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cited utterances are believed to be free from fabrication,47 and are
therefore reliable.4" Hence, the testimony offered by the state with re-
spect to the accomplice's utterance in Turner could have been accepted,
under the traditional view, as independent corroborative evidence.
But the vitality of the traditional res gestae concept is steadily fad-
ing, 49 and this analysis is unlikely to carry much force today. ° The
current relaxation of the traditional res gestae theory does not, how-
ever, discredit the excited utterance as a reliable hearsay exception. In-
deed, the excited utterance, regardless of its source, is widely
recognized as a proven guarantor of testimonial veracity." As such, a
second route lay open to the court: The excited utterance could have
served as a justified exception to the accomplice corroboration rule's
independent source requirement.
Other rulings by Maryland courts with respect to excited utter-
ances and other extrajudicial declarations tend to support this second
alternative. The courts have relied upon the excited utterances of in-
competent52 and biased53 witnesses in the corroboration of their in-
mere narration of the facts); accord, Honick v. Walden, 10 Md. App. 714, 272 A.2d 406
(1971); see I H. UNDERHILL, sUpra note 39, § 266. Butcf. I S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 123, at 207 (rev. ed. 1896) (such declarations "are in truth original
evidence") (emphasis in original).
47. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 704.
48. Contra, Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence." Sponta-
neous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 433 (1928). These writers attack the reliability
of this exception on the ground that an excited utterance may be inaccurate because the
declarant's powers to observe may be lessened while in an excited state. For a view to the
contrary stating that this concern is "outweighed by the advantages of freedom from motiva-
tion," see Strahorn, Extra-Legal Materials And Evidence, 29 ILL. L. Rv. 300, 316 n.24
(1934), reprinted i 15 MD. L. REv. 330, 344 n.24 (1955).
49. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 288, at 687 ("The ancient phrase can well be
jetisoned [sic]. . . it has served well its era in the evolution of evidence law."). For a hu-
morous portrayal of the traditional res gestae theory being used in a modern courtroom, see
Moylan, Res Gestae, Or Why Is That Event Speaking And What Is It Doing In This Court-
room?, 63 A.B.A.J. 968 (1977).
50. The phrase res gestae has generated confusion because "of its exasperating indefi-
niteness." Morgan, supra note 40, at 229.
51. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 704 ("all courts today recognize an exception
to the hearsay rule" for excited utterances).
52. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 561, 338 A.2d 344, 347 (1975) (testimo-
nial competence in cases involving excited utterances is irrelevant); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 37, § 1751.
53. Although rape victims are arguably biased witnesses, the rule in Maryland and other
states is that a rape victim's complaint, made without delay, is sufficient corroboration of the
in-court testimony. This rule stems from the excited utterance exception, but it is less de-
manding with respect to the time element. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 297, at 709;
Green v. State, 161 Md. 75, 82, 155 A. 164, 167 (1931); Guardino v. State, 50 Md. App. 695,
706, 440 A.2d 1101, 1107 (1982) (victim's complaint made while "emotionally engulfed by
the situation" was res gestae and can support her testimony).
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court testimony. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has long held that an
impeached witness's prior consistent statements, made shortly after the
event and "before the motive to fabricate existed," are admissible to
corroborate his in-court testimony. 4 Although such language is broad
enough to include extrajudicial statements in general, it plainly indi-
cates that an excited utterance can be used to corroborate an im-
peached witness. Indeed, the time constraints applied to excited
utterances may make them more reliable than other extrajudicial state-
ments.55 Moreover, biased and impeached witnesses, who have been
proved unreliable, are not necessarily more reliable than accomplices,
who are onlypresumed to be untrustworthy. Thus, if the testimony of
biased or impeached witnesses may be corroborated by their own ex-
cited utterances, the same should hold true for the corroboration of
accomplice testimony.56
This reasoning is supported by dictum in an early Court of Ap-
peals decision, Lanasa v. State." In reviewing a criminal conviction,58
the Lanasa court was asked to determine whether an out-of-court dec-
laration of an impeached accomplice59 could be used to corroborate his
in-court testimony. Although the particular facts of the case mandated
a negative reply,' the court quoted with approval the accepted stan-
dard for corroborating an impeached witness. 61 The court thus indi-
cated that if the accomplice's declaration had been made shortly after
the event, it would have sufficed as corroboration.62
54. See Cross v. State, 118 Md. 660, 86 A. 223 (1912); City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Knee,
83 Md. 77, 79, 34 A. 252, 253 (1896). Indeed, the City Passenger line of cases would seem to
allow an impeached witness to corroborate himself. This approach is inconsistent with the
court's holding in Turner. See supra text accompanying note 17.
55. See Strahorn, supra note 48, 15 MD. L. REv. at 344 ("The brevity of the interval.
indicates absence of motive for falsehood.").
56. Corroboration is required to prevent fabricated testimony, so whether the witness is
an accomplice, a biased witness, or an impeached witness is irrelevant.
57. 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909). See supra note 17.
58. The defendants were accused of conspiracy and destruction of property. 109 Md. at
602, 71 A. at 1508.
59. Certainly an impeached accomplice is much less reliable than an ordinary
accomplice.
60. The accomplice's statement was made 39 days after the commission of the crime,
and thus it did not qualify. 109 Md. at 620, 71 A. at 1065.
61. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
62. 109 Md. at 621, 71 A. at 1065 ("To bring the case within this exception it must
appear that the [declaration] occured soon after the transaction. ") (emphasis in original).
Somewhat analogous to this finding is the holding in Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29
(1958). In Judy, the Court of Appeals allowed an accomplice's extrajudicial identification of
the accused's photograph to be "admitted for the purpose of corroborating the [accomplice]
and bolstering his credibility." Undoubtedly, this prior identification was made by the ac-
complice; thus, the court in Judy is, in fact, allowing an accomplice to corroborate himself.
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Hence, even assuming that the Turner court correctly found that
the excited utterance was not from a source independent of the accom-
plice, it still had ample support for allowing its use as corroboration.
The rationale underlying the accomplice corroboration rule is that an
accomplice's testimony is inherently untrustworthy. The same ration-
ale supports the rejection of other witnesses' testimony. An impeached
witness may be a notorious liar; a biased witness may be so interested
in the outcome of the trial that he is willing to fabricate his testimony;
an incompetent witness, although perhaps sincere, may not understand
the difference between truth and falsehood. Nonetheless, these wit-
nesses' excited utterances are considered reliable even if their in-court
testimony is not.63
The same rule should apply to the excited utterance of a poten-
tially unreliable accomplice. An accomplice's motive to fabricate may
be greater than, say, that of a biased witness. This difference, however,
seems one of degree only, and is far from inevitable in every case. One
can easily imagine a situation in which a biased witness stands to gain
much more by lying than an accomplice stands to lose by telling the
truth. Moreover, the accomplice corroboration rule has never required
much in the way of corroboration.' Therefore, an accomplice's ex-
cited utterance, if it can sufficiently identify the accused with either the
perpetrators of the crime or the commission of the crime itself, should
be admissible as corroboration of his in-court testimony.65
To argue that an accomplice's excited utterance is less reliable be-
cause of his motive to minimize his role in the crime would be to argue
against the validity of the excited utterance as a hearsay exception.
Such an argument can find no support in Maryland case law. Once
having accepted the proposition that an excited utterance is reliable,
the court should not disallow it as corroboration." Because both the
accomplice corroboration rule and the excited utterance exception in-
sure reliability, the court should have recognized the excited utterance
as an exception to the independent source requirement. To say that
63. See supra note 4; Strahorn, supra note 48, 15 MD. L. REv. at 330, 344 n.24 (reasoning
that excited utterances are intrinsically superior guarantors of trustworthiness); see also
Jackson v. State, 31 Md. App. 332, 356 A.2d 299 (1976) (mother's testimony of incompetent
four-year-old's excited utterance is sufficient evidence to convict accused).
64. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for the court in Brown, stated that "[niot much in the
way of evidence corroborative of the accomplice's testimony has been required by our
cases." 281 Md. at 244, 378 A.2d at 1104.
65. See supra note 39.
66. See, e.g., Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1957), in
which Chief Justice Burger, while sitting as a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit,




excited utterances cannot suffice as corroboration, even if they link the
accused to the crime, is to defeat the purpose of the accomplice corrob-
oration rule.67
CONCLUSION
The Turner court's failure to accept the accomplice's excited utter-
ance, either as a source independent of the accomplice or as a justified
exception to the court's independent source requirement, gives rise to
several ambiguities. First, whether the independent source require-
ment will apply solely to accomplice corroboration or, henceforth, to
corroboration in general is uncertain. 68 The failure of the court to ad-
dress this issue could be read as a challenge to the decisions allowing
excited utterances and other extrajudicial declarations to corroborate
the testimony of impeached, biased, and incompetent witnesses. Sec-
ond, given that an excited utterance, under Turner, is no longer viewed
as being independent of the declarant,69 the case may be read as a sub
silentio rejection of the traditional res gestae concept. 70  Third, al-
though the excited utterance is a widely recognized hearsay excep-
tion,7' the Turner holding could undermine the exception's validity.72
67. Another route was available to the court. The facts of the case indicate that the
accomplice's declaration may have been admissible as a declaration against penal interest.
This point was raised by the Court of Special Appeals, 48 Md. App. at 373, 428 A.2d at 90,
but it was not discussed and did not figure into that court's holding. Although there may be
legitimate doubt as to whether a declaration that implicates an accused is actually made
against his or her interest, the declaration in Turner was made to acquaintances prior to the
arrest, which should alleviate this concern. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee
note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 327-28 (1972). But because the declarant was available at the trial, the
admissibility of his declaration against penal interest would be questionable in most courts.
See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) (requiring declarant to be unavailable). Still, an argument can
be made that because an accomplice is unable to corroborate his own in-court testimony, he
is, in a sense, unavailable. Thus, the Turner court could have theoretically allowed the testi-
mony offered by the third-party witnesses to corroborate the accomplice's testimony by cre-
ating a penal interest exception to the accomplice corroboration rule's independent source
requirement.
68. Maryland courts do not confine the need for corroboration to accomplice testimony.
Other cases require corroboration of the testimony of impeached, biased, and incompetent
witnesses. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
69. 294 Md. at 647, 452 A.2d at 420.
70. Because relatively recent decisions have embraced the traditional res gestae theory,
see supra note 46, it should not be rejected without an explicit holding and an explanation.
Such a holding would be consistent with the growing trend rejecting the traditional res ges-
tae concept in favor of the specific hearsay exceptions. See supra note 49.
71. See supra note 51.
72. Admittedly, it has been argued by a few commentators that excited utterances are
not reliable guarantors of testimonial veracity. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 48.
But this is the view of a distinct minority of commentators and is not reflected in the case
law of any state. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee note and cases cited therein.
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Fourth, the court's holding that an otherwise reliable declaration is not
necessarily sufficient corroboration leaves the very premise behind the
accomplice corroboration rule open to question."
The Court of Appeals should reconsider the premise behind the
accomplice corroboration rule. To begin with, the rule is of questiona-
ble merit.74 This rule is not applied in the federal courts or those of
some thirty-four states.7" Maryland has employed the rule, nonetheless,
as a safeguard against untrustworthy testimony, and in so doing the
courts have applied the rule in a flexible manner by not requiring much
in the way of corroboration.76 In Turner, however, the court's unneces-
sarily rigid use of this rule defeated its purpose.
The court should therefore redefine the accomplice corroboration
rule. In so doing, it should abandon the circular reasoning applied in
Turner in favor of allowing the use of any reliable evidence that can
identify the accused with the crime.77 In addition, the court should
clarify its independent source requirement by delineating the extent of
its applicability. Moreover, the court should re-evaluate its position on
res gestae. If, in holding that an excited utterance is not independent of
the declarant, the court means to reject the traditional res gestae theory,
an explicit statement to this effect is in order.
Finally, the court should allow an excited utterance exception to
the accomplice corroboration rule's independent source requirement.
Such an exception would serve the purpose of the accomplice corrobo-
ration rule by providing the jury with reliable accomplice testimony.
73. See supra text accompanying note 24.
74. Wigmore said that the accomplice corroboration rule was but a "technical nicet[y]"
and preferred the common-law approach to accomplice corroboration, stating that the issue
of corroboration was best addressed on a case-by-case basis. 7 J. WiGMORE, supra note 20,
§ 2060, at 451. Wigmore traces the origin of the rule in the United States to a "misguided
moment [when]... [t]he judge was forbidden to contribute to the jury's aid any expression
of opinion upon the weight of evidence in a given case." Id. § 2056, at 416; cf. Brown v.
State, 281 Md. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108 ("[Wle recognize that a jury instruction serves...
much the same purpose as the Maryland rule requiring corroboration.").
75. See supra notes 19-20.
76. 281 Md. at 244, 378 A.2d at 1107.
77. Accord, 7 J. WIGMORRE, supra note 74, § 2059, at 424: "The important thing is not
how our trust is restored, but whether it is restored at all." (emphasis added).
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HUNTER V BOARD OF EDUCATION & DOE V BOARD OF
EDUCATION - NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
PSYCHOLOGISTS
Over the past seven years, students have attempted to sue the pub-
lic schools for their failure to provide an adequate education, and al-
most every jurisdiction has flatly rejected these claims.' Legal
commentators, however, have urged that this new tort, commonly re-
ferred to as "educational malpractice," be recognized.2  The courts
have been reluctant to allow the cause of action even for a limited class
of claims because they fear disenchanted students and parents will use
the courts as a forum for challenging the administration of the public
school system.3 Two recent cases-Hunter v. Board of Education4 and
Doe v. Board of Education -have brought this debate to Maryland. In
Hunter, the Maryland Court of Appeals followed the majority of juris-
dictions in refusing to recognize educational malpractice claims.6 One
year later, the court labelled the claim in Doe as a typical educational
malpractice action and therefore found Hunter to be controlling.7 The
two claims, however, can be distinguished, and the court's reasoning in
Hunter did not justify its rejection of the action in Doe. Although there
are cogent reasons for restricting the scope of this new tort, the courts
nevertheless should recognize at least a limited class of claims. A re-
1. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981);
Smith v. Alameda County Soc. Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App.3d 929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1979);
Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1976); Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill.2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977); Hoffman v. Board of
Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). But see
B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
2. See, e.g., Elson, A Common Law Remedyfor Educational Harms Caused by Incompe-
tent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641 (1978); Tracy, Educational Negligence- A
Student's Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic Instruction, 58 N.C.L. REV. 561 (1980);
Note, Nonliability for Negligence in Public Schools-Educational Malpractice from Peter W.
to Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814 (1980). But see Funston, Educational Malpractice: A
Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d at 127, 400 N.E.2d at 320, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 379 (a court is not the proper forum to test the validity of decisions concerning a
student's education).
4. 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
5. 295 Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814 (1982).
6. 292 Md. at 484-85, 439 A.2d at 583-84.
7. 295 Md. at 68, 453 A.2d at 814.
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view of the leading cases in this area indicates that all educational mal-
practice claims are not simply allegations concerning a school's general
failure to educate a student.
I. BACKGROUND
The principal educational malpractice cases fall into two catego-
ries. Originally, the term educational malpractice described a student's
general claim that a school provided inadequate instruction in basic
skills.' The first two reported educational malpractice cases-Peter W
v. San Francisco Unified School District9 and Donohue v. Copiague
Union Free School District 1°-presented broad claims concerning a
school's failure to teach a student." In Peter W., for example, the stu-
dent claimed that the school system negligently failed to provide ade-
quate instruction in basic academic skills.' 2 In Donohue, the student
alleged that the school system allowed him to graduate from high
school without a rudimentary ability to comprehend written English.' 3
These students, who had no learning handicaps, had the opportunity to
receive the same public school education as other similarly situated
students.
In the second category of cases, claimants have alleged that a
school negligently evaluated them 4 and this incorrect evaluation re-
8. See Note, supra note 2, at 824.
9. 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
10. 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
11. 60 Cal. App.3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856; 47 N.Y.2d at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353,
418 N.Y.S.2d at 376-77. Although students in both Peter W. and Donohue alleged that the
schools failed to evaluate them, both courts summarized the allegations as presenting gen-
eral claims that the school system had failed to instruct the students in academic skills. See
60 Cal. App.3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856; 47 N.Y.2d at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 376. These courts adopted two different analytical approaches for determining
whether a cause of action for educational malpractice should be recognized. The Peter W.
court framed the issue in terms of whether there is a duty to educate. The Donohue court
said that even if the requirements of a traditional negligence claim were met, the policy
considerations precluded liability. But those courts that have addressed the issue in terms of
whether there is a duty have realized that the question of when the law will impose a duty is
largely a matter of policy. See, e.g., 60 Cal. App.3d at 821, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859. The
judicial recognition of a duty of care, according to Peter W., depended upon the following
considerations of public policy: the degree of forseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's action, the need for preventing future harm, the economic consequences to the
community, the availability of insurance coverage, the likelihood of feigned claims, and the
possibility of limitless liability. See 60 Cal. App.3d at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 (quoting
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-13, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 100 (1968)).
12. 60 Cal. App.3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
13. 47 N.Y.2d at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
14. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d at 554; Hoff-
man v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y. 2d at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378. See also
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suited in their being placed in an inappropriate class. In one kind of
negligent evaluation claim, a student alleges that a school incorrectly
evaluated him as being handicapped. For example, in Hoffman v.
Board of Education,'5 the student alleged that he was classified as being
mentally retarded when he was in fact of normal intelligence.' 6 Con-
versely, a student may allege that he was classified as being of normal
intelligence when he actually had some special learning handicap. For
example, in Pierce v. Board of Education,7 the student alleged that he
was suffering from a specific learning disability and the school refused
to transfer him to a special education class. 8 The other kind of negli-
gent evaluation claim involves a student who alleges that a school
never evaluated him to determine if he had a handicap. In D. S. W v.
Fairbanks N. Star Borough School District,'9 one of the student plain-
tiffs claimed that the school failed to ascertain his dyslexia until he was
in the sixth grade.2 ° Such a student is not claiming that his handicap
Smith v. Alameda County Soc. Serv. Agency, 90 Cal. App.3d at 941-42, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
718-19 (plaintiff claimed that clinical psychologist employed by state adoption agency mis-
diagnosed him as mentally retarded); Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill.2d at 92, 370 N.E.2d at
536 (student claimed school refused to place him in special education class).
15. 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
16. Id. at 124-25, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378. In Hoffman, the student
claimed that the school had negligently assessed his intellectual capacity, resulting in his
misplacement for 1 years in a class for the mentally retarded. The school psychologist had
given Hoffman a Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test. He scored 74, which was one point short
of the cut-off score for normal intelligence. The psychologist recommended that Hoffman be
reevaluated in two years because he had a severe speech defect that limited his ability to
respond to the verbal I.Q. test. Hoffman was never retested and attended classes for the
mentally retarded until he was 18 years old. He was later transferred to an occupational
training center where another I.Q. test was administered, and it showed that he was of nor-
mal intelligence. The New York Appellate Division upheld Hoffman's claim on the ground
that the school had committed an affirmative act of negligence in failing to reevaluate Hoff-
man within two years. See 64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121,400
N.E.2d 317,424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979). Recently, however, the Montana Supreme Court con-
cluded that a student who is mislabelled as mentally retarded may sue the state for damages.
B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 426 (Mont. 1982) (4-3 decision). The student in B.M. v. State
was tested by a school psychologist and classified as educable mentally retarded (EMR).
She was placed in a regular first-grade class where she and other EMR students received
additional tutoring. The school discontinued this program and moved the student to a seg-
regated classroom for the mentally retarded without informing her parents. Id. at 426. The
appellate court remanded the case to give the student an opportunity to prove that the school
had negligently misclassified her as mentally retarded. Id. at 427-28.
17. 69 1l.2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977).
18. Id. at 92, 370 N.E.2d at 536. In Pierce, the student claimed that the school officials
were advised by his physicians that he was suffering from a specific learning disability, but
they nevertheless refused to test or to evaluate him and thus he remained in normal classes
where he competed with non-handicapped students.
19. 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981).
20. Id. at 555. The other plaintiff claimed that the school identified him as being dys-
lexic in the first grade but did not provide special education until he was in the fifth grade.
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was misdiagnosed, rather he is alleging that the school was negligent in
failing to refer him to a specialist for an evaluation.2'
Thus, the first category of educational malpractice cases-referred
to in this Note as inadequate education claims-includes students who
allege that a school failed to provide them with an adequate educa-
tion.2 2 The second category of cases-referred to as negligent evalua-
tion claims-takes one of two forms: First, a student with an
identifiable learning handicap alleges that school professionals made
specific errors in evaluating his handicap, or conversely, a normal child
alleges that he was misdiagnosed as being handicapped and this inac-
curate evaluation caused him to be placed in the wrong class.23 Sec-
ond, a student may allege that the school failed to evaluate his learning
abilities at all, even though he exhibited behaviors indicating that he
was handicapped. At first glance, these claims in which a student al-
leges that a school failed to evaluate him at all could be classified as
inadequate education claims, because any student may allege that in
retrospect his failure to learn was caused by a school's failure to evalu-
ate him. If such a student is able to prove that he actually had an
identifiable handicap that was overlooked, however, then a court
should classify the allegation as a negligent evaluation claim. Two re-
cent Maryland cases-Hunter and Doe-illustrate how courts have ig-
nored the differences between the two categories of claims.
II. SUMMARY OF HUNTER AND DOE
The parents of Ross Hunter brought a negligence action on behalf
of their son, alleging that the Montgomery County School f3oard and
several individual educators (hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Both plaintiffs claimed that the school negligently terminated classes for dyslexic children.
Id. at 554-55.
21. See generally Comment, Legal Remediesfor the Misclass#ication or Wrongful Place-
ment ofEducationaly Handicapped Children, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 389, 397 (1979)
(failure to identify a handicapped child at all may be the most compelling case because
professionals can usually agree that a child suffers from some handicap).
22. See Note, supra note 2, at 825-26. The Note compared the Peter W and Donohue
cases to Hoffman and was the first to point out that the holdings in Peter W. and Donohue
were limited to the question of whether a student may sue his school for inadequate instruc-
tion in basic skills and that the New York court had mislabelled Hoffman's professional
malpractice claim against the school psychologist as an educational malpractice claim. Id
at 833. For a discussion of the arguments in favor of recognizing educational malpractice
claims in which a student makes a general allegation concerning a school's failure to educate
him, see Elson, supra note 2, at 642-49.
23. The failure to identify a handicapped student is different from the failure to place a
child correctly. The issue in a wrongful placement case is which educational setting would
be most appropriate and not what is the nature of the child's handicap. See Comment,
supra note 21, at 395-96.
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Board) had failed to provide Hunter with an adequate education.24 Al-
though the Hunters had alleged that the school negligently evaluated
their son,25 the court characterized the issue as whether a public school
student may sue a school for its failure to educate him properly.26 The
Hunters alleged that their son developed learning deficiencies and suf-
fered psychological injury.27 The Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court's dismissal of the negligence claim,28 but reversed in part to give
the plaintiffs an opportunity to prove that individual educators had in-
tentionally injured Hunter.29 A separate opinion agreed with the ma-
jority in its holding that educators may be liable for their intentional
torts,3 ° but urged that educational malpractice claims be allowed.3'
24. See Brief for Appellants at 6, Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582
(1982). The Hunters filed a six-count declaration which included allegations that the school
board maliciously intended to deprive Hunter of an adequate education, failed to evaluate
its programs and personnel, breached a statutory duty of care in not providing him with a
quality education, and breached an implied contract to educate him. Id. at 4. On certiorari,
the Court of Appeals held that an educational malpractice claim based on the violation of a
statute or the breach of an implied contract was also precluded. 292 Md. at 489 n.5, 439
A.2d at 586 n.5. Most other state courts also have rejected the implication that state educa-
tion statutes impose a duty upon instructors to educate students. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d at 826-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (state statute
requiring a school board to allow only students proficient in basic skills to graduate could
not be used to imply a statutory duty of care). The Hunters relied upon § 4-107 of the
Maryland Education Article, which states that each school board shall "[m]aintain through-
out its county a reasonably uniform system of public schools that is designed to provide
quality education and equal educational opportunity for all children." MD. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 4-107(1) (1978), citedin Brief for Appellants at 6, Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md.
481, 437 A.2d 582 (1982). The Hunter court held that the plaintiffs could not recover dam-
ages for a breach of this type of statute. 292 Md. at 489 n.5, 439 A.2d at 586 n.5. For a
discussion of the possible theories of recovery for educational injuries, see generally Fun-
ston, supra note 2, at 759-99.
25. The plaintiffs alleged that the school required Hunter to repeat first-grade materials
in the second grade even though he had successfully mastered the primary materials, tested
him incorrectly, failed to evaluate his learning problems, and prepared inaccurate records.
See Brief for Appellants at 5, Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
26. 292 Md. at 483, 439 A.2d at 583. Later in Doe the court maintained that the decision
in Hunter covered claims in which a plaintiff alleged that a school had negligently evaluated
him. 295 Md. at 78, 453 A.2d at 819. Although the Hunters did allege that the school
negligently misplaced their son, the court summarized the claim as an allegation that the
school failed "to properly educate young Hunter" and did not directly address the negligent
evaluation claim as a separate issue. 292 Md. at 484, 439 A.2d at 583.
27. 292 Md. at 484, 439 A.2d at 583.
28. Id. at 489, 439 A.2d at 586.
29. Id. at 490-91, 439 A.2d at 587. The court remanded the case in part to allow the
plaintiffs to prove that the individual educators willfully and maliciously injured Hunter.
Id. But the court in Hunter unequivocally stated that a school board would not be liable for
the acts of individual educators who willfully injure a student, because such intentional torts
will always constitute an abandonment of employment. 292 Md. at 441 n.8., 439 A.2d at 587
n.8.
30. 292 Md. at 492, 439 A.2d at 587 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 492-93, 439 A.2d at 588.
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In Doe, a former public school student and his parents alleged that
two psychologists, employed by the school district, were negligent in
failing to evaluate and to test their son properly. 32 Dr. Stickel, a psy-
chologist working for the school board, evaluated Doe in 1967 and
found that he "suffered cerebral damage during his infant years and
was retarded or of borderline intellectual functioning. ' 33 Stickel rec-
ommended that Doe be placed in a class for brain-injured children or
in a class for the mentally retarded. In October 1968, the parents noti-
fied the school that a private physician had evaluated Doe and found
that he had a severe case of dyslexia rather than cerebral brain dam-
age. 34 Although Stickel himself had recommended that Doe be reeval-
uated in ten months, the school failed to do so until over seven years
later.35 In January 1975, Dr. Johns, another school psychologist, evalu-
ated the student and recommended that he be retained in the same
program. 36 The plaintiffs alleged that the negligent evaluations by the
school psychologists caused Doe to be retained in classes for the men-
tally retarded for approximately seven years.37 The majority found
that the negligent evaluation of Doe presented a general educational
malpractice claim and therefore was barred under Hunter." Three
judges dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs had presented a traditional
professional malpractice claim against the two psychologists.39
The Maryland court, like most courts, assumed that negligent
evaluation claims are the same as inadequate education claims because
they both are "concerned with the proper administration of the public
school system."'  Hunter, however, involved a child of normal intelli-
gence in a mainstream classroom whose parents waited until his six-
teenth birthday to complain that his second-grade teacher forced him
32. 295 Md. at 72, 453 A.2d at 816.
33. Id. at 71, 453 A.2d at 816, quoting Brief for Appellants at E-21, Doe.
34. ld.
35. Id. at 71-72, 453 A.2d at 816.
36. Id. at 72, 453 A.2d at 816. The plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Johns also knew of Doe's
specific learning disabilities and ignored recommendations from private psychologists who
suggested Doe was not mentally retarded.
37. Id. at 73, 453 A.2d at 816.
38. Id. at 78, 453 A.2d at 819.
39. Id. at 81-82, 453 A.2d at 821 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
plaintiffs had stated a professional malpractice claim against the two psychologists and the
majority was incorrect in labelling the claim as involving educational malpractice. The dis-
sent also pointed out that the court in Hunter had expressly declined to decide the issue of
whether actions against professionals who are normally subject to suit would be barred
merely because those professionals were employed by the school system. Id. at 87, 453 A.2d
at 824.
40. Id. at 79, 453 A.2d at 819.
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to study materials he already had learned. Doe involved a dsylexic
student misplaced in a class for the mentally retarded who could point
to specific acts of two psychologists alleged to have conducted negligent
evaluations. Doe's parents had informed the school that their son was
incorrectly diagnosed as having minimal brain dysfunction. The Does
did not present an amorphous claim about teachers failing to educate
their son. They could identify a particular act--the negligent psycho-
logical assessment-which caused Doe to lose the opportunity to learn
to compensate for his actual handicap.
III. RECOGNIZING A LIMITED CAUSE OF ACTION
In Hunter and Doe, the court followed other state courts in hold-
ing that public policy considerations justify a broad rule precluding all
educational malpractice claims.4 The policy reasons relied upon by
the court include: (1) no workable standard of care exists, (2) the cause
of the injury is too uncertain, (3) the damages are difficult to ascertain,
and (4) the financial burden on the school system would be unaccept-
able.42 The court's conclusion in Hunter rested upon the interrelation-
ship between those problems associated with defining this new cause of
action and the difficulties of devising a fair remedy that would not ex-
pose financially strapped public schools to unlimited liability. Analysis
of the major policy considerations indicates that taken as a whole they
do provide a sound basis for protecting schools from having to defend
against claims that they failed to teach a student basic skills. But when
analyzed separately in light of the distinction between inadequate edu-
cation claims and negligent evaluation claims, it becomes apparent that
these policy considerations do not apply in cases like Doe. Defining
the scope of liability for a new common-law action and fashioning an
appropriate remedy is the kind of problem that a court is capable of
resolving without renouncing its traditional function of providing a fo-
rum for individuals to seek redress for negligently inflicted harms.
41. 292 Md. at 487-88, 439 A.2d at 585; 295 Md. at 79, 453 A.2d at 819.
42. See 292 Md. at 484-88, 439 A.2d at 584-85. The court also mentioned that such suits
would be a judicial intrusion into the day-to-day operations of a school. Id. The majority,
however, did not maintain that the legislature's delegation of certain powers to the school
boards preempted the courts from deciding questions concerning the tort liability of school
employees. Additionally, the Maryland legislature's policy of waiving the defense of gov-
ernmental immunity for schools indicates the legislature sanctioned tort actions against pub-
lic schools. See MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 4-105(d)(2) (1982). A county board of education
may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity to any claim of $ 100,000 or less. Id.
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A. Defining the Cause of Action
1. Standard of Care-The Hunter court, like other courts, con-
cluded that because educators themselves disagree about appropriate
professional standards for teachers, a court is incapable of fashioning a
uniform and nonarbitrary standard of care.43 This lack of agreement
among educators concerning professional standards is the result of
three pedagogical problems. First, the conflicts about how children
learn are unresolved." Second, academicians and practitioners in the
educational field still disagree about which teaching practices are an
essential part of competent academic instruction." Third, even if
teachers agree about which methods are effective in developing aca-
demic skills, most public schools have not devised standard criteria for
evaluating how well teachers implement accepted methods.46
Despite these problems, many advocates of a cause of action for
educational malpractice have maintained that a court could devise a
fair standard of care for teachers using the traditional rules governing
the liability of professionals.4 7 A professional is expected to exercise
43. See 292 Md. at 484-85, 439 A.2d at 584. ("[C]lassroom methodology affords no
readily acceptable standards of care .... ") (quoting Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1976)). The available meth-
ods for devising a standard of care for teachers are analyzed in Elson, supra note 2, at 697-
745.
44. Most educators agree that the psychological principles governing human learning
have yet to be adequately identified. See generally IMPACT OF RESEARCH ON EDUCATION:
SOME CASE STUDIES (P. Suppers ed. 1978) (analysis of the effect of psychological theories of
Thorndike, Skinner, Piaget, Freud, and Dewey on American educational practice); LEARN-
ING AND INSTRUCTION (M. Wittrock ed. 1977) (analysis of theories on learning and human
memory that have influenced classroom instruction).
45. Generally, educators agree that there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that
certain teaching practices are more effective than others. See SECOND HANDBOOK OF RE-
SEARCH ON TEACHINGpassim (R. Travers ed. 1973). One legal researcher, who conducted
an informal survey, has concluded that there is no agreement among educators on the fun-
damental teaching practices that must be used in a classroom. See Elson, supra note 2, at
710-13. But certain research studies on teacher practices nonetheless have found that some
teaching methods are more effective than others. See, e.g., Armento, Teacher Behaviors Re-
lated to Student Achievement on a Social Science Concept Test, 28 J. TCHR. EDUC. 46, 51-52
(April 1977) (describing teacher behaviors that were associated with greater gains in student
learning); Berliner & Tikunoff, The California Beginning Teacher Evaluation Study. Overview
of the Enthnographic Study, 27 J. TCHR. EDUC. 24, 29-30 (Spring 1976)(identifying certain
teaching practices that were consistently more effective than others). See also D. Schalock,
Research on Teacher Selection, in REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION (D. Berliner ed.
vol. 7 (1979)) (summary of research on teacher effectiveness).
46. See J. BECKHAM, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TEACHER EVALUATION 1-2 (1981); Fenster-
macher, Philosophical Consideration of Recent Research on Teacher Effectiveness, in REVIEW
OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION (L. Shulman ed. vol. 6 1978).
47. See Elson, supra note 2, at 737-45; Tracy, supra note 2, at 576-79.
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the care and knowledge commonly possessed by members of good
standing in his profession. 8 If conflicting standards of care govern in a
particular discipline, a professional is judged only according to the
standards of the school of thought to which he adheres. 9
The difficulty with using a professional standard of care in this
area is that few teachers explicitly adhere to a particular educational
school of thought." This lack of consensus concerning the procedures
that are essential to competent teaching is especially problematic when
a student alleges that his educators failed to teach him basic skills. If,
however, a student alleges that a teacher or some other specialist re-
sponsible for identifying a student's learning handicap has negligently
evaluated him, then a court can fashion a workable standard of care
because most specialists agree about the correct procedures for evaluat-
ing students with learning problems.5 ' The American Psychological
Association, for example, promulgates detailed guidelines explaining
how to administer psychological tests. 2 A psychologist or other diag-
nostician who is not employed by a public school is expected to use
reasonable care in conforming to these professional standards.5 3 A
professional psychologist need not be treated differently merely be-
cause he is employed by a public school system.
Standards for evaluating students are available in Maryland for
other school professionals, including teachers, who may be required to
identify students with learning problems. Maryland has a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme for identifying and evaluating children with
48. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 at 161-65 (4th ed. 1971);
accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
49. Cf 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1 (1956) (professionals may
select any method of treatment approved as the standard of the profession in the
community).
50. See Elson, supra note 2, at 709-10 (few routine practices and mechanical procedures
are accepted as the norm by a particular group of teachers).
51. See, e.g., C. COMPTOM, A GUIDE TO 65 TESTS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION 3-5 (1980)
(diagnosticians should use a battery of tests to evaluate a student's academic skills as well as
his ability to process auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli); G. WALLACE & S. LARSEN, EDU-
CATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF LEARNING PROBLEMS: TESTING FOR TEACHING 11-12 (1978)
(diagnosticians usually supplement results of standardized tests with informal assessment
procedures).
52. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (APA), STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS 57-73 (1974). The APA standards, for example, require test
users to have a general knowledge of measurement principles and the limitations of test
interpretations. In addition, a test user is expected to consider more than one variable in an
assessment and any given variable should be assessed by more than one method. Id. at 61.
53. See Doe v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. at 87, 453 A.2d at 823-24 (Eldridge, J., dissent-
ing). Psychologists are licensed as health care professionals in Maryland. MD. HEALTH &
OCC. CODE ANN. § 16-301 (1981).
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learning handicaps. 4 A court could use these statutory and adminis-
trative guidelines to devise a standard of care for determining if a par-
ticular educator's failure to identify or to evaluate properly a child's
learning disability was negligent.
The court in both Hunter and Doe seemed to conclude that a court
could never fashion a standard of care for educators. In Hunter, the
student challenged the routine classroom practices of public school
teachers. He claimed he was forced to repeat materials he already had
learned. 5 A teacher's decision about which academic materials to use
with a student involves individual pedagogical judgment, and a court
would have a difficult time devising a comparative standard of care
that would protect a teacher from having his substantive teaching
54. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-401 to -415 (1978 & Supp. 1982); MD. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 13A, § 05.01.02 (1978). The Maryland statutory scheme governing special education was
enacted to conform with the mandatory requirements prescribed in the federal Education
For All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1976). Each local edu-
cation agency, jointly with a local health agency, must provide for continuous screening of
school-age children to identify problems that impede their learning, and detailed statewide
administrative regulations specify how such evaluations are to be conducted. See MD. AD-
MIN. CODE tit. 13A, §§ 05.01.04 - .05 (1978). In addition, some public school districts have
internal referral forms that a teacher may use to request an evaluation of a student. Balti-
more City Public Schools, General Referral Form (1978) (available from Balto. City Divi-
sion for Exceptional Children). The statute also delineates hearing procedures parents must
use to challenge the educational placement of a handicapped child. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 8-415 (1978 & Supp. 1982). The Court of Appeals in Hunter assumed that § 8-415 would
provide aggrieved parents with an alternative remedy without noting that the recovery of
monetary damages for past harms is not an issue at these administrative hearings. See
Bulman & Moore, Recent Changes in the Law Affecting Educational Hearing Proceduresfor
Handicapped Children, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 41, 43-50 (1977).
The federal statute itself has a provision that allows parents to seek judicial review of
a state agency's decision about where to place a handicapped student. 20 U.S.C. § 1415
(e)(2) (1982). If a state fails to comply with the federal statute, a court may grant the parents
"such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id. Some federal courts have held that
this statutory language authorizes a court to grant monetary damages in addition to injunc-
tive or declarative relief, but they have limited the damages to the costs incurred by parents
who made alternative arrangements for their child during the administrative review process.
See Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1213-14 (7th Cir. 1981); Department of Educ. v.
Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 530 (D. Hawaii 1982); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School
Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 468-69 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (dictum); Gregg B. v. Board of Educ., 535 F.
Supp. 1333, 1337-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 977-81 (N.D. Tex.
1981); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1094 (D. Neb. 1980). But see Meiner v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1982) (no general right to damages under EAHCA),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982); Ezratty v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770,
776 (1st Cir. 1981). The EAHCA does not preempt state courts from creating a new com-
mon-law action for educational malpractice, because the damages awarded under the act are
for the costs parents actually incurred in placing their child in another educational setting
when state facilities were non-existent or inadequate. See Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. at
978.
55. 292 Md. at 483-84, 439 A.2d at 593.
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methods second-guessed. In Doe, on the other hand, the student al-
leged that a psychologist had diagnosed him as suffering from cerebral
brain damage and ignored indications on the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children that were inconsistent with a diagnosis of simple
retardation. 6 The defendant did not administer additional diagnostic
tests, such as the Wide Range Achievement Test or Slingerland's
Screening Test For Identifying Children with Specific Language Disa-
bility. 7 Thus, the Does were challenging the failure of an individual
psychologist to conduct a comprehensive evaluation. As pointed out in
the Doe dissent, the plantiffs were not asking the court to create a nebu-
lous standard of care because the court could refer to existing profes-
sional standards for psychologists. 8
2. Causation-The difficulty of establishing the causal relation-
ship between a teacher's negligence and a student's failure to learn is
the second policy consideration mentioned in Hunter for denying
claims of educational malpractice 9.5  The multiplicity of factors that in-
fluence the learning process make it difficult for a student to prove that
a teacher's negligence was the cause-in-fact6° of the student's illiter-
acy." A child's failure to learn is influenced by his home life and cul-
tural background,62 intellectual capacity,63 and overall psychological
make-up.' Additionally, many institutional factors, such as class
size, student mix,66 and availability of special resources 67 influence a
56. Brief for Appellants at E-21, Doe v. Board of Educ., 295 Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814
(1982).
57. Id.
58. 295 Md. at 82, 453 A.2d at 821 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). See supra note 52 for
discussion of APA professional standards for psychologists. Claims against psychologists
are infrequent, but other professionals in the mental health field have been held liable for
malpractice. Cf. Roy v. Hartogs, 85 Misc. 2d 891, 893, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1976) (psychi-
atrist liable for failure to use professionally acceptable procedures).
59. 292 Md. at 485, 439 A.2d at 584.
60. In a traditional negligence action, a plaintiff must necessarily prove that the defend-
ant's conduct was the legal cause of the injury. See PROSSER, supra note 48, § 41 at 236.
61. See, e.g., Hechinger, No One Knows What Makes a Good School, N.Y. Times, Nov.
13, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
62. See generally C. HURN, THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF SCHOOLING 132-38
(1978); R. GREEN, R. BAKAN, J. MCMILLAN & L. LEZOTTE, Research and the Urban School:
Implications for Educational Improvement, in SECOND HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON
TEACHING (R. Traversed. 1973).
63. See generally TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES HANDBOOK 11: AFFECTIVE
DOMAIN 60-62 (D. Krathwohl, B. Bloom & B. Masia eds. 1964).
64. See generally J. PIAGET, THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD, 428-34
(1954).
65. See G. GLASS & M. SMITH, META-ANALYSIS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF CLASS SIZE
AND ACHIEVEMENT iV-V (1978) (academic achievement improves measurably when class
size is reduced to 20 students).
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child's ability to acquire fundamental skills. The denial of educational
malpractice claims on the ground that it is difficult to prove causation is
persuasive, however, only if one assumes that educational malpractice
claims are general allegations concerning the failure of teachers to in-
struct in basic skills.
Proving that a particular negligent evaluation, such as administer-
ing an intelligence test incorrectly or failing to conduct an evaluation at
all, caused a student to be placed in an inappropriate class is less prob-
lematic than proving causation in an inadequate education case be-
cause the student is able to point to a specific act that was a cause of his
failure to learn. For example, if Doe had been properly evaluated, he
would have had an opportunity to receive an appropriate education.
He should have the same opportunity that is available to other tort
plaintiffs to prove that the identifiable act was the proximate cause of
68his injury.
3. Injury-The lack of certainty concerning the nature of the in-
jury is the third policy consideration addressed by the Hunter court.69
The injury itself, however, can be easily described: The primary injury
is the loss of the opportunity to acquire those skills a student could
have acquired if exposed to appropriate classroom instruction. 0 Al-
though the loss of the opportunity to acquire academic skills is not a
traditional tort injury, modern courts have been willing to allow com-
pensation for a variety of novel injuries as long as they are a forseeable
result of a defendant's negligence.7" The loss of the opportunity to
66. See, e.g., R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM 47-55
(1968) (teachers' expectations of pupils' intellectual competence influence how well students
perform in class).
67. See, e.g., N. BENNETT, TEACHING STYLES AND STUDENT PROGRESS 152-55 (1976)
(analysis of teaching styles that have a significant effect on pupil progress in reading and
mathematics); Gillingham, Detailed Description ofRemedial Work/or Reading, Spelling, and
Penmanship, in EDUCATION AND SPECIFIC LANGUAGE DISABILITY 112, 131-33 (S. Childs
ed. 1968) (description of kinaesthetic-phonetic technique used to teach students with learn-
ing disabilities); Spady, The Impact of School Resources on Students, in REVIEW OF RE-
SEARCH IN EDUCATION (F. Kerlinger ed. vol. 1 1973).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
69. 292 Md. at 484, 439 A.2d at 584.
70. See Tracy, supra note 2, at 581 (plaintiff's best claim for injury is simply his "non-
learning").
71. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (recov-
ery allowed for psychological damage despite the absence of physical injury); Lucas v.
Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (recovery allowed despite lack
of privity for benefits plaintiff would have received under decedent's will if no attorney
malpractice). See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 463, 488 n.62 (1962) ("Why assume that there are no causes of action except those
recognized by precedent rather than assuming that there is a cause of action unless denied
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learn to compensate for one's handicap is a forseeable result of a negli-
gent evaluation of one's learning abilities. In addition, an educational
deficiency may be easier to identify and to prove than other intangible
tort injuries, because a simple paper and pencil test often will show if a
student has learned to read and to write at a certain grade level.
Additional harm may accompany the plaintiffs lost educational
opportunity. A student, for example, may allege that he suffered psy-
72 7chological damage or lost future employment opportunities.73
Whether to recognize these additional damages and to what extent the
lost educational opportunity should be compensated are issues a court
may resolve by devising an appropriate remedy.
B. The Appropriate Remedy
If a court accepts the loss of the opportunity to acquire academic
skills as a legally compensable injury, then it could limit the remedy to
the cost of remedial tutoring. Providing a remedial education compen-
sates the student for his main injury because the tutoring restores, al-
beit imperfectly, the lost educational opportunity. Although this
limited remedy would only partially compensate plaintiffs-because
other injuries, such as emotional distress, would not be covered 74 -it
certainly is better than no damage recovery. Moreover, this compro-
mise solution resolves the speculative damage issue, because a court
need only calculate the cost of educational services for the time period
in which the student was deprived of an appropriate education and
then estimate the current cost of providing remedial education services
rather than determine the damages for all the plaintiffs future harms.
Limiting the remedy in educational malpractice claims is further
justified by the unique financial position of public school defendants.
The public school system is not in the position of a typical private de-
fendant who can increase the price of goods or services to cover the cost
of liability insurance. Monetary resources in many school districts are
restricted because local property taxes rather than general revenues pri-
by precedent?"); Peck, The Role of Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48
MINN. L. REV. 265, 308 (1963) (courts are better equipped than a legislature to decide cru-
cial question of whether a particular type of victim should be compensated).
72. Pierce v. Board of Educ., 69 ll.2d at 92, 370 N.E.2d at 536; Hoffman v. Board of
Educ., 49 N.Y.2d at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
73. D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d at 554-55.
74. In Hoffman, for example, the psychiatrist said that even with special education and
psychotherapy, it would not be possible to correct the educational deprivation and psycho-
logical damage Hoffman suffered as a result of being mislabelled as mentally retarded. 64
A.D.2d at 378, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 105, rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E. 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1979).
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manly are used to fund the school systems.75 Liability insurance for
educational malpractice claims could be expensive,76 and requiring
teacher unions or school districts to carry insurance to cover educa-
tional malpractice claims would decrease the amount of money avail-
able for other school expenditures. In schools in low-income areas,
where financial resources are already strained, money would go toward
redressing individual harms rather than toward improving the overall
school system.7 By restricting the damages to the cost of acquiring a
remedial education and by limiting the potential class of plaintiffs to
those students who have been negligently evaluated, the court could
control the problem of exposing public schools to limitless liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The policy considerations articulated in Hunter and Doe do not
justify a complete bar against all educational malpractice claims. By
recognizing the distinction between inadequate education claims and
negligent evaluation claims and by limiting the recovery to remedial
tutoring, the court could resolve the policy and practical problems asso-
ciated with allowing this new tort. In addition to examining the practi-
cal difficulties in recognizing such claims, the court also should
consider that its traditional role is to provide a forum for aggrieved
litigants and not to protect the state school system completely from lia-
bility for negligent conduct.
75. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (constitutional-
ity of disparate funding methods upheld); Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., No. 93,
slip op. at 2, 7-8 (Md. Ct. of Appeals, April 5, 1983) (describing Maryland's state/local
funding formulas).
76. A Maryland local school board must carry comprehensve liability insurance, which
includes a minimum liability coverage of not less than $100,000 for each occurrence, to
protect itself and its agents and employees. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 4-105(a),(c) (1978).
The Maryland State Teachers' Association (MSTA) provides additional liability coverage
up to $1 million to its members for claims not covered by the local school board. Telephone
interview with Robert L. Haugen, Coordinator of Legal Services for MSTA (Sept. 31, 1982).
77. For a discussion of the possible effects of allowing students to bring educational
malpractice claims on the quality of education in poor school districts, see Funston, supra
note 2, at 803.
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MARTENS CHEVROLET v. SENEY - EXTENDING THE TORT
OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Martens Chevrolet v.
SeneyI "primarily to clarify seeming confusion in the law of this state"
concerning the tort of negligent misrepresentation. 2 In Martens Chevro-
let, the Court of Appeals permitted the buyer of an automobile dealer-
ship to bring an action for negligent misrepresentation against the
seller.3 Although the court clarified Maryland law by holding that an
action for negligent misrepresentation is a viable tort,4 the court de-
parted from the general rule confining the tort to the sale of informa-
tion itself, or to relationships which impose a duty to use care in
supplying information. Because Martens Chevrolet presumably pro-
vides the buyer of a business with a cause of action for negligent mis-
representation against a seller, it is inconsistent with the law on this
subject and should be modified in the future.
Before Martens Chevrolet, if a seller in an arm's-length commer-
cial transaction provided false or incomplete information, or concealed
material or qualifying facts, the buyer had a cause of action only in
deceit.5 Although the tort of negligent misrepresentation existed,6 a
1. 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
2. Id at 331, 439 A.2d at 536.
3. Id. at 338, 439 A.2d at 539.
4. Id at 331, 439 A.2d at 536. Because they addressed the case on direct review, the
Court of Appeals also considered two evidentiary issues the appellant had raised. Id at 331
n.3, 439 A.2d at 536 n.3. See infra note 24.
5. 292 Md. at 328, 439 A.2d at 537. The plaintiff, Martens Chevrolet, Inc., alleged
deceit and breach of contract, as well as negligent misrepresentation. Id at 330, 439 A.2d at
536. One of the requirements of an action in deceit is actual fraud. Donnelly v. Baltimore
Trust & Guarantee Co., 102 Md. 1, 13, 61 A. 301, 306 (1905). Maryland law follows the
view established in the landmark English case, Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (P.C. 1889).
See 292 Md. at 333-34, 439 A.2d at 539. The Derry court held that to prove fraud, a plaintiff
must show that "a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in
its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." 14 App. Cas. at 374 (opinion
of Lord Herschell).
In Gittings v. Von Dorn, 136 Md. 10, 15-16, 109 A. 553, 554 (1920), the Court of
Appeals stated the requirements for a deceit action. Because Maryland has adopted the
requirement of scienter, or actual fraud, a plaintiff generally must prove that a defendant
made a deliberate misstatement. See Cahill v. Applegarth, 98 Md. 493, 498, 56 A. 794, 797
(1904). A defendant's silence or nondisclosure will not constitute actionable fraud. Walsh v.
Edwards, 233 Md. 552, 557, 197 A.2d 424, 427 (1964); Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 581-
82, 185 A.2d 344, 351 (1962). But if a defendant makes an active misstatement of fact, or
only a partial or fragmentary disclosure that misleads the purchaser, he is liable for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. Walsh v. Edwards, 233 Md. 552, 557, 197 A.2d 424, 427 (1964).
Concealment of the truth becomes fraud when it is accompanied by misleading, deceptive
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buyer could not sue a seller on this theory because the seller had no
duty to exercise due care to ensure that the information supplied was
accurate. The rationale for this rule was that in the context of a com-
mercial relationship, a buyer may expect the seller to speak and to act
honestly, but not that the seller would use care to make certain that
everything he said was accurate.' If a buyer wanted to make sure that a
fact was true, he could demand a warranty from the seller, or investi-
gate the fact himself. Martens Chevrolet changes the law because it
places on the seller a duty to use care to make sure that what he says is
accurate. Even though the buyer already had a remedy in deceit if the
seller was dishonest, Martens Chevrolet gives the buyer an additional
remedy for negligent misrepresentation if the seller's statements are
incorrect.8
This Recent Decision discusses the effects of Martens Chevrolet
and argues that a cause of action in negligent misrepresentation for
financial loss should arise only when the parties' relationship justifies
the expectation of accuracy. When one is in the business of providing
information, he must be careful to provide it correctly, but in an arm's-
length transaction that does not involve the sale of information a buyer
should not be able to hold a seller liable for providing false information
on a negligence theory.
FACTS
In February, 1976, Imperial Investment Company, through its of-
ficers, Harry J. Marten, Jr., and his son, Harry J. Marten, III, negoti-
ated to purchase a Chevrolet dealership owned by Franklin Loving and
Howard F. Seney.9 The Martens informed the sellers that they in-
tended to continue operating the Chevrolet franchise after the sale, and
that they therefore wanted accurate information about the dealership's
past profitability.' At the parties' first meeting, Mr. Seney responded
to the Martens' inquiries about the financial status by presenting a
handwritten financial "trend" sheet, stating, "this pretty well depicts
words and conduct that affirmatively suppress or cover up the truth, or distract a person's
attention from the actual facts. See Schnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 57-58, 132 A. 381, 383
(1926). The jury decides whether or not a defendant intentionally concealed material infor-
mation with the object of creating or continuing a false impression. See Levin v. Singer, 227
Md. 47, 64, 175 A.2d 423, 432 (1961); Fowler v. Benton, 229 Md. 571, 579-80, 185 A.2d 344,
350 (1962).
6. See Mfra text accompanying notes 45-52.
7. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
8. See 292 Md. at 333, 337-38, 439 A.2d at 537, 539.




the trends of how we have been doing."" The trend sheet contained a
list of the net profit figures for each year the dealership had been in
operation, including a $2,211 profit for the previous year.' 2
Twice during negotiations, the Martens' accountant asked to in-
spect the dealership's audited financial statements.13 Each time, Seney
denied that such documents existed.' 4 Additionally, Seney reassured
the buyers throughout negotiations that they could rely on the trend
sheet as an accurate reflection of the enterprise's financial status.' 5 On
May 6, 1976, the Martens contracted to purchase the Loving
dealership. 6
After operating as Martens Chevrolet, Inc. for six months, the
franchise showed a $187,000 loss.' 7 This financial plunge baffled the
new owners. The comptroller, who had formerly worked for Seney and
Loving, then showed the Martens a 1975 year-end financial statement
which he had prepared for Loving, and an audited financial statement
prepared by an accountant. 8 Both of these statements disclosed large
deficits, instead of the modest profit reflected on the trend sheet. '9 Al-
though both documents had been prepared well before the sale date,
the sellers did not inform the buyers that they existed.20
Martens Chevrolet2' brought an action against Loving Chevrolet,
Inc., and its sole stockholders, Loving and Seney, alleging breach of
contract, deceit, and negligent misrepresentation.22 At the close of the
plaintiff's case, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict on the negligent misrepresentation and breach of con-
tract claims.2 3 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the
11. Id The trend sheet was an unaudited financial statement marked with the letters
"BBT," meaning "before bonuses and taxes," but the buyers stated that they did not know
the meaning of this acronym. Brief for Appellants at 5, Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292
Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
12. 292 Md. at 331, 439 A.2d at 536.
13. Id at 331-32, 439 A.2d at 536.
14. Id at 332, 439 A.2d at 536.
15. Id.
16. Id at 332, 439 A.2d at 536-37.
17. Id at 332, 439 A.2d at 537.
18. Id In the comptroller's statement, the deficit equalled $39,153, compared to the
$2,211 profit shown on the trend sheet. The financial statement prepared by the certified
public accountant showed an even greater loss of $69,000 for 1975.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Imperial Investment Company and Harry J. Marten, III, joined Martens Chevrolet,
Inc. as plaintiffs. See 292 Md. at 330 n.1, 439 A.2d at 536 n.l.
22. Id at 330, 439 A.2d at 536.
23. Id
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remaining count in deceit.24 Before the Court of Special Appeals could
consider this case, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own
motion to resolve any confusion concerning the existence of the tort of
negligent misrepresentation.2 5 The Court of Appeals reversed the jury
verdict on the deceit count and granted a new trial on the deceit and
negligent misrepresentation counts.2 6 Although the Court of Appeals
24. Id at 331, 439 A.2d at 536. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict on the
deceit count because of two evidentiary errors at trial. Id at 339-40, 439 A.2d at 540-41. The
first matter concerned the cross-examination of one of appellant's nonparty witnesses, Harry
J. Marten, Jr. Id at 338, 439 A.2d at 540. Defense counsel tried to impeach the witness's
credibility concerning appellee's alleged deceit in the sale of the dealership by revealing to
the jury that the witness had himself been formally charged with fraud in an unrelated civil
suit. Id at 339, 439 A.2d at 540.
Although the court permits evidence of certain criminal convictions to impeach a
witness's general credibility, see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-905(a) (1980), the
court adheres to the rule that "evidence concerning any other specific acts of misconduct are
inadmissable for such purposes." 292 Md. at 339-40, 439 A.2d at 540-41. See, e.g., State v.
Giles, 239 Md. 458, 472-73, 212 A.2d 101, 110 (1965).
The court also noted that the appellees disregarded a court order that all discovery
be completed by a certain date, and deposed a witness two weeks after the discovery dead-
line had passed. Quoting Maryland Rule 400(a), the court stated that because appellees did
not request modification of the discovery terminating order, they had violated the Maryland
Rule. 292 Md. at 341, 439 A.2d at 541. The Court of Appeals appeared to rely more heavily
on the impeachment issue in reversing the jury verdict. Id Consequently, the court ordered
a new trial on both the deceit and negligent misrepresentation counts. Id
25. 292 Md. at 331, 439 A.2d at 539. Since the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in
Delmarva Drilling Co. v. Tuckahoe Shopping Center, 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973),
courts were confused about the existence and scope of the tort of negligent misrepresentation
in Maryland. See, e.g., George Byers, Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, 488 F.Supp. 574,
586 (D. Md. 1980); Note, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland, 35 MD. L.
REv. 651, 670 (1976). In Delmarva Drilling, the Court of Appeals stated that "there can be
no recovery in an action for deceit on the ground of negligent misrepresentation." 268 Md.
at 427, 302 A.2d at 41. In other words, in a deceit action, the misrepresentation must be
willful and not merely negligent. See Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 639, 57 A.2d 287, 288
(1948). But litigants have interpreted the Delmarva Drilling language variously to mean (1)
that there is no cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, (2) that if there is such a tort,
it cannot arise between parties to an arm's-length contract, or (3) that a valid disclaimer
provision in a contract would bar any claims for negligent oral misrepresentations. See
Brief for Appellees at 19-20, Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982);
Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. at 338 n.7, 439 A.2d at 539 n.7. See also George Byers,
Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, 488 F. Supp. at 586.
In Delmarva Drilling, the court correctly held that the evidence did not support a
cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation because Delmarva's statement that it could
produce useable water for Tuckahoe Shopping Center was, at most, a promise. 268 Md. at
427, 302 A.2d at 41. As the court accurately observed, because one of the elements of fraud
is the representation of a past or existing fact, fraud cannot be predicated on a promise to do
something in the future. Id See Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 379, 84 A.2d 94, 96 (1951);
Boulden v. Stillwell, 100 Md. 543, 552, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905).
The court in Delmarva Drilling concentrated on why the claim could not lie in de-
ceit, and failed to discuss any of the previous Maryland cases that had recognized and up-
held actions for negligent misrepresentation. See infra note 45.
26. See 292 Md. at 341, 439 A.2d at 541.
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correctly reaffirmed the existence of negligent misrepresentation as a
valid tort, distinct from a cause of action in deceit,2 the court should
not have chosen to recognize this tort under the Martens Chevrolet
facts.
BACKGROUND
In negligent misrepresentation, as in negligence law generally,
courts have more willingly compensated physical injury than economic
injury. 8 One reason is historical. Courts traditionally used negligence
law to analyze misstatements that caused physical harm.29 They ap-
plied the same rules whether a defendant's negligent words or negligent
acts resulted in the plaintiff's personal injury.30 Misstatements that
caused only economic injury were associated with the intentional tort
of deceit.3 Second, courts have not readily expanded recovery for neg-
ligent misrepresentation to include purely pecuniary loss because they
did not want to expose defendants to "liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."32 A de-
fendant's negligent misstatement could be repeated and passed along
indefinitely. A limitless number of people could rely on his words, and
the magnitude of the defendant's liability might far exceed his fault.33
Although the courts have extended negligent misrepresentation to
compensate purely economic loss, they have done so only in limited
27. Id at 337-38, 439 A.2d at 539. The court held that if the trial judge directed a
verdict on the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation count, either because he believed the
cause of action did not exist, or that there was insufficient believable evidence to support the
claim, he was incorrect. The court added: "a review of the evidence ... demonstrates, in
our view, its sufficiency to at least create a jury issue concerning whether recovery may be
had under the negligent misrepresentation count." Id. at 338, 439 A.2d at 539.
28. See, e.g., Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1975) (government liable
when air traffic controller negligently gave incorrect target location causing parachutists to
jump to their deaths over Lake Erie); Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 1
A.2d 897 (1938) (plaintiff employee fell through glass case when he relied on store manager's
advice that it would support him). See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 704 (4th
ed. 1971); James & Gray, Misrepresentation--Part I, 37 MD. L. REv. 286, 306-10 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as James & Gray, Part 1]; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence
or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv. 733, 733-34 (1929).
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 105, at 684, 686; Bohlen, supra note 28, at 733-34;
James & Gray, Part I, supra note 28, at 306-07.
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 107, at 704.
31. See id § 105, at 684.
32. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (account-
ants not liable to an indefinite number of creditors whom accountants did not know would
rely on inaccurate balance sheet).
33. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 107, at 706-07. See, e.g., Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N.Y.
511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923) (per curiam) (defendant not liable to member of the investing
public for publishing unintentionally false stock market information on its tickers).
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situations in which the parties' relationship justified the plaintiff's ex-
pectation of the defendant's accuracy, and reliance on the truth of his
words.34 The reason for this limitation is to avoid disproportionate lia-
bility when a defendant had spoken negligently, but in good faith, un-
less he had expressly undertaken to observe a certain standard of
care.35 The special relationships required to hold a defendant liable for
negligent statements resulting in the plaintiff's economic loss can be
grouped into three categories: (1) when the defendant is in the business
of supplying information,36 (2) when the defendant has a duty to use
care arising from his profession, 37 and (3) when the parties have a
fiduciary relationship.38
In a negligent misrepresentation action for purely pecuniary in-
jury, the parties' relationship itself imposes an obligation on the de-
fendant to use care to provide correct information. A person engaged
in the commercial sale of information, who encourages purchasers' reli-
ance on its accuracy, is under a duty to supply correct information.39
Similiarly, when one person seeks professional or business advice from
a professional or a person operating a business, he expects that the ad-
vice will be given carefully and accurately.' In fiduciary relationships,
one party owes to the other a duty to speak and to act with care be-
cause, by definition, he must act for the other's benefit.4 ' Only in these
relationships can a person receiving information reasonably expect the
exercise of care to assure accuracy. In other kinds of relationships the
recipient of information has no reason to expect or to rely on more than
34. See, e.g., International Products Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662
(1927) (bailee-bailor relationship); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922)
(public weighers and purchasers of weighed beans); Bradford Securities Processing Services
v. Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P.2d 188 (Okla. 1982) (bond counselor and holder of bonds).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1965).
36. Eg., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
37. See m&fa text at notes 40, 43, 44.
38. See bfira text at note 41.
39. See, e.g, Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public weigher).
40. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 107, at 706; Hill, Damagesfor Innocent Mis-
representation, 73 COLUM. L. Rnv. 679, 683-88 (1973); James & Gray, Part I, supra note 28,
at 309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) states:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other trans-
action in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
41. See, e.g., Brink v. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1374 (D. Md. 1980) (insurance broker
and participants' funds); Gerson v. Gerson, 179 Md. 171, 177-78, 20 A.2d 567, 570 (1941)
(widow and stepsons). Other relationships which invite particular confidence may also fall
into this category. James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 MD. L. Rv. 488, 491-92
(1978) [hereinafter James & Gray, Part II]; James & Gray, Part I, supra note 28, at 308.
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the speaker's honesty and good faith.42
The recipient's justifiable reliance on the data's correctness, and
hence the duty to use care to supply it, exist only because the parties
have a certain relationship. For example, courts have found liability
based on professional relationships such as that between an accountant
and his client.43 The accountant represents that he is qualified to per-
form certain services for the public. The client expects that his ac-
countant will either give him careful service and accurate data, or be
liable for damages in negligence if he is careless. Because the recipient
expects care and accuracy, and the provider undertakes to perform
services knowing of that expectation, courts have allowed recovery for
negligent misrepresentation that caused economic loss when the parties
have such a relationship.'
MARYLAND LAW
Maryland courts initially recognized the tort of negligent misrep-
resentation only in the context of physical injury.45 The Court of Ap-
peals first extended negligent misrepresentation to compensate
economic loss where the parties had a special relationship that justified
reliance.' For example, in Brack v. Evans, 47 the court allowed a client
to bring an action in negligent misrepresentation for financial loss
42. Dean Prosser argues that a duty of care must exist by analogy to a gratuitous state-
ment made by one who derives no benefit from it, such as a doctor's curbside medical opin-
ion. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 107, at 706. When the gratuitous opinion is intentionally
false, the doctor is liable in deceit. If a statement is merely negligent, however, it can be
compared to a gift or loan of chattels, where the recipient is not justified in relying upon any
care on the donor's part. Id
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965). See also James & Gray,
Part I, supra note 28, at 309 n.15.
44. But cf. Home Mutual Ins. Co. v. Broadway Bank & Trust Co., 53 N.Y.2d 568, 428
N.E.2d 842, 444 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1981). (When a defendant is not required to speak, but
speaks for its own protection, an existing business relationship does not create a duty to
speak with care and no cause of action for negligent misrepresentation arises.). But see
Survey ofNew York Practice, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. Rsv. 371 (1982). The Survey approves the
Court of Appeals' support of the legislative policy to promote premium finance agencies by
limiting their liability to the amount of the premiums, id at 414, but finds a statutory duty to
speak with care under the New York Banking Law. Id. at 416 n.205.
45. Eg., Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman, 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938) (plain-
tiff injured when he relied on his employer's statement that glass case would support him);
Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A.2d 287 (1948) (plaintiff fell through porch relying on
plumber's statement that it would support her-, recovery denied because plumber not under
any duty to plaintiff, who had no right to rely on a casual expression of opinion); Piper v.
Jenkins, 207 Md. 308, 313, 113 A.2d 919, 921 (1955) (no recovery for misrepresentations
concerning sale of land; dicta inferred that the cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion was limited to cases where personal injury results).
46. See Note, supra note 25, at 668-70.
47. 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963).
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when his stockbroker negligently and incorrectly advised him concern-
ing a stock purchase.48 In Brack, the plaintiff consulted the stockbro-
ker in his professional capacity and had a reason to anticipate his
careful, competent advice. Another case authorizing recovery for pecu-
niary loss, St. Paul at Chase v. Manufacturers' Life Insurance , allowed
a client to recover for losses he sustained by relying on a mortgage
broker. The trial court held the mortgage broker to "the degree of care
one would expect of the particular person involved, whether he is a
doctor, or a lawyer, or a real estate broker or specialist."" ° Most re-
cently, in Local 75, United Furniture Workers of America v. Regiec,s '
the Court of Special Appeals concluded that because a labor union had
"chosen to establish procedures whereby inquiry was invited and an-
swers given with the clear knowledge that such advice would be acted
upon to sway the conduct of the inquirer," the plaintiff could recover in
negligence by proving that he depended on his union for that
information.5 2
In all of these cases, the special relationship between the parties
justified the plaintiffs' reliance on the truth of the defendants' state-
ments. In Brack and St. Paul, the plaintiffs sought the services of the
defendants as professionals. These defendants typically performed
such services for compensation, and because of their occupations, rep-
resented that they were qualified to perform them accurately. Regiec
also fits into this category because Regiec relied on the union to pro-
vide correct facts about his insurance coverage. The union routinely
gave information regarding its members' insurance benefits to hospitals
that would telephone it when union members were admitted.53
Martens Chevrolet differs from the previous Maryland cases al-
lowing recovery for financial loss in negligent misrepresentation. No
special relationship exists between the parties in Martens Chevrolet to
justify the buyer's reliance on the seller's representations. The seller is
not selling information; any information he provides the buyer is
merely incidental to the underlying sale of something else. Because
they are buyer and seller in a commercial situation, the parties in Mar-
tens Chevrolet are in an adversarial relationship. In an adversarial
business deal, the buyer cannot expect that the seller has taken care to
state each fact correctly for the buyer's benefit. But the buyer does ex-
48. Id. at 554, 187 A.2d at 883..
49. 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12 (1971).
50. Id at 219, 278 A.2d at 26.
51. 19 Md. App. 406, 311 A.2d 456 (1973).
52. Id at 413, 311 A.2d at 460.
53. Id at 408-09, 311 A.2d at 457-58.
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pect, and the law requires, that the seller act and speak honestly.54 Par-
ties in commercial deals have always owed each other a "duty" of
honesty and good faith, and the law provides the buyer with other
means to insure the seller's honesty. If the seller knowingly or reck-
lessly supplies false information, the buyer's remedy is in deceit. If the
buyer wants to insure accuracy in addition to honesty, he can demand
that the seller warrant or promise that his statement is true. Unlike the
special relationship cases, the buyer has not engaged the seller to pro-
vide him with careful and accurate facts. Therefore, he cannot expect
the seller to make sure that every fact he states is correct, and he has no
basis for holding the seller liable on a negligence theory for an honest,
unintentionally false statement.
CONSEQUENCES OF MARTENS CHEVROLET
At first glance, the consequences of extending the tort of negligent
misrepresentation to arm's-length commercial parties who are not sell-
ing information might appear to be beneficial. The possibility of a neg-
ligence action for inaccurate statements probably would encourage
sellers to be careful that what they said was actually true. During nego-
tiations, the buyer would be entitled to rely on the truth of the seller's
statements, or to recover damages. Additionally, a buyer's ability to
sue in negligence would alleviate two difficulties in proving deceit:
first, proving that the seller knew or should have known his statement
was false, and second, satisfying the stricter clear and convincing evi-
dence standard of proof.5
5
Despite these policy considerations, an action in negligent misrep-
resentation for financial loss should be limited to those special relation-
ships in which the plaintiff asks the defendant to provide accurate
information, or the relationship requires him to do so. First, an addi-
tional buyer's remedy in negligent misrepresentation serves only to
complicate commercial transactions and to superimpose negligence
concepts upon an area where they do not belong. When information
provided by the seller relates only incidentally to the subject matter of
the parties' deal, placing the responsibility of using care to give correct
information on the seller fundamentally alters the relationship's arm's-
length, adversarial character. If the buyer intends to rely on the truth
of the seller's statement, the buyer should investigate the facts himself.
This encourages both parties to be diligent in investigating the sub-
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a.
55. See Bennett v. Kiggins, 377 A.2d 57 (D.C. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); Brief for Appellee at 22-23, Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534
(1982).
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stance of the transaction. When the underlying sale is of information,
however, the buyer cannot investigate the truth of the seller's state-
ments and must rely upon the seller's accuracy.
Before Martens Chevrolet, if the buyer of a business wanted to
make certain that facts orally represented by the seller were true, he
demanded a warranty or verified the facts himself. Whether the seller
would give certain warranties and which ones he would give are bar-
gaining points in negotiations. Under Martens Chevrolet, the commer-
cial seller must use care to provide accurate facts even when he has not
agreed to give a warranty.
Imposing this duty of accuracy in oral statements does not neces-
sarily improve the flow of commercial information during negotiations.
Sellers will not be as free to bargain during negotiations because they
must use caution to make sure everything they say is correct, even
when they do not know upon which representations the buyer will rely.
Before Martens Chevrolet, on the other hand, a buyer's demand for a
warranty would put the seller on notice that certain facts were impor-
tant to the buyer. The seller then could exercise care to make sure
those facts were true. Thus, the seller's duties and responsibilities were
more clearly defined.
Second, the Martens Chevrolet opinion leaves unanswered many
of the practical problems courts and parties will face in applying and
proving negligent misrepresentation in the context of commercial deals
that do not involve the sale of information. Courts must determine the
standard of care for a reasonable seller. In personal injury cases, the
jury decides whether or not the defendant behaved as a reasonable man
under the circumstances.56 Expert testimony establishes the standard
of care for professionals.5" In both instances, the expected standard of
care is the measure for negligence. No community standard exists to
assess the conduct of a reasonable commercial seller because buyers
have never expected more than honesty and good faith, absent a seller's
express agreement to warrant more.58
Several elements of the tort itself complicate proof of negligent
misrepresentation in a commercial context like the one in Martens
Chevrolet. First, the buyer must prove that the seller owed him "a duty
56. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 37, at 207.
57. Id. § 32, at 161-66.
58. Cf. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 292 Md. 481,484, 439 A.2d 582, 583-84 (1982) (lack of
a satisfactory standard of care is a factor in refusal to allow cause of action for educational
malpractice).
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of care."59 Unlike a situation where one person is paying another to
give him information, the buyer-seller relationship does not impose a
legal obligation upon the seller to use care to be accurate for the
buyer's benefit.' Because they are adversaries, the buyer and seller act
to benefit themselves, not each other. Occasionally, courts will find a
duty of care in a complex transaction requiring one party to rely upon
the superior knowledge of the other,6" but Martens Chevrolet did not
present this kind of situation.62
Second, the buyer must justifiably take action in reliance on the
seller's statement.63 A buyer may have difficulty proving why he felt
justified in relying on the truth of his opponent's statement, yet ne-
glected to obtain any written promise from him. Although an account-
ant or any other seller of information has no motive to give his client
false information, and every reason to perform as competently as he
can, the same is not always true of a seller who wants to make a profita-
ble deal. Third, because negligent misrepresentation is a negligence ac-
tion, the buyer must be prepared to meet the seller's defense of
contributory negligence.' Although the buyer has no reason to expect
that his adversary would use care to speak accurately, the seller may
have a good argument that the buyer was contributorily negligent for
failing to use care to ascertain the truth. After all, the buyer is making
the investment, and the seller could reasonably expect the buyer to
carefully investigate representations related to the sale.
Finally, expanding negligent misrepresentation to commercial
deals like the one in Martens Chevrolet may affect certain contract rules
59. 292 Md. at 337, 439 A.2d at 539. In Martens Chevrolet, the court outlined the princi-
pal elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation:
(1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false state-
ment; (2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the plaintiff; (3)
the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the statement,
which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; (4) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in
reliance on the statement; and (5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence.
Id
60. See Hill, supra note 40, at 687-88.
61. See, e.g., Littau v. Midwest Commodities, 316 N.W.2d 639, 644 (S.D. 1982) (citing
cases).
62. In Martens Chevrolet, the plaintiff buyer already owned "several other automobile
dealerships." Brief for Appellant at 4, Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d
534 (1982).
63. 292 Md. at 337, 439 A.2d at 539.
64. Contributory negligence is commonly recognized as a defense to an action for negli-
gent misrepresentation. See Vartan Garapedian, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 395, 31
A.2d 371, 374 (1943); Gould v. Flato, 170 Misc. 378, 383, 10 N.Y.S.2d 361, 368 (1938); James
& Gray, Part I, supra note 28, at 314-15; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552A; W.
PROSSER, supra note 28, § 107, at 706.
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that govern the admission of evidence outside the parties' written
agreement. When the parties have reduced their agreement to a con-
tract, evidence of prior understandings or negotiations will not be ad-
mitted to vary or to contradict the terms of their agreement.65 No parol
evidence problem exists to bar proof of negligent misrepresentation
when, as in Martens Chevrolet, the representation does not conflict with
express contract terms.6 The Court of Appeals, however, has since re-
served the question of whether a plaintiff could recover in negligent
misrepresentation when the alleged representation directly conflicts
with an express term of the contract.67
In Martens Chevrolet, the court did rule on the effect of an integra-
tion or merger clause, which provided that the contract superseded or
integrated all prior oral or written agreements and understandings.
The court found that the clause would not shield the defendants from
liability for any breach of duty in a negligent misrepresentation ac-
tion.68 To support its conclusion, however, the court relied on cases
involving actual fraud, not negligence.69 Integration or merger clauses
do not bar proof of fraud in inducing a contract.70 Because the court
failed to reconcile, for the purpose of disregarding an integration
clause, the distinction between fraud and negligence, the law on this
point remains unclear. Prior cases suggest that the court will examine
the facts of each case in negligent misrepresentation actions before ad-
mitting oral evidence to prove the parties' intent despite the presence of
65. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 573, at 357 (1960). See Creamer v. Heifer-
stay, 294 Md. 107, 117, 448 A.2d 332, 337 (1982), and cases cited therein. Creamer involved
recision of a contract for an honest or unintentional misrepresentation.
66. 294 Md. at 119, 448 A.2d at 338.
67. Id at 119 n.13, 448 A.2d at 338 n.13.
68. 292 Md. at 338 n.7, 439 A.2d at 540 n.7.
69. Id The Court of Appeals in Martens Chevrolet stated that its position was in accord
with that taken by the New York Court of Appeals in Jackson v. State, 241 N.Y. 563, 150
N.E. 556 (1925), adopting the opinion of Hubbs, J., in Jackson v. State, 210 App. Div. 115,
119, 205 N.Y.S. 658, 661 (1924). In Jackson, the court stated:
A party to a contract cannot, by misrepresentation of a material fact, induce the other
party to the contract to enter into it to his damage and then protect himself from the
legal effect of such misrepresentation by inserting in the contract a clause to the effect
that he is not to be held liable for the misrepresentation which induced the other party
to enter into the contract.
Id The problem with the Maryland Court of Appeals' adoption of the position in Jackson v.
State is that Jackson involved fraudulent, not negligent, misrepresentation. In Jackson,
state plans, which were the basis of a contract, failed to disclose all the facts to the excava-
tors and indicated that the soil was soft when the state knew it was not.
70. Young v. Frost, 5 Gill 287, 313-14 (Md. 1847); Schmidts v. Miller, 212 Md. 585, 593-






Martens Chevrolet v. Seney is a product of the existing confusion in
Maryland concerning the tort of negligent misrepresentation. The
Court of Appeals took a step toward eliminating that confusion by de-
finitively stating that a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation
exists apart from an action in deceit. But, in Martens Chevrolet, the
Court of Appeals expanded the action for negligent misrepresentation
to provide the buyer with a new remedy against the seller.
This decision leaves many questions unanswered. Primarily, be-
cause the result represents such a departure from prior law, it is unclear
whether the Court of Appeals intended to expand the tort of negligent
misrepresentation to include this kind of commercial transaction. If
the court did mean to extend the tort to a buyer-seller situation in
which the sale is not of information, some guidelines for trial courts
and potential parties are needed.
The law of negligent misrepresentation could take several possible
future directions. If the court wanted to limit the tort to situations in
which the defendant was selling information, or the parties' relation-
ship otherwise required the defendant to speak with care, the court
should retreat from its holding in Martens Chevrolet to the traditional
plaintifis remedies of deceit and breach of warranty. Alternatively, the
court could follow other jurisdictions that hold a seller liable on the
theory that he is presumed to know the truth of his statements, even if
he made them in good faith.72
Martens Chevrolet provides commercial buyers and sellers with a
negligence remedy that lies somewhere between fraud, with its scienter
requirement, and strict liability. 3 Meanwhile, until the court acts fur-
71. See, e.g., Binder v. Benson, 225 Md. 456, 461, 171 A.2d 248, 250 (1960); Rinaudo v.
Bloom, 209 Md. 1, 9, 120 A.2d 184, 189 (1955).
72. These jurisdictions hold a person liable for fraud by dispensing with the traditional
scienter requirement. The defendant is presumed to know the truth of his words. If his
statement is indeed false, the defendant is liable and it is no defense that he believed it to be
true. See, e.g., Bostic v. Amoco Oil Co., 553 F.2d 329, 336-37 (4th Cir. 1977); Aldrich v.
Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581, 583 (1908); Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147
Mass. 403, 405, 18 N.E. 168, 169 (1888); Becker v. McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 427, 186 P. 496,
496 (1920); Jacquot v. Farmers' Straw Gas Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 487-88, 249 P. 984,
986-87 (1926). See a/.o Williston, Liabilityfor Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv.
415, 427-40 (1911).
Liability on a warranty theory has nearly the same effect as abandoning or manipu-
lating the scienter requirement; the defendant is held to warrant the truth of his statements.
E.g., 1er v. Jennings, 87 S.C. 87, 91, 68 S.E. 1041, 1042-43 (1910).
73. Perhaps sales law generally is moving toward a "strict liability" theory of warranty,
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ther, under Martens Chevrolet, parties to commercial transactions must
take care to speak not only honestly, but accurately as well.
such as that relating to the sale of goods in the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-
313 comment 8 (1981).












B. County of Origin
Action of Judges
The Court of Special Appeals in The Court of
Appeals
A. Opinions of The Court of Special Appeals
B. Reported Opinions of The Court of Special
Appeals




B. Most Aligned-Least Aligned
C. Swing Votes
Primary Subject Matter of Opinions
* Tables prepared by William Carlson, Articles Editor of the Maryland Law Review.
These tables follow the format used in Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Rules,
Work and Per/ormance-Part 1, 37 MD. L. REV. 1, 40-60 (1977) (September 1975 Term);
The Work of The Court of Appeals. A Statistical Miscellany, 39 MD. L. REV. 646 (1980)
(September 1978 Term); and The Work of The Court ofAppeals. A Statistical Miscellany, 41
MD. L. REV. 554 (1982) (September 1980 Term). Unless otherwise noted, figures from these
tables may be compared with figures in the earlier tables. Comparable figures for the Sep-
tember 1957 through September 1963 Terms are found in Special Report ofthe Committee on
Judicial Administration of the Maryland State Bar Association, reprinted in I Md. App. vii,
xxv-xxx (1967)..
1. Throughout these tables, the data include all published opinions of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland decided between September 1, 1981 and August 31, 1982, inclusive.
These tables, unlike some previous tables, include per curiam opinions and orders (exclud-
ing voluntary dismissals and writs of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted). Sepa-
rately captioned cases consolidated and disposed of by the court in a single decision are









To the Court of Special Appeals




Expedited to the Court of Appeals 69 39.0
To Circuit Courts
DIRECT APPEALS FROM CIRCUIT COURT3






B. COUNTY OF ORIGIN 5
PCT. OF PCT. OF
COUNTY No. OF CASES POPULATION 6  CASES POPULATION
Allegany 2 80,548 1.3 1.9
Anne Arundel 15 370,775 9.7 8.8
Baltimore 13 655,615 8.4 15.5
Calvert 2 34,638 1.3 0.8
Caroline 1 23,143 0.6 0.5
Carroll 4 96,356 2.6 2.3
Cecil 2 60,430 1.3 1.4
2. The practice of rendering unreported opinions is discussed in Note, In Re Randolf
T. and In Re Bobby C.-The Standard of Proof in a Juvenile Waiver Hearing and the Problem
of Unreported Opinions, 41 MD. L. REV. 169, 177-79 (1981).
3. The only direct appeal from a circuit court was the mandatory review of the death
sentence in Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982).
4. Slight discrepancies in total percentages in this and subsequent tables are caused by
rounding.
5. Each separately captioned case below is counted twice. See supra note 1.
6. Population figures reflect population as of April 1, 1980. The statistics are taken
from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING-FINAL
POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT CoUNTs-PHC 80-V-22 MARYLAND (1981), reported in
MARYLAND CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCE REPORT-MARYLAND POPULA-
TION ESTIMATED, JULY 1, 1979 AND JULY 1, 1980 AND PROJECTIONS TO 1986 WITH MARY-
LAND POPULATION AT THE 1970 AND 1980 U.S. CENSUSES (1981).
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PCT. OF PCT. OF
COUNTY No. OF CASES POPULATION CASES POPULATION
Charles 3 72,751 1.9 1.7
Dorchester 2 30,623 1.3 0.7
Frederick 0 114,263 0.0 2.7
Garrett 1 26,498 0.6 0.6
Harford 2 145,930 1.3 3.5
Howard 3 118,572 1.9 2.8
Kent 1 16,695 0.6 0.4
Montgomery 24 579,053 15.6 13.7
Prince George's 25 665,071 16.2 15.8
Queen Anne's 2 25,508 1.3 0.6
St. Mary's 3 59,895 1.9 1.4
Somerset 0 19,188 0.0 0.5
Talbot 2 25,604 1.3 0.6
Washington 3 113,086 1.9 2.7
Wicomico 2 64,540 1.3 1.5
Worcester 1 30,889 0.6 0.7
Baltimore City 41 786,775 26.6 18.7
Total 1547 4,216,446 99.5 99.8
TABLE II
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS8 '














7. Not included in the total are twenty-one professional supervision cases and two
questions certified to the Court of Appeals by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland.
8. In these tables, a decision has been designated as :'affirmed" or "reversed" if that is
the label placed upon it by the Court of Appeals. The "reversed" column also includes
decisions that were "modified," "vacated," or "remanded" either wholly or in part.
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B. REPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS
MAJORITY CONCURRENCE DISSENT9
Authored Joined Authored Joined Authored Joined
Ald Rev'd Afd Rev'd Afi'd Rev'd Aff'd Rev'd Aff'd Rev'd Afl'd Rev'd
COUCH 1 3 4 4
GILBERT 1 4 3 4
Liss 1 2 3 3
LOWE 2 4 2 3
MACDANIEL 3 1 1 4
MASON 4 2
MELVIN 1 1 1 1
MOORE 1 3 3
MORTON 2 1 3 3
MOYLAN 1 I I 1
THOMPSON 3 1 4




TOTAL' 0  13 22 28 44
"Affirmed" and "reversed" are fairly crude labels. A decision may be "affirmed," for
example, even if the reviewing court thought the grounds given by the lower court to support
the decision below were completely wrong. Nevertheless, the terms serve as rough indica-
tors of possible trends or problems.
9. For dissenting opinions, "affirmed" and "reversed" refer to the Court of Appeals'
treatment of the majority decision. Thus, a dissenting opinion noted as "reversed" signifies
that the Court of Appeals may have reached the same result urged by the dissenter.
10. Total of reported and unreported opinions in Table II do not include cases in which







Court (Pct.) 12 Concurrence Dissent 13  Court Concurrence Dissent 13
COLE 17 (11.5) 0 9 141 0 6
COUCH14  6 (4.1) 0 1 21 0 0
DAVIDSON 20 (13.5) 0 11 127 2 7
DIGGES15  12 (8.1) 0 3 111 0 5
ELDRIDGE 23 (15.5) 2 6 128 1 6
MURPHY 16 (10.8) 3 5 124 0 3
RODOWSKY 24 (16.2) 0 1 141 0 3
SMITH 30 (20.3) 0 9 126 0 3
SPECIALLY
ASSIGNED 15  0 (0.0) 0 0 5 0 0
PER CURIAM 1 6  22 - -
TOTAL 17  170 (100.0) 5 45
11. JUDGES PARTICIPATING IN A PER CURIAM DECISION ARE LISTED AS JOINING THE OPINION
OF THE COURT. A CONCURRENCE OR DISSENT BY A JUDGE WHO DOES NOT PUBLISH AN OPINION IS
TREATED NONETHELESS AS A CONCURRENCE OR DISSENT.
12. THE PARENTHETICAL FIGURES IN THIS COLUMN ARE THE PERCENTAGES OF signed opin-
ions of the court authored by each judge.
13. Opinions designated by their author as "Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part" are
treated in this table as dissenting opinions. Similarly, judges joining such opinions are treated as
joining dissenting opinions. Otherwise, the designation of the opinion used by the author has
been adopted.
14. Associate Judge James F. Couch, Jr., was sworn in on March 1, 1982.
15. Associate Judge J. Dudley Digges retired on January 7, 1982, but participated in the deci-
sion and adoption of the opinions in which he participated in the hearing and conference (pursu-
ant to Article IV, Section 3A, of Maryland's Constitution), and was specially assigned to
participate in the decision of twelve cases. These cases are included under "Digges," not "Spe-
cially Assigned."
See Tributes to Judge J. Dudley Digges, 41 MD. L. REV. 384 (1982).
16. "Per Curiam" includes opinions and orders published without a signed opinion. Dismis-
sals of writs of certiorari as improvidently granted, and voluntary dismissals are not included.




FREQUENCY OF SEPARATE OPINIONS 8
The Court Number
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS 120
DECISIONS WITH CONCURRING OPINIONS 5
DECISIONS WITH DISSENTING OPINIONS 44
DECISIONS WITH BOTH CONCURRING




































18. Cases consolidated on appeal, in which the court issued a single opinion disposing of
more than one case, are treated as a single opinions in this and all subsequent tables. The
word "opinions" includes concurrences and dissents without opinions. Per curiam opinions
and orders are included in this table.





































COUCH DAVIDSON DIGGES ELDRIDGE MURPHY RODOWSKY SMITH ASSIGNED
COLE M 92.6 79.6 83.2 83.0 82.8 88.2 83.3 100.0
S 0.0 4.8 0.0 3.6 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.0
R 0.0 1.2 0.0 2.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
D 7.4 13.2 16.8 10.9 15.2 11.8 16.1 0.0
COUCH M 83.3 96.0 96.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
S 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
R 0.0 - 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
D 16.7 - 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
DAVIDSON M 80.8 83.2 78.1 82.6 80.6 0.0
S 1.5 7.8 0.7 0.0 0.6 0.0
R 3.1 0.6 2.6 1.2 1.2 0.0
D 14.6 8.4 18.5 16,2 17.6 0.0
DIGGES M 82.7 86.2 91.5 89.2 0.0
S 0.8 0.9 0.8 4.6 0.0
R 2.4 1.8 0.0 0.8 0.0
D 14.2 11.0 7.7 5.4 0.0
ELDRIDGE M 83.8 89.0 83.4 0.0
S 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
R 3.4 1.8 1.8 0.0
D 12.2 9.2 14.7 0.0
MURPHY M 92.7 86.6 0.0
S 2.0 2.0 0.0
R 1.3 2.0 0.0





20. Key: M - The two judges joined in the majority opinion. One may have au-
thored it.
S - The two judges joined in a separate opinion, either a concurrence or a
dissent. One may have authored it.
R - The two judges joined in the result, but in different opinions.
D - The two judges disagreed in the result.
"M" and "S" replace "J" - two judgesjoining in the same opinion - a symbol found in
earlier tables.
This table includes all cases, both those with signed opinions of the court and per
curiam opinions and orders (except voluntary dismissals and writs of certiorari dismissed as
improvidently granted). Percentages vary not only because of agreement and disagreement
between the judges, but also because of the number of cases each judge heard. For example,
Chief Judge Murphy was not involved in the argument and decision of nineteen cases, while
Associate Judge Rodowsky missed only one case.
STATISTICAL MISCELLANY
TABLE VI (continued)
B. MOST ALIGNED - LEAST ALIGNED 2 1
























VOTING COMBINATIONS IN SWING VOTE OPINIONS
Murphy, Smith, Digges, Rodowsky 5
Digges, Eldridge, Cole, Davidson 3
Murphy, Eldridge, Cole, Rodowsky 2
Murphy, Smith, Cole, Rodowsky I
Eldridge, Cole, Davidson, Rodowsky 1
Murphy, Eldridge, Cole, Davidson 1
Smith, Digges, Cole, Rodowsky 1
21. Figures used in this table are from Table VI.A. The "Most Aligned" table presents
the five most aligned pairs ofjudges; the pairs are arranged in descending order according to
the combined "M," "S," and "R" percentages. Conversely, the "Least Aligned" table
presents the five least aligned pairs.
Judge Couch is not included in this table because of the small number of cases in which
he was involved.
22. A "swing vote" is cast by each judge in the majority in a 4-3 case.
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TABLE VII



































Labor (including unemployment and workmen's
compensation) 7










Admission to Bar 3
T66
23. Not listed in this table are four per curiam opinions that did not divulge the primary
subject matter of the case.
